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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis interrogates the continued statelessness of more than 12 million stateless people 
around the world, in the face of Article 15 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which provides that everyone has a right to a nationality. Its principal argument is that 
the continued unresolved presence of stateless groups around the world exposes international 
law’s inadequate protection of the ‘right to a nationality’. It advocates the adoption of a robust 
approach to protect and enforce this right to nationality of stateless people. 
 
Article 15 of the UDHR has been complemented by a host of international and regional 
instruments relating to the right to nationality. In developing its argument, the thesis reviews the 
relevant instruments, as well as local and international judicial decisions relating to the right. The 
review is juxtaposed with local legislation and state practices on the issue of citizenship, for the 
purpose of determining the status of the right, and whether the right forms part of customary 
international law.  
 
This thesis also examines the emergence of nationality as a human right under international law 
and the interplay between states sovereignty and the right to nationality, for the purpose of 
showing the lacuna in international law that allows continued statelessness. It examines the 
relationship between the possession of nationality and the enjoyment of other human rights vis-à-
vis the sufferings that arise from statelessness, as well as the extent to which denationalization is 
a step toward genocide, for the purpose of showing that protection of the right qualifies as erga 
omnes obligation. It also argues that suffering of stateless people must be taken seriously, as a 
step toward taking the right to nationality of stateless people seriously.  
 
While the thesis does not necessarily provide the final solution to all the problems arising out of 
statelessness, it is anticipated that it will make a worthy contribution to addressing the legal 
questions on statelessness and, more importantly, provide a sound basis for further discussions 
on the status, importance and the need to protect and enforce the right to nationality of stateless 
people. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
STATELESS PEOPLE: TAKING THEIR SUFFERING SERIOUSLY 
 
This thesis interrogates the continued statelessness of groups like the Rohingyas and the Bidoons 
in the face of international law’s recognition of ‘right to nationality’. It argues that the continued 
unresolved presence of stateless groups around the world exposes international human rights 
law’s inadequate protection of the right to a nationality. It advocates the adoption of a robust 
approach to protecting and enforcing the right to nationality of stateless people. 
 
Article 15 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
1
 provides that everyone 
has a right to a nationality. This provision has been complemented by a host of international and 
regional instruments bordering on right to nationality or reduction of statelessness.
2
 However, in 
spite of the provision, the Burmese Rohingyas, Kuwaiti Bidoons and the ‘Non-Citizens’ of 
Latvia, amongst others, do not have any nationality; they are stateless. They are part of an 
estimated 12 million stateless people around the world; in Asia, Middle East, Africa, and 
Europe.
3
 These stateless people are living in limbo, suffering untold hardships, severely and 
harshly discriminated against wherever they are. They have little or no access to basic education, 
healthcare and other social services. They usually do not participate in the political affairs of 
their place of residence. Although most stateless people are found in ‘refugee’ camps around the 
world, they are in a dilemma. Unlike other refugees who have a right to return to their ‘own’ 
country, these stateless people usually have no place to call ‘home’. As Seckler-Hudson aptly 
puts it, they are forever prohibited from saying “this is my own, my native land”.4 
                                                 
1 UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, G.A 217 A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 
2
 The international and regional instruments are discussed in chapter two. 
3
 UNHCR, “Media Backgrounder: Millions Are Stateless, Living in Legal Limbo” online: 
UNHCR < http://www.unhcr.org/4e54ec469.html>; see also, Equal Rights Trust, Unravelling 
Anomaly Detention, Discrimination and the Protection Needs of Stateless Persons (London-UK: 
Equal Rights Trust, 2010), 3.  
4
 Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, Statelessness: With Special Reference to the United States (New 
York: American University Graduate School, 1934) at 12 [Seckler-Hudson]. 
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1.0 OVERVIEW OF THE WORK 
 
The thesis reviews various international and regional instruments dealing with nationality and 
statelessness, as well as municipal and international judicial decisions relating to the right to 
nationality. The review of the international and regional instruments is juxtaposed with local 
legislations and state practices of various countries on the issue of citizenship, for the purpose of 
determining the status of the right to nationality, and whether the right is part of customary 
international law; and also whether the protection of the right qualifies as an obligatio erga 
omnes.  
 
This thesis adopts a critical approach to examining the right to nationality. The approach 
combines the views espoused in Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously,5 Uprenda Baxi’s 
Taking Suffering Seriously,
6
 and William Felice’s The Case for Collective Human Rights.7 The 
thesis acknowledges the existence of divergent views on the concept of “human right” and the 
fact that the question of “what is exactly meant by human rights remains controversial and 
ambiguous.”8 Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on the meaning of human right, the thesis’ 
approach proceeds from the proposition that when one says that a person has a right to 
something: it means that person is entitled to that thing, and if a person is entitled to something, 
it means he is entitled to demand for it and it will be wrong or unlawful to deprive him/her of it.
9
 
                                                 
5
 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 
[Dworkin]. 
6
 Baxi, Upendra, “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India”  (1985) 4 Third World Legal Studies, 107 [Baxi]. 
7
 William F. Felice, "The Case for Collective Human Rights: The Reality of Group Suffering" 
(1996) 10 Ethics and International Affairs 47 [Felice]. 
8
 Julie Harrelson-Stephens & Rhonda L. Callaway, “What are Human Rights? Definitions and 
Typologies of Today’s Human Rights Discourse”, in Rhonda L. Callaway & Julie Harrelson-
Stephens, eds., Exploring International Human Rights; Essential Readings (Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner, 2007), 4 [Harrelson-Stephens & Callaway].  
9
 For  a general discussion on the divergent views of (human) rights: see Michael Haas, 
International Human Rights: A Comprehensive Introduction (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 3 [“the 
power or privilege to which once is justly entitled’ and then concludes that human rights ‘involve 
the ability to demand and enjoy a minimally restrictive yet optimal quality of life with liberty, 
equal justice before the law, and an opportunity to fulfil basic cultural, economic and social 
needs”]; Peter Bailey, Bringing Human Rights to Life (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1993), viii 
[“statements of standards of behavior we should be able to expect between individuals and 
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In other words, a right is an entitlement to demand for something that is right – in the sense of 
what is important or necessary for the proper quality of life – for every human being. 
 
Dworkin in his Taking Rights Seriously argues that “if rights make sense at all, then the invasion 
of a relatively important right must be a very serious matter. It means treating a man as less than 
a man, or less worthy of concern than other men”.10 Using Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously, 
this thesis argues that the statelessness of stateless people means that each of them is being 
treated “less than a man, or less worthy of concern than other men”, and their right to nationality 
is a “relatively important right” – the “invasion” of which should be “a very serious matter”. 
 
Inspired by Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously, Baxi used the idea of Taking Suffering Seriously 
to advocate the “active assertion of judicial power to ameliorate the miseries of the masses.”11 He 
also advocates the interpretation of statutory provisions with a strong bias in favour of human 
rights.
12
 His main contention is that taking rights seriously requires taking suffering seriously. 
Using Baxi’s Taking Suffering Seriously, this thesis examines the suffering that arise from 
statelessness to make a case for the necessity of taking the right to nationality of stateless people 
seriously.  
 
Felice also used the concept of Taking Suffering Seriously to advocate the protection of 
collective rights. According to him, “[t]o take suffering seriously we must address both 
individual and group oppression.”13 He contends that “[g]roup and individual rights are 
                                                                                                                                                             
groups. Because they are human and not citizens’ rights, they apply to everyone everywhere”]. 
See also Thomas Fleiner, What Are Human Rights?  (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1999), 8; 
Jerome J. Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights 
Quarterly 201, at 203 [Shestack] Gerbard von Glabn and James Larry Taulbee, Law Among 
Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law, 8th ed (New York: Pearson Education, 
2007),  4; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 1 – 25; Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1 – 30; Rebecca M.M. Wallace, International Law, 5th ed, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), 1 – 2; Mark Freeman & Gibran Van Ert, International 
Human Rights Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004), 3 – 5. 
10
 Dworkin, supra, note 5, at 199. 
11
 Baxi, supra, note 6, at 111. 
12
 Ibid, at 116 – 119. 
13
 Felice, supra, note 7, at 47.  
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interdependent in that certain individual rights cannot be exercised outside the group context. In 
many instances, individual rights can be fully realised only through the understanding and 
protection of group rights.”14 For example, trade union rights must be protected to give the 
individual the freedom to join a union, and minority culture must be protected if, its individual 
members are to enjoy it.
15
 The crux of Felice’s argument seems to be that although some 
individual members of a group (for example the African-Americans) will be able to enjoy some 
basic rights, it does not detract from the general group suffering. He thus contends that there is a 
need to protect the whole group, so that more individuals will be protected.
16
 Using Felice’s 
conception of Taking Suffering Seriously, this thesis will focus on the statelessness of the 
Burmese Rohingyas and Kuwaiti Bidoons as group, as opposed to individuals’ statelessness. 
This is because, as will be shown below, most cases of statelessness arise from the exclusion of 
the targeted groups from being part of the relevant state.   
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. This first chapter deals with introductory matters and the 
factual background of the thesis. Chapter two focuses on the emergence of right to a nationality 
under international law. It contextualizes the term ‘nationality’ and the relationship between 
nationality and ‘citizenship’. It also examines statelessness and some of its causes.  Chapter three 
examines the interplay between states’ sovereignty and the right to nationality. It also examines 
the effects of the clash between the right to nationality and state sovereignty, and whether the 
right to nationality forms part of customary international law. It examines the lacuna in 
international law that allows continued statelessness. Chapter four examines the qualification of 
the protection of right to nationality as an obligatio erga omnes from two perspectives: (a) the 
right to nationality as a ‘basic right’, that is, the relationship between the possession of 
nationality and the enjoyment of other human rights, and (b) the relationship between 
denationalization/statelessness and the erga omnes duty to prevent genocide. Chapter five 
proffers recommendations and concludes. 
 
                                                 
14
 Ibid, at 50. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid, at 50 – 51. See also William F. Felice, Taking Suffering Seriously: The Importance of 
Collective Human Rights, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
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2.0 FACTUAL BACKGROUND  
 
As will be shown later in this thesis, there have been numerous cases of statelessness over time 
and in diverse situations. However, this thesis will focus on the predominant type of 
statelessness, i.e., that which arises by virtue of state legislations. Consequently, this thesis will 
use the factual situation of three stateless groups, namely, the Burmese Rohingyas, Kuwaiti 
Bidoons and ‘Non-Citizens’ of Latvia, to interrogate continued statelessness vis-à-vis the right to 
nationality. Of the three groups, the Rohingyas will be the main focus, while the Kuwaiti 
Bidoons and the ‘Non-Citizens’ of Latvia are examined for comparative analysis. The focus is on 
these three groups because their factual situation is representative of the situations of other 
groups rendered stateless by state legislations. The relevant factual situation includes: the socio-
political situation of their respective countries, whether their respective countries have adopted 
or ratified relevant international human rights instruments, factors that gave rise to their 
statelessness and the attitude of neighbouring countries to these three stateless groups, that is, 
whether they are able to freely move from one neighbouring country to another. 
 
2.1 The Rohingyas 
 
The Rohingyas
17
 are a Muslim minority group residing in Arakan State in the western coast of 
Burma.
18
 There are about 800,000 Rohingyas in Arakan, constituting 25% of the state 
                                                 
17
 The origin of term ‘Rohingya’ is disputed. The main grouse against the term is that it was 
allegedly invented in the 1950s and does not represent all the Muslim groups in Arakan. See for 
example, Irish Centre for Human Rights, “Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The 
Situation of the Rohingyas” (Galway: National University of Ireland, 2010), 22 – 23 [ICHR 
Report]; Aye Chan, “The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rakhine) State of 
Burma (Myanmar)” (2005) 3 SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research 396 at 397 available online at 
<http://www.soas.ac.uk/sbbr/editions/file64388.pdf> [Aye Chan]. However, one available report 
suggests the term was used as far back as 1799, see Human Rights Watch ‘“The Government 
Could Have Stopped This” Sectarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State’ 
August 2012 Report, 12 online: HRW 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover_0.pdf> [HRW 2012]. 
However, the ICHR Report  (p. 23) observes that the Muslims resident in North Arakan prefer to 
be designated “Rohingya” as opposed to “Burmese Muslim” and they have developed a culture 
and language which is absolutely unique to the region. Like the ICHR Report, this thesis takes 
the position that ‘the term “Rohingya” is a legitimate identifier for this group. 
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population, but a large number of Rohingyas presently live outside Burma, including over 
200,000 in Bangladesh. The origin of the Burmese Rohingyas, as well as how long they have 
been residing in North Arakan, is disputed. On one hand, there is a claim that they are 
descendants of the first Muslim inhabitants of Arakan, who arrived at the erstwhile Arakan 
Kingdom in or around the 9th century.
19
 On the other hand is the claim that they are descendants 
of Bengali immigrants from the Chittagong District in modern Bangladesh who had migrated to 
present-day Burma as agricultural workers for the (colonial) British East Indian Company in the 
1830s.
20
 However, there is no dispute that, at the time of independence from Britain in 1948, 
Burma had a sizeable Rohingya population, who had been in Burma for at least a century, and 
have always either regarded themselves as Burmese, or had nowhere to go because they lost 
contact with their alleged native place. It is noteworthy that some reports state that the Rohingyas 
took active part in Burma’s quest for independence in 1948 and formed part of the early national 
government, established under the independence Constitution.
21
  
                                                                                                                                                             
18
 In 1989, the then Military Government of Burma changed its name to “Union of Myanmar” 
after the series of pro-democracy protests of 1988. The United Nations and most of the world has 
recognized the change of name, but the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as some pro-
democracy and minority groups in the country, do not accept the legitimacy of the Military 
Government’s change of name. The thesis will use the name ‘Burma’ in solidarity with the 
Rohingyas and other minority groups.   
19
 See generally, ICHR  Report, supra, note 17, at 22; Amnesty International, Myanmar The 
Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied (May 2004) p.2, online: Amnesty International 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/005/2004/en/9e8bb8db-d5d5-11dd-bb24-
1fb85fe8fa05/asa160052004en.pdf> [Amnesty, 2004]; Habib Siddiqui: “Rohingya: The forgotten 
people” (2007), online: ARNO <http://www.rohingya.org/portal/index.php/scholars/44-dr-habib-
siddiqui/143-rohingya-the-forgotten-people.html>; Physicians for Human Rights, “Stateless and 
Starving: Persecuted Rohingya flee Burma and starve in Bangladesh” (Emergency Report, 
2010), online: PHR <https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/stateless-and-starving.pdf>.  
20
 See for example, the address of the then Head of State, General Ne Win’s (delivered at the 
Meeting held in the Central Meeting Hall, President House, Ahlone Road, 8 October 1982)  
translated by The Working People’s Daily, 9 October 1982, online: Burma Library, 
<http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/Ne_Win%27s_speech_Oct-1982-Citizenship_Law.pdf>. 
See also Aye Chan, supra, 399 – 402. 
21
 See for example, Eileen Pittaway, “The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Failure of 
International Protection Regime” in Howard Adelman, ed., Protacted Displacement in Asia, No 
Place to call Home (Hamshire  England: Ashgate, 2008) at 83 – 106; Chris Lewa, “The 
Rohingya: Forced Migration and Statelessness” in Omprakash Mishra, ed., Forced Migration in 
South Asian Region, (Washington D.C: Centre for Refugee studies Jadavpur University, Calcutta 
and Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, 2004) 325; Chizom Ekeh, Minorities 
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The independence Constitution of Burma
22
 defined Burmese citizenship to include: (a) “every 
person, both of whose parents belong or belonged to any of the indigenous races of Burma”;23 or 
(b) “every person who was born and who has resided in any of the territories included within the 
Union for a period of not less than eight years in the ten years immediately preceding the date of 
the commencement of the Constitution or immediately preceding the 1
st
 day of January 1942 and 
who intends to reside permanently there in and who signifies his election of citizenship of the 
Union in the manner and within the time prescribed by law.”24 This citizenship definition was 
complemented by the Union Citizens Act
25
 which provides that “for the purposes of section 11 
of the Constitution the expression ‘any of the indigenous races of Burma’ shall mean the 
Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan race and such racial group as 
has settled in any of the territories included within the Union as their permanent home from a 
period anterior to 1823 A. D. (1185 B.E.).”26 The Act also provides that “any person descended 
from ancestors who for two generations at least have all made any of the territories included 
within the Union their permanent home and whose parents and himself were born in any of such 
territories shall be deemed to be a citizen of the Union.”27 Although there was apparently no 
explicit reference to the Rohingyas in the 1948 Citizens Act, the Rohingyas were nonetheless 
regarded as or deemed to be Burmese citizens (probably as being part of “Arakanese”) at the 
time of the country’s independence – hence they took part in the quest for independence and 
early national government.
28
  
 
There also are reports which suggest that the Rohingyas themselves have had histories of ethnic 
clashes with other ethnic groups in Arakan prior to Burma’s independence and they were 
accused of disloyalty to the Burmese cause during and after the Second World War (WWII). 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Burma (Minority Rights Group International, October 2007) online: Minority Rights Group 
International <http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=3546>. 
22
 The Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947. 
23
 Ibid, section 11(i). 
24
 Ibid, section 11(iv). 
25
 Act No. LXVI of 1948 available online: Burma Library 
<http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/UNION_CITIZENSHIP_ACT-1948.htm>. 
26
 Ibid, section 3(1). 
27
 Ibid, Article 4(2) (emphasis supplied). 
28
 See note 21 and accompanying text above. 
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According to a report of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, “[t]hroughout the Japanese 
occupation of Burma during World War II, the Rohingyas remained loyal to the British, who 
promised to reward them with their own independent Muslim State, and they were thus seen as 
standing in the way of the Burmese independence movement, led by General Aung San, who had 
struck an independence deal with the Japanese.”29 After the war, the Rohingyas reportedly 
lobbied the British colonial ruler for Arakan to be part of Muslim Pakistan shortly before 
independence. According to Smith, “this move more than any other…determined the present-day 
governmental attitude towards the Rohingyas: they had threatened Burma’s territorial integrity 
on the eve of independence and could never be trusted again.”30 The move also “forms the basis 
of the frequent claims that the Rohingyas are simply foreigners or ‘Kala’ intending on seceding 
from the Union of Burma”.31 Although the foregoing affected the general attitude of other ethnic 
groups to the Rohingyas, their citizenship travails can be traced directly to a series of 
discriminatory policies of the General Ne Win-led military government which seized power via a 
coup d’état on 2 March 1962.32  
 
First, the independence constitution of 1947 was suspended and later replaced by the 1974 
Constitution,
33
 which contains no provision on Burmese citizenship.
34
 This was followed, in 
1977, by an Operation Nagamin (“King Dragon”), whose declared aim was to “scrutinize each 
individual living in the State, designating citizens and foreigners in accordance with the law and 
taking actions against foreigners who have filtered into the country illegally.”35 According to a 
report, Operation Nagamin became a “vehicle for the commission of extreme violence against 
the Rohingyas”, and this led to a mass exodus of the Rohingyas, involving some 200,000 people 
                                                 
29
 ICHR Report, supra, note 17, at 24. 
30
 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2d ed, (London. Zed Books, 
1999) 41, cited in ICHR Report, supra, note 17, at 25. 
31
 ICHR Report, supra, note 17, at 25. 
32
 See generally, Vincent Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast 
Asia (Cambridge-UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 37-51; David I. Steinberg, Burma: The 
State of Myanmar (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 1 – 27. 
33
 The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1974, online: Thailand Law 
Forum <http://www.thailawforum.com/database1/constmyanmar.html>.  
34
 See Robert H. Taylor, “Burma's National Unity Problem and the 1974 Constitution” (1979) 
1:3 Contemporary Southeast Asia 232. 
35
 ICHR Report, supra, note 17, at 25. 
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who fled across the Burma-Bangladesh border between 1978 and 1979.
36
  About 10,000 
Rohingyas also reportedly died from starvation and disease arising from deplorable conditions in 
refugee camps and as a result of the Bangladeshi authorities forcefully deporting most of the 
fleeing Rohingyas to Burma.
37
 Operation Nagamin was followed in 1982 by the promulgation of 
the ‘Burma Citizenship Law’ of 1982 (“1982 Law”)38 which repealed the 1948 Citizens Act. 
Section 3 of the 1892 Law provides that “Nationals such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, 
Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan and ethnic groups as have settled in any of the territories 
included within the State as their permanent home from a period anterior to 1185 B.E., 1823 
A.D. are Burma citizens”.   
 
Although the provisions of section 3 of the 1982 Law is similar to that of section 3 of the 1948 
Act, in that, both provisions do not explicitly include or exclude the Rohingya people as part of 
the ethnic groups in the country that are Burmese citizenships, the 1982 Law significantly 
adversely affected the Rohingyas in two ways: (a) it replaced the group “Arakanese” (which has 
a wider connotation and could accommodate other minorities in Arakan State) with the term 
“Rakhine”, which has been said to be “inextricably associated” with a Buddhist identity of the 
majority Buddhist population of Arakan state,
39
 and (b) the 1982 Law also does not contain any 
equivalent of section 4(2) of the repealed 1948 Citizens Act. Rather Section 4 of the 1982 Law 
provides that the “Council of State may decide whether any ethnic group is national or not”.  
 
Successive Burmese regimes do not recognize the Rohingyas as an ethnic group indigenous to 
Arakan or as part of the “ethnic groups as have settled in any of the territories included within 
the State” under sections 3 and 4 of the 1982 Law. On the contrary, the official policy of the 
government is that the Rohingyas are ‘illegal immigrants’ who emigrated from Chittagong (in 
                                                 
36
 Ibid. 
37
Ibid, see also Human Rights Watch, “Perilous Plight: Burma’s Rohingya take to the Seas” 
(May 2009), 6 [HRW 2009]; Amnesty 2004, supra, note 19, at 5.  
38
 Burma Citizenship Law 1982, available online: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f71b.html [accessed 15 May 2013]. 
39See Michael W. Charney, “Buddhism in Arakan: Theories and Historiography of the Religious 
Basis of Ethnonyms”, Paper presented at the Forgotten Kingdom of Arakan Workshop, 23 – 24 
November 2005, Bangkok, 1, online: Kaladan Press Network 
<http://www.kaladanpress.org/scholar-column-mainmenu-36/58-arakan-historical-seminar/718-
buddhism-in-arakantheories-and-historiography-of-the-religious-basis-of-ethnonyms>. 
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present Bangladesh) during the British colonial rule. Hence the Rohingyas are consistently 
referred to as “Bengali Muslims” or “Chittagonians” by the government and other ethnic groups 
in Burma, in order to emphasize their alleged Bengali origin.
40
 However, in spite of not being 
regarded as Burmese citizens, the Rohingyas were allowed to participate in the 1990 ‘democratic 
election’ by the General Than Shwe-led military State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC).
41
 The election was won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy 
Party (NLD) but SLORC refused to hand over power. The refusal sparked country-wide 
protests.
42
 A human rights agency report has observed that following the nation-wide protest, 
“SLORC needed a diversion: they chose the Rohingyas”.43 Consequently, North Arakan State 
was heavily militarized with the establishment of the notorious Nay-Sat Kut-kwey Ye (NaSaKa), 
a border security force consisting of members of the police, Military Intelligence, riot police, 
customs officials, and the Immigration and Manpower Department.
44
 The “intensification of 
oppressive tactics against the Rohingyas” by NaSaKa resulted in “a second mass exodus across 
the Burma-Bangladesh border.”45 Between May 1991 and March 1992 about 270,000 Rohingyas 
sought refuge in the Cox’s Bazar region of Bangladesh. There were reported cases of summary 
executions, torture, forced labor, and rape of the Rohingyas by the NaSaKa.
46
 
 
In addition to NaSaKa’s activities, the Rohingyas also continue to suffer from unending sectarian 
violence between them and the majority Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan State. In June 2012, for 
example, deadly sectarian violence erupted in Arakan between the Rakhine Buddhists and 
Rohingya Muslims (as well as non-Rohingya Muslims). The violence broke out after reports 
                                                 
40
 See for example, Aye Chan, supra, note 17, at 397, HRW 2012, supra, note 17, at 5 – 6; U 
Khin Maung Saw, The Rohingyas who are they? The Origin of the name “Rohingya”, in Uta 
Gartner & Jens Lorenz, eds., Tradition and Modernity in Myanmar: Proceedings of an 
International Conference Held in Berlin from May 7th to May 9th, 1993 (Muster, Hamburg: 
National Library, Germany, 1994) 89. Contra, Nurul Islam, Rebuttal to Khin Maung Saw’s 
Misinformation on Rohingya, online: ARNO 
<http://www.rohingya.org/portal/index.php/scholars/65-nurul-islam-uk/292-rebuttal-to-u-khin-
maung-saws-misinformation-on-rohingya.html>. 
41
 ICHR Report, supra, note 17, at 26. 
42
 Ibid.  
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid  
45
 Ibid; see also, Amnesty 2004, supra, note 19, at 5. 
46
 Amnesty 2004, supra, note 19, at 5 – 6. 
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circulated that an Arakan woman was allegedly raped and killed by three Muslim men on 28 
May 2012. By way of reprisal, a large group of Rakhine Buddhists stopped a bus and brutally 
killed 10 Muslims on board on 3 June 2012. Human Rights Watch confirmed that local police 
and soldiers stood by and watched the killings without intervening.
47
 The notorious NaSaKa also 
took part in sectarian violence against the Rohingyas.
48
 The 2012 sectarian violence resulted in 
several deaths, more than 5000 homes were completely burned down, and about 100,000 
Rohinyas were displaced, leading to another Rohingya exodus.
49
  
 
Unfortunately, in most cases when the Rohingyas are forced to flee from Burma as a result of 
violence inflicted on them, they usually do so by poorly constructed and hastily built wooden 
rafts or small boats which frequently capsize and cause several deaths at sea.
50
 Even when some 
of the rafts are lucky enough to make it to the shores of neighbouring countries (usually Thailand 
or Bangladesh), which are themselves seemingly overwhelmed by the continued high influx of 
Rohingya refugees, the fleeing Rohingyas are often subjected to various forms of inhuman and 
degrading treatments. An example of such inhuman and degrading treatment is the much 
publicized ‘boat people’ incident of January 2009 when the Thai Army/Navy arrested all the 
fleeing Rohingyas onboard such boats, beat them up and towed the boats back into the sea; 
ostensibly for the boat occupants to die in the sea.
51
  
                                                 
47
 See HRW 2012, supra, note 17, at 1. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid, 1 – 5; see also International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon” 
Asia Report No. 238, 12 November 2012, 1 – 3, online: Crisis Group 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/238-myanmar-
storm-clouds-on-the-horizon.pdf> [ICR 2012]. 
50
 A recent UN report indicates that a boat carrying about 200 fleeing Rohingyas from Burma 
capsized on Monday, 13 May 2013 with virtually all the people on board. See for example, ABC 
News “Boats Carrying Fleeing Rohingya Minority Capsize”, 14 May 2013, online: ABC News 
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/boats-carrying-fleeing-rohingya-muslims-
capsize-19177184#.UZPSkMoV_3k>; Jethro Mullen & Brian Walker, “Boats Carring Scores of 
Rohingya Capsize in Myanmar, UN Says ” CNN News 14 May 2013, online: CNN 
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/14/world/asia/myanmar-boats-capsize>.    
51
 See for example: ICHR Report, supra, note 17, at 15; HRW 2009, supra, note 37, at  2 – 4: 
UNHCR, “UNHCR concern at reports of shooting involving Rohingya boat people” Briefing 
Notes, 15 March 2013, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/5143076c9.html>; Human 
Rights Watch, “Thailand: Investigate Departure of Rohingya ‘Boat People’” (News February 21, 
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Although recent developments in Burma tend to suggest that there is a general improvement in 
the human rights situation in the country, there is presently no improvement in the Rohingyas’ 
situation.
52
 First, they are still not regarded as Burmese citizens by the present government.
53
 
Second, they are still victims of mass executions, arrests, forced labor, and rape, such that a 2013 
Human Rights Watch report concludes that “the criminal acts committed against the Rohingya 
and Kaman Muslim communities in Arakan State beginning in June 2012 amount to crimes 
against humanity carried out as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing”.54 The report also 
accused the Burmese government of complicity in the “systematic ethnic cleansing” of the 
Rohingyas.
55
 Another report states that a “slow-burning genocide” is being carried out against 
them.
56
 Third, there are also several reports of repeated racial abuse against the Rohingyas. For 
example, a Human Rights Watch Report notes that the treatments meted to the Rohingyas “are at 
times married to outright racism”.57 The report also observes that “South Asians are derogatorily 
referred to as kala (foreigner) in Burma, but the Rohingya often are viewed as beneath even this 
level of disdain”.58 There is also a February 2009 letter from the Burmese Consul-General in 
Hong Kong, Ye Myint Aung, to his fellow heads of mission where he said: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
2011) online: HRW <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/21/thailand-investigate-departure-
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52
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2013]. 
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In reality, Rohingya are neither ‘Myanmar People’ nor Myanmar’s ethnic group. You 
will see in the photos that their complexion is ‘dark brown’. The complexion of Myanmar 
people is fair and soft, good looking as well… They are as ugly as ogres.59 
. 
Thus, on the whole, the Rohingyas have been rightly described by the British Broadcasting 
Service (BBC) as “the world’s least wanted and most persecuted people”60 and as reportedly 
admitted recently (2013) by Burma's information minister, U Ang Kyi, “the statelessness of its 
Rohingya Muslim minority is a key cause of its suffering in the country”.61 
  
2.1.1 The Rohingyas’ Dilemma 
 
The greatest dilemma of the Rohingyas seems to be their rejection on all sides. On one hand, the 
Burmese government denied them citizenship because they are allegedly Bengalis from 
Bangladesh and therefore have no place in Burma, and on the other hand, the Bangladeshi 
authorities do not also accept them as citizens – the Bangladeshi authorities regard Rohingya 
refugees as Burmese and have repatriated thousands of Rohingyas to Burma. This dilemma is 
well captured in the testimony of Hossain, who was repatriated to Burma in 2005, but he 
returned to Bangladesh after finding out that his land was “occupied” by the Rakhine Buddhists. 
According to him: 
 
The Burmese government says we're Bangladeshi, but the Arakan is the only home we 
know. My father was born in Arakan and so was my grandfather. The Bangladesh 
                                                 
59
 Letter from Ye Myint Aung, Consul General of Myanmar in Hong Kong, to heads of Mission, 
Consul Corps, Hong Kong and Macau SAR, February 9, 2009, cited in HRW 2009, supra, note 
37, at 7. 
60
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February 2010), online: BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8521280.stm> See also  Akbar Ahmed 
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2011), online: Guardian 
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online: Telegraph 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/9648329/Burma-considers-
citizenship-for-Rohingya-Muslims.html>. 
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government says we're illegal migrants. But we didn't enter Bangladesh secretly to work. 
We came to save ourselves and our families.
62
  
 
The second dilemma relates to a general apathy on the part of the international community to 
intervene in the nationality travails of the stateless Rohingyas, despite being aware of their plight 
since 1992, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a Resolution which 
states that it was “deeply concerned at the continuing problem of large numbers of refugees from 
Myanmar in neighboring countries, including the almost 265,000 Myanmar Rohingya refugees 
in Bangladesh”,63 and was also “gravely concerned” about the “oppressive measures directed in 
particular against ethnic and religious minorities” by the Burmese (military) government.64 These 
‘concerns’ influenced the imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions on the Burmese 
government by the international community. However, following the recent emergence of Nobel 
Laureate and pro-democracy icon, Aung San Suu Kyi, as a member of parliament, the United 
States, European Union, and Canada have all lifted or suspended the decades-long sanctions 
imposed on the country, despite concerns expressed by various human rights organizations that 
the nationality travails of the Rohingyas have remained unresolved.
65
 In lifting the sanctions, 
without first addressing the nationality travails of the Rohingyas, the international community 
seems to have given Burma a clean bill of health despite its non-readiness to reverse or address 
the denationalization of the Rohingyas. Thus, Burma’s celebrated return to democratic rule may 
not resolve the Rohingyas’ nationality travails. 66 
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2.2. Kuwaiti Bidoons 
 
The term “Bidoon”67 is from the Arabic phrase bidoon jinsiyya, which literally means “without 
nationality” or “without citizenship”. It is different from “Bedouin”, which is from the Arabic 
word badawi, (nomad) or badu (nomads). The term (bidoon jinsiyya) was originally an official 
designation for anyone whose qualification for Kuwaiti citizenship was in doubt, but it has now 
been officially replaced with such terms like “Non-Kuwaiti” or “Undetermined nationality”.68  
 
The origin of the Bidoons is also disputed. Some literature contend that the Bidoons are a 
heterogeneous group consisting of a substantial number of people (the majority of) who were 
born and had lived all their lives in Kuwait.
69
 Others contend that the Bidoons are descendants of 
indigenous Bedouin tribes (nomads) who lived in the Northern parts of Arabia for centuries and 
had moved freely across present day borders of Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
70
 
At the other extreme is the Kuwaiti government’s contention that the Bidoons are foreigners who 
have concealed their real nationality in order to claim Kuwaiti citizenship.
71
 These three 
                                                 
67
 In Kuwaiti usage, bidoon is used as a singular or plural noun, but many English language texts 
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<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kuwait0611WebInside.pdf> [HRW 2011]. 
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Human Rights Watch, “Response of Kuwaiti Government to Human Rights Watch” (2011), 2, 
online: HRW 
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positions seem to have been reflected in a 2011 Human Rights Watch report which states that 
today’s Bidoon population originates from three different categories: (a) those who claim 
citizenship under Kuwait’s Nationality Law, but whose ancestors failed to apply or lacked 
necessary documentation at the time of Kuwait’s independence. These are the descendants of 
nomadic clans that regularly traversed the borders of modern day Gulf states but settled 
permanently in Kuwait prior to independence. (b) Former citizens of other Arab states (such as 
Iraq, Syria, and Jordan), and their descendents, who came to Kuwait in the 1960s and 70s to 
work in Kuwait’s army and police force. The Kuwaiti government preferred to register them as 
Bidoons rather than to reveal this politically sensitive recruitment policy. Some of these migrants 
reportedly settled in Kuwait with their families and never left. (c) Individuals born to Kuwaiti 
mothers and Bidoon fathers.
72
 For the purpose of this thesis, the Bidoons refer to those that fall 
under the first category identified by the 2011 Human Rights Report, namely, the descendants of 
the nomadic Bedouin tribes. 
 
Kuwaiti citizenship is regulated by the 1959 Nationality Law of Kuwait,
73
 which defines Kuwaiti 
nationals as persons who were settled in Kuwaiti prior to 1920 and maintain normal residence 
there until the date of publication (1959).
74
 This law requires proof of residence in Kuwait in 
order to be considered a Kuwaiti national.
75
 Some authors have identified the nomadic lifestyle 
of the Bedouin ancestors, illiteracy, and lack of effective means of communication as some of 
the factors that made the Bidoons unable to comply with the residency requirement.
76
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Expression” (2000) Volume 12, Number 2(E), Ch. 4 (Discrimination Based on Origin and 
Status: The Bidun), online: UNHCR <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/kuwait/> [HRW 2000]. 
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Some reports suggest that despite not having fully complied with the requirement of citizenship 
under the Law, the Bidoons were generally regarded as lawful residents of Kuwait until the 
1980s. According to Shiblak, for example, the Kuwaiti government not only “tolerated the 
presence of the Bidoon” it also “offered them financial incentive to settle and work in Kuwait 
due to the need for greater manpower following the discovery of oil.”77 Unlike foreign residents 
and guest workers, they were also exempted from visa restrictions.
78
 They also enjoyed full civil, 
social and economic rights, with access to government services like housing, medical care, 
education, work, etc. At a stage, the Bidoons reportedly accounted for over 90% of the Kuwaiti 
army and police, although they were mainly low ranking officers.
79
 
 
The Bidoons’ nationality travails commenced in the mid 1980s, following the Iran-Iraq war of 
1980-1988 which reportedly created a “climate of fear and suspicion towards irregular residents, 
whether Bidoon or foreign workers.”80 According to a Kuwaiti Scholar, “when Khomeini’s 
revolution swept across Iran and war broke out between Iran and Iraq, much of Kuwaitis’ 
concern for the country’s internal security found its concrete expression in the existence of the 
bidoons: their ambiguous status… provided a human pool into which Iraqi refugees, draft 
dodgers, and infiltrators… could easily blend after getting rid of their identity papers.”81 Thus, 
the Bidoons, who are mainly Shiites, were seen by the Kuwaiti government as Iranians and 
sometimes Iraqi supporters. By 1986, the Kuwaiti government began to apply the Alien 
Residence Act to the Bidoons, effectively stripping them of most of the rights they had enjoyed 
since independence and re-classifying them as “illegal residents”.82 This move was allegedly part 
of a ‘policy’ pursued by the then Minister of Interior, Shaikh Salem al-Sabah, and the ultimate 
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aim of the policy was “to drive [B]idoon out of the country”.83 The Bidoons were also suspected 
of involvement in the attempted assassination of the Emir in 1986.
84
  
 
Things got worse for the Bidoons after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the attendant first Gulf 
War. According to reports, there were an estimated 250,000 Bidoons in Kuwait prior to the 1990 
Iraqi invasion; the figure dropped to about 100,000 after the invasion.
85
 The drastic decline was 
due to the fact that they were accused of supporting the Iraqi during the Iraqi invasion.
86
 During 
the Iraqi invasion, the Iraqi occupation authorities reportedly “ordered” the Bidoons to join the 
Popular Army (a pro-Iraq militia) and those who did not join risked imprisonment and possible 
execution. Consequently, some of them joined the militia, but others did not.
87
 A large number of 
Bidoons actually served in the Kuwaiti military during the Iraqi invasion, and it has been 
estimated that as many as one third of the people who were killed by the Iraqi army were 
Bidoons.
88
 Notwithstanding the fact that many Bidoons fought on the side of the Kuwaiti 
government, many Kuwaitis still viewed the Bidoons as Iraqi accomplices and this led to reprisal 
attacks against them. The attacks resulted in hundreds of deaths and disappearances after 
liberation of Kuwait by the Allied Forces in late February 1991.
89
 Those who fled to Iraq during 
the invasion were also not allowed to return, and those who stayed were threatened with jail or 
deportation unless they proved their identity.
 90
 Further to these reprisals, the term “Bidoon” was 
replaced, first with “non-Kuwait” and then with the official label “illegal residents” in official 
documents. With the new designation (“illegal residents”), the Bidoons no longer had right of 
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employment and any firm that employed them faced a government-imposed fine.
91
 Their present 
travail is summed up in the Parliamentary Committee 2005 report which states that: 
 
The Kuwaiti government exerts security, economic and social pressures on more than 
120,000 Bidoons to force them to either reveal their nationalities or sign affidavit 
admitting to foreign nationality for modification of their legality status and for depriving 
Bidoons of the freedom of movement and freedom to travel except on rare occasions. 
Bidoons are not employed by the public sector and their employment in the private sector 
has been restricted. They are not allowed to get driving licenses or any other form of 
identification from government offices. Bidoons do not have rights of possession of 
property or even cars. They are also deprived of any right of possession of personal 
identity or anything to prove their legal residence. They cannot register births, marriages, 
divorces and death. It is in breach of the law for a Bidoon to get married without official 
approval. All these practices are considered as contradicting Islamic Sharia law and 
violating human rights and international conventions, which Kuwait is obliged to follow 
as it has signed.
92
  
 
In recent times, the political landscape of the Arab world/Middle East has changed following the 
Arab Spring.
93
 The Bidoons, who are perhaps inspired by the success of the Arab Spring in other 
countries, have held a number of public demonstrations against the Kuwaiti government since 
early 2011. But, unlike their counterparts in the Arab Spring, all the Bidoons are demanding 
from the Kuwaiti government is ‘citizenship’ and not change of government. The first Bidoons’ 
demonstrations for nationality rights took place on February 18, 2011.
94
 As a possible ‘damage 
control’ and to prevent the protests from spiraling out of control, the Kuwaiti government 
reportedly promised some reforms, including access to a few basic rights for the Bidoons.
95
 The 
Kuwaiti parliament also held a two-hour discussion on the Bidoons on March 8, 2011, but it 
unfortunately passed a resolution to postpone the discussion in favour of debating “issues that 
concern Kuwaitis”.96 Following the failure of the Kuwaiti government to take any concrete 
measure taken to resolve their demands for citizenship, the Bidoons took to the streets again in 
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20 
 
protests from March 2011 to May 2012. The protests resulted in several arrests and other forms 
of brutality against the Bidoons from the police.
97
 However, the Bidoons’ protests and the brutal 
police crackdown have not attracted any response from the international community.
98
 
 
2.2.1 The Bidoons’ Dilemma 
 
Like the Rohingyas, the Bidoon also face the dilemma of rejection by their home state (Kuwait). 
There is also failure on the part of the international community to respond to their plights as 
evident in the international silence that greeted their public demonstrations for citizenship during 
the Arab Spring.
99
 However, unlike the situation of the Rohingyas, recent events indicate that 
there are some rays of hope for the Bidoons in Kuwait. This is because, on 20 March 2013, the 
Kuwaiti parliament passed a bill to grant citizenship to up to 4,000 “foreigners”. The legislation 
was amended to say a “maximum of 4,000 foreigners” from an original “at least 4,000 stateless 
people” or “Bidoons”, amid pressure from ministers.100 In order to take effect, the legislation 
must be signed by the Emir of Kuwait and there is presently no indication that bill has been 
                                                 
97
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signed into law. Notwithstanding the status of the bill, Amnesty International has described the 
Kuwaiti parliament's decision to grant citizenship to 4,000 “foreigners” as “a step in the right 
direction” though it concedes that “the Kuwaiti government must intensify its efforts to find a 
lasting solution for all the [Bidoons] in the country.”101 Critics have, however, dismissed the bill 
as a “diversion”. For example, a Kuwaiti activist has retorted that: 
 
[This bill] is just a way of keeping people busy talking about a mere 4,000 and diverting 
the discussion from the real problems… There are around 120,000 Bedoons living in 
Kuwait, spanning over three generations. If you’re going to nationalize 4,000 a year, how 
long will it take with their growing population? And what are the ones waiting supposed 
to do?”102 
 
With the passage of the recent bill, it is arguable that the Bidoons are in a better position than 
their stateless Rohingyas counterpart. Again, the Bidoons also seem to have the ability to move 
freely within most states in the Gulf. 
 
2.3 “Non-citizens” of Latvia  
 
The “Non-citizens” of Latvia are also without nationality due to the applicable Latvian 
Citizenship Law. They are mainly ethnic Russians who migrated to Latvia during Soviet 
occupation which began in 1940. Like most other Latvians, they were also citizens of the former 
Soviet Union who resided in Latvia before and after its independence in 1990.
103
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Unlike most former USSR Republics, which adopted registration of residence as sufficient basis 
for automatic citizenship (the ‘zero-option’) after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
restoration of independence, Latvia adopted a citizenship policy which is based on the principle 
of state continuity – as a result of its claim that Soviet occupation was illegal and that Latvia had 
never been part of the USSR de jure.
104
 In furtherance of this principle, the Latvia Parliament, on 
15 October 1991, adopted a resolution entitled “On the Renewal of the Rights of the Citizens of 
the Republic of Latvia and on the Fundamental Principles of Naturalization”. The resolution 
granted Latvian citizenship only to those residents who were citizens up to 17 June 1940 (the 
beginning of Soviet occupation) as well as their descendants.
105
 According to the Latvia Human 
Rights Committee, by this act, “[o]ne third of the population of Latvia were deprived of all 
political rights in spite of possessing these rights at the time of the previous elections. This is a 
unique case in parliamentary history: a parliament deprived its own voters of citizenship and, 
thus, voting rights.”106 Those who do not qualify for citizenship under the resolution were left in 
limbo for a long time.
107
  
 
The Citizenship Law, which was adopted in 1994, cemented the provisions of the 1991 
resolution. It, however, also provides for citizenship by naturalization in an attempt to resolve the 
status of those who were not entitled to citizenship under the 1991 resolution.
108
 The Law 
provides that in order to become a naturalized Latvian citizen, a person must have lived in Latvia 
for five years and have command of the Latvian language and basic knowledge of Latvian 
history and society.
109
 The Law, however, excludes people with employment links with the 
former USSR from naturalization. This includes those who served in the armed forces, secret 
service, police, and were members of the communist party.
110
 This exclusion affects a large 
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number of people, especially the older generations, who were born in Latvia or had lived in the 
country for decades, but can only speak Russian (which was then an official language of the state 
as part of the Soviet Union), and were also former employees of the Soviet Union.
111
 Those 
affected by the exclusion were between 700,000 and 900,000 (representing about 32% of Latvian 
population at independence).
112
  
 
In 1995, the Latvian parliament passed the “On the Status of those Former USSR Citizens who 
do not have the Citizenship of Latvia or that of any Other State” Law113 in a further attempt to 
resolve the status of those not entitled to its citizenship under the 1994 Citizenship Law.
114
 The 
law confers a “Non-citizens” status on citizens of the former Soviet Union who have resided in 
Latvia for at least ten years.
115
 Subject to complying with the Latvian language requirement, they 
were also entitled to apply for Latvian citizenship.
116
 However, a vast majority of affected people 
emigrated to acquire foreign, mainly Russian, citizenship;
117
 hence, the number of the affected 
population has declined to about 400,000 (now representing about 17% of the total Latvian 
population).
118
 
 
3.2.3.1 The Latvian ‘Non-citizens’ Dilemma 
 
                                                 
111
 In 2012, the country held a referendum in an unsuccessful attempt to make Russian language 
the second ‘official’ language. See generally Timothy Heleniak, “Latvia Looks West, But 
Legacy of Soviets Remains”, online: Migration Policy Institute 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=375>; Aleks Tapinsh, “Russian 
language vote shows ethnic split in Latvia”, Reuters, 17 February 2012, Online: Reuters, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/17/us-latvia-russia-vote-idUSTRE81G0AS20120217>; 
BBC News, “Latvia rejects making Russian an official language” BBC News, 18 February 2012, 
online: BBC News <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17083397>.      
112
 LHRC 2011, supra, note 103, at 4. See also Poleshchuk, supra, note 103, at 166 – 167. 
113
 On the Status of those Former USSR Citizens who do not have the Citizenship of Latvia or 
that of any Other State Law 1995. 
114
 See Kristine Kruma, Naturalization Procedures for Immigrants Latvia, Research for the 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory Country Reports (San Domenico di Fiesole- Italy: European 
University Institute, 2013), 2-3, online: European University Institute <http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia>. 
115
 Ibid, section 1. 
116
Citizenship Law 1994, section 12. 
117
 Poleshchuk, supra, note 103, at 171. 
118
 Ibid. See also LHRC 2011, supra, note 103, at 6. 
24 
 
As noted above, a large majority of the Latvian ‘Non-citizens’ are ethnic Russians. They are 
generally seen as “puppets of Moscow”.119 Like the Rohingyas and Bidoon, they are generally 
perceived as disloyal groups, deserving of no part in their home state. They have also engaged in 
public demonstrations for citizenship but such demonstration is generally ignored by the 
international community and mainstream (western) media.
120
 
 
However, they are not as helpless as the Rohingyas, or even the Bidoons, mainly due to the fact 
that Latvia is a European country and a party to several relevant international instruments 
relating to nationality. For example, under the 1995 “Law on the Status of those Former USSR 
Citizens who do not have the Citizenship of Latvia or that of any Other State”, they are entitled 
to most rights other Latvians enjoy, apart from the right to vote and restrictions on some kinds of 
employments.
121
 They are entitled to a special passport which grants them the special status of 
belonging to the state, thus giving them the constitutional right to return.
122
 They cannot be 
deported, unlike the case with third-country nationals.
123
 They also enjoy the diplomatic 
protection of Latvia.
124
 They also tend to have a choice to take up Russian citizenship, especially 
in the light of recent reports which show that the Russian Government has taken both legislative 
and executive steps to simplify the procedure for granting of Russian citizenship to direct 
descendants of nationals of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union who now live abroad.
125
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4.0 CONCLUSION 
 
A common thread that runs through the factual situations of the Rohingyas, Bidoons and the 
Non-Citizens of Latvia is that their respective countries excluded them as a group forming part 
of its membership, mainly because they are seen as foreigners and disloyal, even though they 
have settled or resided in their respective countries for decades.
126
 They, thus, occupy the 
unenviable position of not being a part of any organized political community. The fact that they 
are without nationality in the face of an internationally recognized ‘right to nationality’ raises 
questions regarding the ability of present international human rights law to protect their ‘right to 
nationality’. This inability seems to be strengthened by a general apathy towards right to 
nationality of stateless groups, as evident by the international response to the Rohingyas, Bidoon, 
and Latvian ‘Non-citizens’ nationality travails.  
 
The above-mentioned general apathy raises a question of whether there is anything intrinsic to 
the ‘right to nationality’ that accounts for the lack of interest on the part of the international 
community. In determining this question, it is necessary to examine the extent to which the right 
to nationality conflicts with another fundamental principle of international law, namely, the 
sovereign power of states to regulate and determine who should be their nationals. This conflict 
is the major focus of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
NATIONALITY: FROM NATIO TO ‘HUMAN RIGHT’ 
 
There is no greater right or privilege than nationality; and because of its vast 
importance, its acquisition and its loss should be clearly defined and stated. There 
should be for every person a nationality – a single and exclusive nationality – and 
there should be no stateless person in a world governed by law.
1
 
 
Being a national of a particular country or owing allegiance to a particular sovereign always has 
significant socio-political implications at the local and inter-state level. It has been known to be 
the basis for discrimination, and the basis for conferring or depriving someone of some particular 
benefits. For example, ancient Jews classified all non-Jews as ‘Gentiles’, the Greeks classified 
non-Greek as ‘barbarians’, and the Romans also classified non-Romans as ‘barbarians’. These 
classifications were not merely pejorative; there were significant socio-legal disadvantages 
attached to such terms.  
 
The biblical account of an incidence involving Paul the Apostle clearly depicts some of the 
privileges attached to being a Roman ‘citizen’ in ancient Roman Empire.2 As recorded in the 
Bible, Apostle Paul, a Roman citizen of Jewish descent, was being lynched by a mob (comprised 
of fellow Jews) who suspected him of desecrating the Holy Temple by allowing a Gentile 
(Trophimus) to accompany him into the temple. He was rescued by some soldiers who later 
brought him before a military tribunal. During the proceedings, the presiding chief captain 
ordered Paul to be examined by flogging (tortured) in the course of interrogation. As the soldiers 
were ready to carry out the order, Paul, apparently knowledgeable about the importance of being 
a Roman citizen, asked one of the soldiers the following question: “is it legal for you to flog a 
Roman citizen who is uncondemned?”3 Immediately the soldier heard that, he went to the chief 
captain and said: “What are you about to do? This man is a Roman citizen.”4 Paul’s declaration 
                                                 
1 James Brown Scott “Introduction” to Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, Statelessness:With Special 
Reference to the United States (New York: American University Graduate School, 1934) at ix.  
2
 See generally, New Revised Standard Version Bible (Division of Christian Education of the 
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 1989), Acts 21: 26 – 
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of his Roman citizenship changed his status; he was no longer subject to torture and he even 
received extra security for his life. The impact of his Roman citizenship was summed up in the 
letter by the chief captain to the Roman-appointed Governor, Felix, where he explained that “this 
man was seized by the Jews and was about to be killed by them, but when I had learned that he 
was a Roman citizen, I came with the guards and rescued him”.5 Invariably, Apostle Paul 
protected his right to life by the declaration of his Roman citizenship. 
 
There is no doubt that even in today’s globalized world, being a national of a particular country 
still confers a wide range of benefits on individuals, especially in areas of international 
diplomacy or relations. However, as noted in chapter one, the Rohingyas, Bidoons and ‘Non-
Citizens’ of Latvia are without nationality even in the face of Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)
6
 which provides that “everyone has a right to 
nationality”. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the changing concept of nationality, 
statelessness, and the emergence of nationality as ‘human right’. 
 
1.0 ‘NATIONALITY’ IN CONTEXT 
 
Etymologically, the word “nationality” is derived from the Latin word natio which literally 
means to be born (of a people).
7
 The word natio, in ancient Rome, was understood to be a group 
of people “who belonged together in someway because of similarity of birth”.8 This was mainly 
due to the fact that “the members of a natio were born in the same city or the same tract of 
land”.9 The meaning of the word natio progressed, over the years, to include people who share 
common ancestry, values, and aspirations.
10
  Hence, contemporary definitions of “nation” 
connote “a people” or “group” who share common cultural values, heritage or history, territory 
                                                 
5
 Ibid, (emphasis added). 
6
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or geographical origin, language and government.
11
 However, the modern concept of nation has 
been traced to the Peace of Westphalia Treaty (1648) which gave birth to modern nation-state.
12
 
The compound term “nation-state” is now used in international relations to denote a sovereign 
entity, often without any reference to common characteristics of the people.
13
  
 
Today, existing literature describes “nationality” in two senses. For example, Keating describes 
nationality in “a narrow, restricted sense to refer to citizenship of a state; and in a weaker sense 
to denote a broad cultural affiliation.”14 Seckler-Hudson also defines nationality in the 
“broadest” sense as “membership in a certain nation which is held together by definite common 
ethnic, physical, educational, religious or racial ties or characteristics” and in the “strict” sense as 
“the status of a natural person who is attached to a particular state by ties of allegiance.”15 
However, most literature describes nationality only in the “strict” or “narrow” sense which 
denotes “a specific relationship between individual and state conferring mutual rights and 
duties.”16 It is also “the bond that unites individuals with a given state that identifies them as 
members of that entity, that enable them to claim its protection, and also subject them to the 
performance of such duties as their state may impose on them.”17  
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1.1 Nationality and citizenship 
 
Closely related to the concept of nationality is the word “citizenship”. There is no significant 
difference between the dictionary definitions of “nationality” and “citizenship”, as they describe 
the link between a person and a state; hence, most existing literature use both terms 
interchangeably.
18
 However, some scholars have drawn a distinction between the two terms. For 
example, according to Kesby, nationality “evolved from the medieval European concept of a 
‘subject’ tied to  territory and to a sovereign to whom allegiance was owed, [whereas] citizenship 
has its roots in the Greek and Roman idea of membership of the polis with its attendant rights 
and duties.”19 She also argues that “nationality relates to legal membership of a state for inter-
state purposes. The rights of nationals within the state thus become a question of citizenship and 
beyond the scope of international law.”20 Similarly, Weis argues that nationality pertains to the 
external aspect of state membership and citizenship to the international relationship between the 
individual and the state.
21
  
 
A key element of the modern concept of nationality is the idea of a person coming under the 
protection or jurisdiction of a state, usually for the purpose of inter-state relations.
22
 There are 
two significant relevance of nationality in this context of the inter-state relations. First, it relates 
to the right, which states generally assert, of protecting citizens abroad or ensuring that citizens 
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are not mistreated contrary to international law.
23
 The second aspect relates to territorial integrity 
of the states. Here, nationality is linked with the territorial sovereignty of states to admit and 
expel (repatriate) aliens.
24
 Usually, the power of a state to expel is contingent on a corresponding 
duty of other states to re-admit their nationals.
25
  
 
Thus, on the whole, the meaning of the term “nationality” has progressed from its original 
conception as natio (which ordinarily denotes a person being a “part” of a people), to Medieval 
Greek and Roman Polis (which suggests that the person is “part” of a city-state with rights and 
obligations), to the modern conception (which connotes the idea of a person belonging to a 
particular state or having reciprocal relationship with a sovereign state authority for the purpose 
of inter-state relations). It is necessary to bear in mind that this thesis is mainly concerned with 
the ‘modern conception’ of “nationality” in the strict or civic sense. The term “nationality” will 
be used interchangeably with “citizenship” in this thesis.  
 
1.2 “Right” to Nationality 
 
As observed in chapter one, this thesis takes the view that to have a right to something means to 
be entitled to demand for that thing.
26
 Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the “right” to 
nationality connotes the right or entitlement of every individual to demand to be part of a 
national group for the purpose of inter-state relations. It also connotes the right to acquire a 
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nationality. This right has been described as the “right to belong to some kind of organized 
community”,27 “right to have rights”,28  and the right to “belong to the civilized world”.29  
 
1.3 Statelessness 
 
Article 1(1) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
30
 defines a stateless 
person as a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law. 
There are two classes of stateless persons, namely, de jure and de facto stateless persons. A de 
jure stateless person is one who is not a citizen of any state, as defined in Article 1 of the 
Convention. On the other hand, a de facto stateless person is one who is outside his/her country 
but is unable or unwilling, for some valid reasons, to avail himself/herself of the protection of 
that country.
31
 Protection, in this sense, refers to the right of diplomatic protection exercised by a 
state in order to remedy an internationally wrongful act against one of its nationals, as well as 
diplomatic and consular protection and assistance generally.
32
 Although some authors distinguish 
between de jure and de facto statelessness, this thesis is principally concerned with de jure 
statelessness.     
 
Like nationality, a key element of the concept of statelessness is the idea of a person not being 
under the protection of any state for the purpose of inter-state relations. This inability to come 
under the protection of any state seems to be reason why the condition of statelessness has 
always been historically considered abnormal.
33
 For example, Aristotle described a stateless 
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person as a “beast or a god” ‘either above humanity or below it”.34 De Lapradelle and Niboyet 
described stateless persons as “international vagabonds”.35 According to Seckler-Hudson, a 
stateless person is “an unfortunate individual [who] is placed in the unenviable position of being 
without any country at all”, “an ill-fated person” who “will discover to his consternation that the 
frontiers of all civilized states are closed upon him”, a “tertium quid [a third party of ambiguous 
status] whose home is presumably somewhere between all other countries”.36 She compares a 
stateless person to “vessels sailing on the open sea, but not sailing under the flag of any state, and 
hence not enjoying any protection.”37 
 
However, the abnormality of statelessness was not always considered from the humanitarian 
point of view; it was also considered abnormal because statelessness was seen as derogating 
from the sovereign power of a state to expel aliens from its territory.
38
 A typical scenario of this 
derogation of sovereign power to expel aliens occurred shortly before the Second World War 
(WWII), when several European countries had admitted a large number of German Jews in their 
territory as refugees, workers, students, scholars, etc. The situation changed with the Nazi 
promulgation of the Reich Citizenship Law
39
 which stripped the German Jews of their German 
citizenship. This resulted in a situation where states could no longer expel the erstwhile German 
Jews in their territory because no other state had the corresponding duty of receiving them.
40
 
Arendt aptly captured the dilemma of the European countries thus: 
 
The real trouble started as soon as the two recognized remedies [for dealing with 
refugees], repatriation and naturalization, were tried. Repatriation measures naturally 
failed when there was no country to which these people could be deported. They failed 
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not because of consideration for the stateless person; and not for humanitarian sentiments 
on the part of the countries that were swamped with refugees; but because neither the 
country of origin nor any other agreed to accept stateless person… In other words, the 
state, insisting on its sovereign right of expulsion, was forced by the illegal nature of 
statelessness into admittedly illegal acts. It smuggled the expelled stateless into 
neighboring countries and the latter retaliated in kind.
41
 
 
 
It seems that present day states do sometimes face the dilemma of being unable to expel stateless 
persons from their territories. For example, the Canadian immigration authorities had tried to 
deport one of the 2013 Toronto VIA Rail terror suspects in 2004 but could not do so because, as 
a stateless Palestinian, the suspect could not be sent to any other country. Thus, statelessness 
became a clog in exercise of Canada’s sovereign right to expel an ‘alien’, who turned out to 
become a potential future ‘terror suspect’.42    
 
1.3.1 Causes of Statelessness 
 
The causes of statelessness may be generally classified into personal acts and non-personal acts. 
For ‘personal’ acts, a person may deliberately renounce his citizenship without acquiring or 
having any intention to acquire another. An example of such personal acts is that by Garry Davis, 
a former US Army WWII B-17 bomber pilot who renounced his American citizenship in 1948 to 
become a “citizen of the world”.43 He founded the International Registry of World Citizens 
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which reportedly has registered over 750,000 individuals from 150 countries.
44
 He also founded 
the World Service Authority (WSA)
45
 which issues “world” passports to applicants.46 The 
“world passport” is reportedly issued “based on the inalienable right of all humans to travel 
freely on their own planet.”47 The WSA also issues “World Identity Card”, “World Birth 
Certificate” and “World Marriage Certificate” to applicants, usually “registered World Citizens”, 
upon the payment of the requisite application fee.
48
 It has so far issued 2,500,000 “world 
passports”49 and over 180 countries have reportedly accepted the world passport, at one time or 
another.
50
  
 
‘Non-personal’ acts, on the other hand, generally refer to the “arbitrary denial and deprivation of 
citizenship” which “takes place as a result of a specific state action”.51 The state action may 
include the introduction of discriminatory laws targeting specific communities or ethnic groups 
or which make it “virtually impossible” for the targeted groups “to access their rights to 
citizenship, including establishing a legal identity by means of formal registration of births, 
marriages, and voting”.52 The state action may also be an outright denationalizing legislation or a 
“process of exclusion”, which usually occurs “during periods of state creation or state 
transformation”.53 At times, the state action causing statelessness may also be involuntary or one 
which arises as a result of a clash of the nationality laws of two countries. An example of such 
situation is a story of a young Pakistani woman who was abused by her family in the Pakistani-
administered part of Kashmir. She attempted to commit suicide by throwing herself in a river, 
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but she survived as the river took her to Indian-controlled Kashmir, where she was arrested for 
illegal entry and taken to jail. She was raped by one of the jailers and she gave birth to the 
jailer’s child. Although DNA tests proved the child was the jailer’s, he refused to acknowledge 
paternity of the child. The Indian government attempted to deport the woman, but the Pakistani 
authorities refused to accept the child as a Pakistani national. The woman refused to abandon her 
child in order to return to Pakistan and is now living in limbo in Indian-controlled Kashmir.
54
 
 
Available literature suggests that most recent cases of statelessness usually arise from dissolution 
of states and state succession.
55
 For example, as discussed in chapter one, the dissolution of the 
former Soviet Union gave rise to the present stateless ‘Non-citizens’ of Latvia. The dissolution 
of the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also gave rise to the present stateless ‘Erased 
People’ of Slovenia, and Romas respectively.56 Even the recent succession of Eritrea and South 
Sudan from the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Federal Republic Sudan 
respectively has given rise to new cases of statelessness in Africa.
57
 However, the cases of 
statelessness that arise from such dissolution of states and state succession are usually as a result 
of state legislations that exclude targeted groups from citizenship through a “process of 
exclusion”.  
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2.0 EMERGENCE OF NATIONALITY AS A ‘HUMAN RIGHT’ 
 
Prior to WWII, some authors had canvassed a “right to nationality” in various forms. For 
example, Fiore, in the mid-nineteenth century, argued that the “right to nationality” is a primary, 
sacred and undeniable right.
58
 He also argued that people have the right to nationality, not 
because they belong to the same race and speak the same language, but because God has created 
all men free and sociable.
59
 Garner also described deprivation of nationality as a violation of 
“one of the most fundamental rights which belongs to the individual in modern society”,60 while 
Scott also noted that there is no greater right than nationality.
61
 However, these pro-right to 
nationality views were in the minority, as the prevailing view prior to WWII seemed to be that 
the idea of a ‘right’ to nationality was a utopia.62 
 
The situation changed significantly as a result of the horrors of WWII, which necessitated the 
development of various reactionary safeguards against all identifiable Nazi strategies. One of 
such reactionary safeguards was the conception of a ‘right to nationality’. This arose from the 
realization that the Reich Citizenship Law 1935, which denationalized a large number of Jews 
and Romas, laid the foundation for the massive deportations of the holocaust victims to the 
various concentration camps.
63
 Thus, the concept of a ‘right to nationality’ was originally 
designed to ensure, as the US representative at the UDHR Drafting Committee puts it, 
“individuals should not be subject to action such as was taken during the Nazi regime in 
Germany when thousands had been stripped of their nationality by arbitrary government action; 
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and no one should be forced to keep a nationality when he did not want [it] and that he should 
not therefore be denied the right to change his nationality”.64  
 
2.1 The Making of ‘Right to Nationality’ 
 
The first draft article on the right to nationality was modeled after the Chilean government’s 
proposal. It originally states that: 
 
[a] Every person has the right to a nationality.  
[b] No state may refuse to grant its nationality to persons born upon its soil of parents 
who are 1egitimately present in the country.  
[c] No person may be deprived of his nationality of birth unless by his own free choice he 
acquires another nationality.  
[d] Every person has the right to renounce the nationality of his birth, or a previously 
acquired nationality, upon acquiring the nationality of another state.
65
 
 
However, this long draft was shortened to a simple single sentence: ‘everyone has a right to a 
nationality’ by Cassin (France’s representative).66 Upon a successful Belgian proposal, Cassin’s 
short version of the draft article was amended to read thus:  
 
(1) Everyone has a right to a nationality. 
(2) All persons who do not enjoy the protection of any government shall be placed under 
the protection of the United Nations. This protection shall not be accorded to 
criminals nor to those whose acts are contrary to the principles and aims of the United 
Nations.
67
 
 
The reference to the United Nations was opposed by most members, mainly because it would put 
a “heavy burden” on the newly established United Nations and raise “false hope”.68 The French 
Cassin supported the reference to the UN. He argued that the “purpose of article 15 was to 
express one of the general principles of mankind and to affirm that every human being should be 
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a member of a national group. The United Nations should contribute to putting an end to 
statelessness by urging the necessary measures upon sovereign states”.69 He also pointed out that 
“since the war [WWII], France has made it a strict rule not to declare forfeiture of nationality”,70 
and that it was the duty of the Committee to “prepare the work for the General Assembly with a 
view of granting everyone a right to nationality”.71 However, the United States (US), United 
Kingdom (UK), Soviet Union (USSR) and some others vigorously opposed putting any burden 
on the UN to deal with statelessness. The US suggested that the whole article should be 
“deleted” altogether.72 The UK also suggested that the first sentence (“everyone has a right to 
nationality”) should instead be replaced by “[p]ersons shall not be deprived of their nationality, 
which they have acquired at birth, unless possessing another nationality”.73 It also suggested the 
deletion of the second sentence in view of an earlier decision that obligations should be imposed 
upon the UN in a similar case concerning right to asylum.
74
 The government of Netherlands also 
contended that the “first paragraph should be deleted” because “[i]t appears from the second 
paragraph that the object of this article is to ensure that every one will have the right to invoke 
some official protection; for this purpose paragraph 1 stipulating that everyone has the right to a 
nationality is not necessary.”75 Consequently, the second paragraph was later rejected by a 
majority vote, leaving only the first sentence (“everyone has a right to a nationality”) as the 
surviving provision.
76
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Despite the removal of the reference to the UN, some powerful states were still opposed to any 
idea of a right to nationality. The United Kingdom and the India delegates, for example, 
consistently rejected the first paragraph and contended instead that the only right everyone could 
be entitled to is a “right not to be deprived of one’s nationality”.77 Uruguay argued instead for the 
“right of changing nationality”.78 The US called for the “omission” of the right. Demchenko, the 
Ukrainian delegate, summed up the argument against the right in his argument that “the principle 
of national sovereignty would be violated by the adoption of the idea that everyone had the right 
to a nationality”.79 Consequently, the surviving first sentence (“everyone has a right to 
nationality”) was rejected at Third Session of the Drafting Committee on account of its clash 
with States’ sovereignty on determining nationality.80 It was replaced by a UK-India text, as 
amended by the Uruguay delegation, which simply states that: “No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”81 
 
However, like Banquo’s ghost who will not vanish away,82 the first sentence (“everyone has a 
right to nationality”) resurfaced at a later stage – during the debate on the meaning and propriety 
of the word ‘arbitrarily’ in the adopted UK-India text. The reintroduction of the first sentence 
was as a result of a successful proposal for the amendment of the UK-India text by France, 
Lebanon, Cuba and Uruguay.
83
 It was re-adopted by 31 votes to 1, with 11 abstentions. The first 
part of the second paragraph (‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality’) was 
adopted unanimously, while the second part (‘nor denied the right to change his nationality’) was 
also adopted by 36 votes to 6 with 1 abstention.
84
 Hence the version of the Article 15 of the 
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UDHR adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 10 
December 1948 states that: “(1) Everyone has a right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality”. 
 
2.2 Status of the UDHR 
 
The UDHR contains a wide range of political and socio-economic rights, whose origin can be 
traced to the rights outlined in various historical Western documents, such as, the Magna Carta 
(1215),
85
 the English Bill of Rights (1689),
86
 the US Declaration of Independence (1776), Bill of 
Rights (US) (1789),
87
 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens (1789).
88
 
Examples of rights whose origin could be traced to the Western documents include: the right to 
life, liberty and security of person;
89
 freedom from torture or from cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment;
90
 right to equality before the law and freedom from discrimination;
91
 
freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile;
 92
 right to fair hearing;
93
 presumption of 
innocence, etc.
94
 The inclusion of these rights in the UDHR was also as result of the horrors of 
the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities.
95
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Being a resolution of the UNGA, the UDHR is technically not a binding legal document.
96
 The 
records of UDHR draft committee proceedings suggest that the states representatives intended 
the UDHR to be a provisional document containing only political-moral aspirations, rather than 
binding legal obligations.
97
 The provisions of the UDHR was intended to be subsequently 
transformed into legally binding obligations via the International Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)
98
 and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),
99
 which were also under consideration at the time the UDHR was adopted in 1948. 
The two Covenants have now developed most of the rights enshrined in the UDHR, making them 
effectively binding on the states that have ratified them. Together with the UDHR, the Covenants 
comprise what is today known as the International Bill of Human Rights. 
 
The UDHR is regarded as the foundation of modern international human rights law and it exerts 
a moral, political, and legal influence on the jurisprudence of human rights far beyond the hopes 
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and expectations of many of its drafters.
100
 Some authors have argued that it carries legal weight 
beyond a resolution or other declarations of the UNGA.
101
 Some authors have also argued that 
the UDHR as a whole embodies the ‘customary international law’ on human rights.102 However, 
the emerging consensus is that some of its provisions represent customary international law. 
These include, for example, prohibition against racial discrimination, abolition of slavery, and 
the right to self-determination.
103
  
 
2.3 Article 15 of the UDHR (Right to a Nationality) 
 
Whilst, as noted above, most provisions of the UDHR have their roots in historical western 
documents, the right to nationality provided for under Article 15 of the UDHR does not enjoy 
any such history: there is no evidence to suggest such right was acceptable to states until it was 
introduced into the draft of the UDHR.
104
 Hence, Article 15 has been hailed as “a total 
innovation in the history of international law”.105 It is also said to represent a fundamental 
departure from the traditional view of nationality as being exclusively an act of sovereignty.
106
 
The provisions of Article 15 of the UDHR are now complemented by a number of international 
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legal instruments which border on right to nationality or reduction of statelessness. These include 
the following discussed below.   
   
2.3.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
As noted above, the ICCPR has codified all the civil and political rights set out in the UDHR.
107
 
It is the most comprehensive binding international instrument on human rights and also one of 
the most widely accepted international instruments on human rights: 167 States (including 
Kuwait and Latvia, but excluding Burma) are presently parties to the Convention.
108
 However, in 
relation to the right to nationality, the ICCPR shares similar history with the UDHR.  This is 
because Article 32 of an earlier draft of the ICCPR provides inter alia that “everyone is entitled 
to the nationality of the State where he is born unless and until on attaining majority he declares 
for the nationality open to him by virtue of descent.”109 This draft was similar to the Chilean 
proposal regarding Article 15 of the UDHR which had provided that “no state may refuse to 
grant its nationality to persons born upon its soil of parents who are 1egitimately present in the 
country”.110 However, just like the UDHR, it seems that only the French representative (Cassin) 
supported the inclusion of a right to nationality in the draft covenant, though he also observed 
that the right was not specified in any of the existing national bills of rights (Constitutions).
111
 
Other states were apparently not in support of the inclusion of the right in the ICCPR, hence the 
article was omitted in the final draft.
112
 
 
Nonetheless, there is a limited reference to a right to nationality in Article 24(3) of the Covenant 
which provides that “every child has a right to acquire a nationality”.  
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2.3.2 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination
113
 
 
The Convention is also a widely accepted international human rights instrument: 175 States 
(including Kuwait and Latvia, but excluding Burma) are parties to the Convention.
114
 By Article 
5(d)(iii) of the Convention, contracting States undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to 
race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, in the enjoyment of the right to nationality.  
 
2.3.3 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women115 
 
The purpose of the Convention is to address the “conflict in law and in practice” arising “as a 
result of provisions concerning the loss or acquisition of nationality by women as a result of the 
marriage, of its dissolution or change of nationality by the husband during marriage”.116 Its 
purpose is also to give effect to Article 15 of the UDHR.
117
 So far, only 74 States (including 
Latvia, but excluding Burma and Kuwait) are parties to the Convention.
118
 Under Article 1 of the 
Convention, each State party agrees that that neither the celebration nor the dissolution of a 
marriage between one of its nationals and an alien, nor the change of nationality by the husband 
during marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the wife. The States also agree that 
neither the voluntary acquisition of the nationality of another State nor the renunciation of its 
nationality by one of its nationals shall prevent the retention of its nationality by the wife of such 
national.
119
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2.3.4 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women120 
 
The objective of the Convention is to eliminate all various forms of discrimination against 
women. It is also one of the most widely accepted binding international human rights 
instruments: 187 States (including Burma, Kuwait and Latvia) are parties to the Convention.
121
 
Contracting States undertook to grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality.
122
 The contracting States also undertake to grant women equal rights with men 
with respect to the nationality of their children.
123
  
 
2.3.5 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)124 
 
Article 7 of the Convention provides that “the child shall be registered immediately after birth 
and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality”. Parties are 
obliged to ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and 
their obligations under the relevant international instruments, in particular where the child would 
otherwise be stateless.
125
 The CRC is also a widely accepted binding international human rights 
instrument: 193 States (including Burma, Kuwait and Latvia) are parties to the Convention.
126
 
 
2.3.6 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons127  
 
This Convention is intended to further rights outlined in the UDHR, especially “the principle that 
human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedom without discrimination.”128 Its purpose 
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is to ensure that stateless persons enjoy the “widest possible exercise” of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms set out in the UDHR.
129
 Its main thrust is that it obliges contracting States to 
accord stateless persons “lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible, and in 
any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances”.130 Thus, under the Convention, stateless persons are entitled to enjoy the same 
rights and privilege which the relevant State accords to aliens in areas of acquisition of moveable 
and immovable properties,
131
 gainful employment,
132
 right of association,
133
 housing,
134
 
education,
135
 and freedom of movement.
136
 In respect of freedom of religion,
137
 right of access to 
court,
138
 and intellectual property protection,
139
 stateless persons are entitled to enjoy the same 
rights and privilege as the nationals of contracting States.   
 
However, very few States have ratified the Convention: only 78 countries (including Latvia, but 
excluding the US, Canada, Russia, India, and also Burma and Kuwait) are parties to the 
Convention.
140
 
 
2.3.7 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness141 
 
The UN adopted this Convention in 1961 as a follow up to the 1954 Convention on the Status of 
Stateless Persons. Of particular importance is Article 1 of the Convention which provides that 
contracting States shall grant nationality to any person born in its territory who would otherwise 
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be stateless, and any foundling found in the state shall be presumed to have been born in that 
state.
142
 A Contracting State is also obliged to grant its nationality to a person, not born in the 
territory of a Contracting State, who would otherwise be stateless, if the nationality of one of his 
parents at the time of the person’s birth was that of that State.143 Under Article 6 of the 
Convention, if the law of a Contracting State provides for loss of its nationality by a person’s 
spouse or children as a consequence of that person losing or being deprived of that nationality, 
such loss shall be conditional upon their possession or acquisition of another nationality. Article 
7 also provides that the State law which permits renunciation of nationality should ensure that 
such renunciation shall not result in loss of nationality unless the person concerned possesses or 
acquires another nationality. By Article 9, States may not deprive any person or group of persons 
of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds. 
 
However, even though the Convention mainly seeks to reduce the increasing cases of 
statelessness, only 53 countries (including Latvia, but excluding major powers like the US, 
China, India, Russia, etc., and also Burma and Kuwait) are parties to the Convention to date.
144
 
 
2.3.8 Regional Instruments 
 
In addition to the above international instruments, there are also some regional human rights 
instruments that contain provisions relating to a right to nationality. The relevant regional 
instruments are discussed below. 
 
2.3.8.1  Americas 
 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
145
 provides that “every person has 
the right to the nationality to which he is entitled by law and to change it, if he so wishes, for the 
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nationality of any other country that is willing to grant it to him.”146 Like the UDHR, the 
Declaration is not a technically binding instrument, but its provisions have been codified in the 
American Convention on Human Rights.
147
 Unlike the ICCPR which left out Article 15 of the 
UDHR, Article 20 of the American Convention provides as follows: 
 
1. Every person has the right to a nationality.  
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if 
he does not have the right to any other nationality.  
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it. 
 
2.3.8.2  Europe 
 
Although the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
148
 resolved to “take the 
first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration”,149 it contains no provision for a right to nationality. The European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights
150
 also does not contain any provision for the right to nationality.  
 
However, the European Convention on Nationality
151
 contains provisions relating to the right to 
nationality in Europe. The Convention bears “in mind the numerous international instruments 
relating to nationality, multiple nationality and statelessness”.152 It also recognizes that, “in 
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matters concerning nationality, account should be taken of both the legitimate interests of States 
and those of individuals”153 and desires “to promote the progressive development of legal 
principles concerning nationality, as well as their adoption in internal law and desiring to avoid, 
as far as possible, cases of statelessness”.154 Article 2 of the Convention defines ‘nationality’ as 
“the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin”. 
Article 3 affirms exclusive sovereignty of States to determine their nationals. It states that 
“[e]ach State shall determine under its own law who are its nationals” and the law “shall be 
accepted by other States in so far as it is consistent with applicable international conventions, 
customary international law and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to 
nationality”. Article 4 ostensibly seeks to give effect to Article 15 of the UDHR, as well as other 
international instruments. It provides that the rules on nationality of each State Party shall be 
based on the following principles: 
 
(a) everyone has the right to a nationality; 
(b) statelessness shall be avoided; 
(c) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality; 
(d) neither marriage nor the dissolution of a marriage between a national of a State Party and 
an alien, nor the change of nationality by one of the spouses during marriage, shall 
automatically affect the nationality of the other spouse. 
 
Article 5 provides that the rules of States on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include 
any practice which amounts to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or 
national or ethnic origin. Article 6 obliges each State to provide in its internal law for its 
nationality to be acquired ex lege by (i) children one of whose parents possesses the nationality 
of that State Party, at the time of the birth of the children, (ii) foundlings found in its territory 
who would otherwise be stateless, (iii) children born on its territory who do not acquire at birth 
another nationality. The Article provides that each State Party shall permit the renunciation of its 
nationality provided the persons concerned do not thereby become stateless. 
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2.3.8.3  Middle East 
 
Article 24 of the 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights
155
 provides that “no citizen shall be 
arbitrarily denied of his original nationality, nor denied his right to acquire another nationality 
without legal basis”. This Charter was replaced by a more elaborate 2004 Arab Charter on 
Human Rights,
156
 Article 29 of which provides that “every person has the right to a nationality, 
and no citizen shall be deprived of his nationality without a legally valid reason”. It also enjoins 
State parties to take appropriate legislative measures to allow a child to acquire the nationality of 
his mother with regard to the interest of the child.
157
 
 
2.3.8.4  Africa  
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not contain any direct provision on the 
right to nationality. However, in April 2013, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) passed a Resolution on the right to nationality.
158
 The resolution inter alia 
“[r]eaffirms that the right to nationality of every human person is a fundamental human right 
implied within the provisions of Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and essential to the enjoyment of other fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter”.159 It 
“[c]alls upon African States to refrain from taking discriminatory nationality measures and to 
repeal laws which deny or deprive persons of their nationality on grounds of race, ethnic group, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, 
birth or other status, especially if such measures and laws render a person stateless.”160 It also 
enjoins African States “to observe minimum procedural standards so that decisions concerning 
the recognition, acquisition, deprivation or change of nationality do not contain any elements of 
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arbitrariness, and are subject to review by an impartial tribunal in accordance with their 
obligations under Article 7 of the African Charter.”161   
 
 
Unlike most other regions, countries in Asia presently do not have regional human rights 
instruments.
162
 
 
3.0 INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS APPLICABLE TO BURMA, 
KUWAIT AND LATVIA 
 
As explained in chapter one of thesis, one of reasons for the use of the Burmese Rohingyas, 
Kuwaiti Bidoons and ‘Non-Citizens’ of Latvia as case study for the purpose of interrogating 
continued statelessness vis-à-vis the right to nationality is that their factual situation encompasses 
the situations of other stateless groups. This includes the issue of whether their respective 
countries have adopted or ratified any of the above-mentioned international human rights 
instruments relating to the right to nationality.
163
 The purpose of this section is to examine the 
status of the countries in relation to the aforementioned international instruments. 
 
As noted above, there is currently no regional human rights instrument in Asia, thus Burma is not 
party to any regional human rights instrument. Burma is also not a party to most of the above-
mentioned relevant international instruments relating to right to nationality and reduction of 
statelessness, except the CRC and the CERDW. Unlike Burma, Kuwait is a party to most of the 
relevant international instruments, except the CRS and the CSSP. It however made reservations 
to the operative provisions of most of the relevant international instruments relating to the right 
to nationality. Kuwait has also ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights. By contrast, Latvia 
                                                 
161
 Ibid. 
162
 See Jina Kim, “Development of Regional Human Rights Regime: Prospects for and 
Implications to Asia” in Yozo Yokota, ed, Contentious Politics and Human Rights (Tokyo: 
Tokyo Foundation, 2009), 57. 
163
 See page 5 above.  
52 
 
has ratified all the relevant international instruments on the right to nationality without making 
any reservation. It has also signed the European Convention on Nationality.
164
  
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of nationality in international law has progressed from being a ‘privilege’ relevant 
only for the purpose of inter-state relations to a ‘human right’ everyone is entitled to under 
international law as provided for by the UDHR and other instruments. But unlike other 
internationally recognized human rights whose origin are traceable to progressive historical 
Western documents on human rights, the right to nationality was borne out of the necessities of 
WWII. The right to nationality has three elements namely (a) everyone has right to a nationality, 
(b) the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of an individual’s nationality, and (c) preservation of 
an individual’s right to change a nationality. 
 
As noted above, some provisions of the UDHR are regarded as customary international law. The 
question that then arises is whether, in view of the plurality of international/regional instruments 
bordering on right to nationality and reduction of statelessness, the right to nationality as 
provided for by Article 15 of the UDHR is part of customary international law. A corollary of 
this question is the issue of whether the right to nationality is a ‘fundamental’ or ‘relatively 
important right’ the invasion of which, as Dworkin has argued, “must be a very serious 
matter”.165 In determining the question, it is necessary to examine the interplay between the right 
to nationality and states’ sovereignty on nationality matters, and the resultant effect of the 
interplay on the continued existence of stateless people like the Rohingyas and the Bidoons. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY VERSUS STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The law of nationality is primarily a domestic matter as regards each 
state, to be determined by each state for itself, according to its needs, 
social, political, military, economic, etc. Thus no state is willing to 
surrender its sovereign prerogative in the matter of determining the way 
in which its nationality may be acquired.
1
  
 
States play a very important role in the traditional concept of nationality; the development of 
international law on nationality has largely been state oriented and dominated by state interest.
2
 
In the face of a state-dominated conception of nationality, Article 15 of the UDHR provides that 
everyone has a right to nationality. The purpose of this chapter is to examine nationality as an 
exercise of state sovereignty and the impact of state sovereignty on the status of nationality as a 
‘human right’ and whether it forms part of customary international law. This examination is for 
the purpose of interrogating the continued existence of stateless people like the Rohingyas and 
the Bidoons in the face of international law’s recognition of a right to nationality.  
 
1.0 STATE SOVEREIGNTY ON NATIONALITY MATTERS  
 
As discussed in chapter two, the modern concept of nationality is generally traced to the Peace of 
Westphalia Treaty (1648) which gave birth to the modern state. The Treaty also established the 
fundamental principles of international law which rests on the twin ideas of sovereign 
independence and equality of States.
3
 One major component of ‘sovereign independence’ is the 
principle of non-interference in the ‘internal affairs’ of a state, that is, the rule that the 
relationship between a state and its nationals is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that state. 
A corollary of this rule is the exclusive rights of each state to regulate and determine its 
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membership or who its nationals are. This right is traditionally jealously guarded by all states, 
and as Flournoy aptly observed, “no state is willing to surrender its sovereign prerogative in the 
matter of determining the way in which its nationality may be acquired.”4  
 
Although states have historically recognized the sovereign exclusive rights of other states to 
regulate their membership, available evidence of states practice show that states also generally 
recognized that the right of states to determine nationality is not unlimited.
5
 The recognized 
limitation was, however, not based on any acceptance of an individual “right” to nationality; 
rather, it relates to the extra-territorial claim of nationality which usually gives rise to competing 
sovereignty claims, especially pre-Second World War (WWII). A typical scenario of this kind 
will arise, for example, if Germany claims sovereignty over persons of German descent, who 
reside in France and over whom France also claimed sovereignty. The implication of such 
competing sovereignty claims is that the two countries will hold conflicting views in relation to 
such persons. For example, while France will hold the view that whatever it does to such persons 
[its perceived citizens] are within its “internal affairs”, Germany will a a contrary view that they 
are Germans and Germany has a right to protect them or insist they are treated in accordance 
with international law. Such competing claims also had a wider implication as to which of the 
competing states will have the right to draft such persons for military service when necessary, in 
war-prone Europe prior to WWII.
6
 In order to avoid such conflicting claims, Garner argued that 
“[m]odern law ought to ensure that every man, woman, and child shall possess the nationality of 
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some state (and but one),”7 while Scott advised that “[t]here should be for every person a 
nationality – a single and exclusive nationality”.8 
 
The need to preserve the jealously-guarded state sovereignty on nationality, as well as to 
harmonize conflicting nationality laws, which could potentially give rise to competing 
jurisdictional claims by states over the same subject/persons as described above, led to adoption 
of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws.
9
 The 
Hague Convention is the first international instrument to address the issue of nationality. One of 
declared aims of the Convention was the abolition of “double nationality”.10 Article 1 of the 
Convention affirmed the pre-existing state sovereignty on nationality matters by providing that 
“[i]t is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals.” Article 2 of the 
Convention further states that “[a]ny question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of 
a particular state shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State”. This state-
centered position on nationality received judicial backing in the decision of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Tunis and Morroco Nationality Decrees Case
11
 where the 
Court held that:  
 
The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State 
is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international 
relations. Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in 
the opinion of this Court, in principle within this reserved domain.
12
 
 
This position was also affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm Case 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala),
13
 as well as some domestic courts (especially pre-UDHR) 
                                                 
7
 James W. Garner, “Uniformity of Law in Respect to Nationality” (1925) 19 Am. Journal Int. 
Law 547, at 552 (emphasis supplied). 
8
 James Brown Scott in “Introduction” to Seckler-Hudson, supra, note 5, at ix [Scott]. (Emphasis 
added). 
9
 (1937-38) 179 L.N.T.S.89 (No. 4137). 
10
 Ibid, third preambular paragraph. 
11
 (1923) P.C.I.J. Ser B., No. 4, p 24.   
12
 Ibid.  
13
 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 1955 I.C.J. 4 at 20: “It is for Liechtenstein, as it 
is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of 
its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in 
accordance with that legislation.” 
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decisions, which regarded nationality as falling exclusively within the legislative competence of 
a state.
14
  
 
Although adopted prior to the present United Nations system, the Hague Convention still 
represents a valid authoritative statement of international law on nationality. Thus, the present 
state of international law still recognizes the sovereign rights of States to determine their 
membership. States generally express this sovereignty by making: (a) rules governing the 
conferment of nationality, and (b) rules relating to revocation, renunciation and loss of 
nationality. 
 
1.1 Rules Governing Conferment of Nationality 
 
International law generally recognizes the sovereign rights of each State to make its own rules 
governing the conferment of its citizenship by its municipal law. Hence, all States have varying 
rules governing the conferment of their nationality. These rules are generally classified into (a) 
jus soli, and (b) jus sanguinis.
15
  
 
                                                 
14
 See for example, See Re: Hoffman, 13 F. Supp. 907 (1936) (US), where Cosgrave J. observed 
that “[i]t is generally held that the right of citizen is not an inherent right, but a privilege 
extended by the sovereign power. It is founded upon reciprocal relations, protection to the 
subject and allegiance to the sovereign”; Stoeck v. Public Trustees [1921] 2 Ch. 67 at 82 (UK), 
per Lord Russel: “Whether a person is a national of a country must be determined by the 
municipal law of that country. Upon this I think all tests writers are agreed. It would be strange 
were it otherwise. How could the municipal law of England determine that a person is a national 
of Germany?”; Re Chamberlain’s Settlement [1921], 2 Ch. 533 (UK).  See also Weis, supra, note 
5, at 33. 
15
 For a general discussion on jus soli and jus sanguinis, see David Weissbrodt & Connie de la 
Vega, International Human Rights Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) 
82 – 86; Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch, Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship: A 
Comparative Study, (Oxford: Oxford Brookes University, 2009), 7 – 10 [Blitz & Lynch]; Brad K. 
Blitz, Statelessness, Protection and Equity (Forced Migration Policy Briefing 3) (Refugees 
Studies Centre- University of Oxford, 2009), online: Refugees Studies Centre 
<http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policy-briefings/RSCPB3-Statelessness.pdf>; Laura 
Bingham, Julia Harrington Reddy, & Sebastian Köhn, De jure Statelessness in the Real World: 
Applying the Prato Summary Conclusions (New York: Open Society Initiative, 2011); Katherine 
Southwink & M. Lynch, “Nationality for All: A progress Report and Global Survey on 
Statelessness” (Refugees International, 2009) 1 – 3.  
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Jus soli (right of soil/land) confers nationality on any individual born within the territory of a 
state. Jus soli is observed by few countries in the world, mainly in the Americas. For example, 
persons born in the United States or Canada are citizens of the US or Canada respectively, 
irrespective of the citizenship of their parents – except persons born to foreign diplomats or 
envoys.
16
 Jus sanguinis (law of blood), on the other hand, confers nationality based on family 
relationship, irrespective of place of birth. Jus sanguinis is observed by most countries in the 
world: all the countries in Europe,
17
 Africa (except Lesotho),
18
 Middle East,
19
 Asia (except 
Pakistan and Cambodia),
20
 and recently, Australia and New Zealand.
21
 However, in some 
countries of the Arab world, jus sanguinis is only applicable to persons born to male members of 
the relevant country.
22
  
 
Some countries, in exercise of the exclusive sovereignty to determine their membership, confer 
their nationality on persons in a hybrid of jus soli and jus sanguinis situation. For example, apart 
from the fact that any person born in Canada and US is a citizen a Canada and US respectively, 
                                                 
16
 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, 8 U.S.C. § 1401: “The following shall be nationals 
and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof” [US]; Citizenship Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29), section 3(1) (a): “a person is a 
citizen if… the person was born in Canada after February 14, 1977” [Canada]. See also Antigua 
and Barbuda Citizenship Act 1982 (Cap 22 Laws of Antigua and Barbuda), sections 2 and 3; 
Constitution of Jamaica, 1962, section 3(3)(B);  Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, 2000, 
section 17; Constitution of Dominican Republic, 2002, Article 11(1). 
17
 See for example, British Nationality Act, 1981, Cap 61, section 1 [UK]; German Nationality 
Act 1913 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 583 – Federal Law Gazette III 102-1), section 4 [Germany].  
18
 See for example, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, section 25 
[Nigeria]; Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, section 6(2) [Ghana]; Constitution of 
Zambia 1991, Article 5 [Zambia]; South African Citizenship Act, No. 88 of 1995, section 2 
[South Africa]. See also Bronwen Manby, “International Law and the Right to a Nationality in 
Sudan” (Open Society Foundation, 2011), online: Citizenship Rights 
<http://www.citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/Publications/2011/Manby-Feb2011-
Citizenship%20Options%20Sudan.pdf>.  
19
See for example, the Civil Code of Iran, 1928, Article 976 [Islamic Republic of Iran]; Decree 
No 15 on Lebanese Nationality, 1925, Article 1 [Lebanon]. 
20
 See for example the Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 5 and 6 [India]; Burma Citizenship 
Law, 1982, section 7 [Burma]; Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, 1980, Article 
4 [China]; contra, Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, Article 4 [Pakistan]. 
21
 See Section 12 of the Australian Citizenship Act, 2007; section 1 of the Citizenship Act, 1977 
(New Zealand) as amended by the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2005. 
22
 See for example, Article 4 of Pakistan, supra, note 20. 
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persons born of Canadian or US parentage born outside Canada or US are also Canada or US 
citizens by birth.
23
 The interplay between jus soli (as in the case with US and Canada) and jus 
sanguinis (especially in cases where the sex of the parents is irrelevant) is the major factor that 
has given rise to cases of multiple nationalities.
24
  For example, where a child born is in Canada 
to a Nigerian mother and a UK father, the child is a Canadian, UK and Nigerian citizen by birth. 
However, in exercise of their sovereignty, the citizenship laws of countries like China,
25
 
Burma,
26
 Kuwait,
27
 Pakistan,
28
 Lesotho, and Zambia,
29
 do not permit such dual or multiple 
citizenships.      
 
One other area of states sovereignty to make rules governing the conferment of its citizenship 
relates to the power of states to make rules for nationality by naturalization and registration. 
Through naturalization and registration, states confer nationality on residents who are otherwise 
not qualified to acquire nationality by birth. To this end, all states have their own unique 
naturalization and registration procedure, and there are hardly any two states that have identical 
provisions.  
 
1.2 Rules Governing Revocation, Renunciation and Loss of Nationality 
 
Another aspect of states’ sovereignty to determine and regulate nationality is the sovereign 
power of a state to revoke the nationality conferred on its nationals in certain given situations. 
                                                 
23
 Section 3(b) of Canada, supra, note 16; paras. (c) and (d) of  US,  supra, note 16. 
24
 See Philip Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction (NP: Archon Books, 1968) 
(“Dual nationality at birth is the natural and inevitable consequence of the coexistence of the two 
systems of ius soli and ius sanguinis.” at 73). 
25
 Article 3 of China, supra, note 20.  
26
 Section 13 of Burma, supra, note 20. 
27
 Nationality Law 1959, KWT 110, Article 11 [Kuwait]. 
28
 Article 14 of Pakistan, supra, note 20. 
29
 See Article 9 of Zambia, supra, note 18. However, the “first draft” Constitution 2012 recently 
submitted for ‘consultation’ by the Zambian Parliament seeks to reverse this position. Article 18 
of the draft provides that: A citizen, by birth, shall not lose that citizenship by acquiring the 
citizenship of another country. (2) A person who, before the commencement of this Constitution, 
acquired the citizenship of another country and as a result ceased to be a Zambian citizen as 
specified in clause (1), is entitled, on application, to regain the citizenship. The draft Constitution 
is available online at http://www.zambian.com/zambia-constitution-2012-first-draft.pdf. 
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States have historically exercised this power, especially prior to and during the WWII, with some 
level of arbitrariness and without any restraint or international interference.
30
 For example, 
France during the First World War stripped foreign-born naturalized nationals of their citizenship 
without any international interference or condemnation.
31
 Portugal issued a decree in 1916 that 
automatically denationalized all citizens born of a German father.
32
 Belgium in 1922 
denationalized naturalized citizens who allegedly committed “antinational acts” during the First 
World War.
33
 The Soviet Union also denationalized about two million people who had opposed 
the Bolshevik regime by virtue of the Union Citizenship Law of 13 November 1925.
34
 Egypt and 
Turkey, in 1926 and 1928 respectively, passed laws that denationalized persons “who were a 
threat to the social order.”35 Fascist Italy passed a law that denationalized people who were 
deemed by the fascist regime of being not “worthy of Italian citizenship” in 1926.36 Nazi 
Germany, by the Reich Citizenship Law 1935, denationalized millions of Jews and Romas on 
racial grounds.
37
 At about the same time, the United States was also reportedly “seriously 
considering” depriving Native Americans who were suspected communists of their citizenship.38  
 
Although there was no international interference in respect of the various revocations of 
nationality or denationalizing legislations, some scholars condemned such revocation, especially 
when it further exacerbated the increasing stateless populations of the pre-WWII Europe.
39
 
Garner, for example, argued that “any state which deliberately enacts legislation the effect of 
which is to denationalize any class of its own or of foreign nationals, except as a punishment for 
                                                 
30
 Usually the targeted groups are persons or ethnic groups considered disloyal to the relevant 
States. 
31
 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: The World, 1958), 278 n 23 
[Arendt]. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid.  
34
 See Blitz & Lynch, supra, note 15, at 8. 
35
 Arendt, supra, note 31, at 278. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. See also Blitz & Lynch, supra, note 15, at 8; Ineta Ziemele & Gunnar G. Schram, 
“Article 15” in Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjorn Eide, eds., The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; A Common Standard of Achievement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999), 297 
at 303 [Ziemele & Schram]. 
38
 Arendt, supra, note 31, at 278. 
39
 Ibid, 278 – 286. 
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their own misconduct, deprives them of one of the most fundamental rights which belongs to the 
individual in modern society.”40 Scott also argues that “[t]here is no greater right or privilege 
than nationality; and because of its vast importance, its acquisition and its loss should be clearly 
defined and stated… there should be no stateless person in a world governed by law”.41 The 
preamble to the Hague Convention states that the parties were “convinced” that “it is in the 
general interest of the international community to secure that all its members should recognize 
that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only”, and that they 
also recognized that the “ideal towards which the efforts of humanity should be directed in this 
domain is the abolition of all cases both of statelessness”.42 However, neither Garner nor Scott, 
not even the Hague Convention, challenged the sovereign power of a state the revoke the grant 
of its nationality. On the contrary Garner apparently accepted the power of states to denationalize 
persons for “criminal conduct”.43  Thus, even though there has always been a general recognition 
of states’ unfettered rights to determine who should qualify or remain their citizens, some 
scholars still advocated and recognized the need for everyone to have at least one nationality.
44
  
 
2.0 INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHT TO 
NATIONALITY 
 
This interplay between state sovereignty and the right to nationality will be discussed in relation 
to, (a) Interplay between state sovereignty and the right under Article 15 of the UDHR and other 
relevant instruments, as reflected by modern nationality laws, and (b) impact of state sovereignty 
on the customary international law status of right to nationality.  
 
                                                 
40
 Garner, supra, note 7, at 552 – 553 (emphasis supplied). 
41
 Scott, supra, note 8, at ix. 
42
 The Hague Convention, second and third preambular paragraphs. 
43
 See note 40 and the accompanying text above. 
44
 See for example, Seckler-Hudson, supra, note 5, at 14; Pasquale Fiore, Noveau Droit 
International Public: Suivant Les Besoins de la Civilization Moderne, translated by P. Pradier-
Fodere (Paris: Auguste Durand & Pedone-Lauriel, 1868), at 119 [Fiore]; Albert Geouffre de 
Lapradelle & Jean Paulin Niboyet , eds, Repertoire de Droit International, Tome VIII (Paris: 
Recueil Sirey, 1930), 559; David Dudley Field, Outlines of an International Code, 2d ed (New 
York: Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1876), 130. 
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2.1 Right to Nationality and Nationality Laws 
 
As discussed above, states historically have sovereign rights to determine their membership, 
including the power to revoke the nationality conferred on nationals whenever they deem fit. The 
exercise of this power to revoke nationality gave rise to two events that overshadowed the 
formulation of Article 15 of the UDHR. The first was the presence of large number of stateless 
refugees in Europe. These include the estimated two million refugees from the Russian civil war 
who were denationalized by Soviet Union in 1920s, millions of Armenians denationalized by 
Turkey, and millions of Jews denationalized by the Nazi Germany.
45
 While the denationalization 
of these stateless refugees was generally deemed to be a legitimate exercise of the respective 
states’ sovereign right to determine their membership, their presence in Europe was problematic 
for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the states could no longer expel the stateless 
people from their territory because no other state had the corresponding duty of receiving them. 
This was seen as a derogation of the sovereign rights of states to expel aliens from their 
territory.
46
 The second event was the established link between the Holocaust and the 
denationalization of the Jews by the Nazi Germany.
47
 It seems that it was in direct response to 
these two events that an earlier version of Article 15 of the UDHR had proposed that: 
 
(1) Everyone has a right to a nationality. 
(2) All persons who do not enjoy the protection of any government shall be placed under 
the protection of the United Nations. This protection shall not be accorded to 
criminals nor to those who acts are contrary to the principles and aims of the United 
Nations.
48
 
 
The above proposal was intended to serve a dual purpose. On one hand, the provision for a ‘right 
to nationality’ was designed to prevent further arbitrary deprivation of nationality.49 On the other 
hand, the latter provision apparently recognized the presence of stateless people in Europe at that 
                                                 
45
 See notes 31 – 38 and the accompanying text above. 
46
 See for example, Weis, supra, note 5, at 56, Arendt, supra, note 31, at 278 – 286. 
47
 See generally, Ziemele & Schram, supra, note 37, at 300 – 301; Johannes Morsink, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Origins, Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) 80 – 83 [Morsink]; Mirna Adjami & Julia Harrington, “The Scope 
and Content of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2008) 27:3 Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 93, at 96 [Adjami & Harrington]. 
48
 See Morsink, supra, note 47, at 80 – 81. 
49
 See Ziemele & Schram, supra, note 37, at 301. 
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time; hence it sought to place them under the care of the United Nations (UN). While the first 
purpose would have been a direct challenge to the prevailing doctrine of exclusive states 
sovereignty on nationality matters, the second purpose was a bit cautious, in that it does not 
necessary challenge the sovereign right of the denationalizing states to denationalize the stateless 
refugees but it nonetheless acknowledged that such denationalized stateless people deserve some 
protection by reason of their statelessness. However, as noted in chapter two, the proposal to 
place the then stateless people under the care of the UN was ultimately rejected mainly because it 
would put a ‘heavy burden’ on the newly established UN and raise ‘false hope’.50  
 
As previously observed, the right to nationality has three elements, namely (a) everyone has right 
to a nationality, (b) the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of an individual’s nationality, and (c) 
preservation of an individual’s right to change a nationality. The interplay between state 
sovereignty and each of these elements of the right will be considered below. 
 
2.1.1 ‘Everyone has a Right to a Nationality’  
 
A review of the UDHR drafting proceedings shows that there was a major challenge with this 
first element of Article 15, which ostensibly suggests that everyone has the right to [acquire] a 
nationality.
51
 The challenge arose mainly because it strikes at the heart of the jealously guarded 
sovereign right of every state to determine and regulate its citizenship.
52
 The resultant effect of 
this clash – or put differently, the impact of states sovereignty on this first element of right to 
nationality – may be discussed under three broad headings: (a) vagueness and imprecision of 
terms, (b) states withholding consent for unambiguous provisions, (c) absence of effective 
monitoring or enforcement mechanism. 
 
                                                 
50
 See pages 37 – 38 above. 
51
 The other two elements – prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality and right to 
change nationality – are subsumed in the first element, since they presuppose the existence of (or 
an already exercised right to) a nationality. 
52
 See Morsink, supra, note 47, 83. 
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2.1.1.1  Vagueness and Imprecision 
 
One major impact of state sovereignty on the first element of the right to nationality is that 
Article 15 of the UDHR is cautiously worded, such that it does not make any provision for which 
“nationality” everyone is entitled to.53 Like Article 15 of the UDHR, the provisions of the ICCPR 
and CRC on nationality, as well as those of the Arab Charter and the European Convention on 
Nationality, are also cautiously drafted such that they fail to elaborate on which nationality every 
child or person is entitled to. These provisions are unlike an earlier draft Article 32 of the ICCPR 
and the Chilean proposal to Article 15 of the UDHR which sought to make everyone entitled to 
the nationality of the place he/she was born.
54
  
 
The failure to make adequate provision for which nationality ‘everyone’ is entitled to renders this 
element “vague and imprecise”,55 and this allows states to essentially continue to retain their 
exclusive sovereignty to determine who can acquire their nationality.
56
 For example, in affirming 
states sovereignty in respect of acquisition of nationality, the Human Rights Committee in its 
General Comment on Article 24(3) of the ICCPR (which like the UDHR fails to state which 
nationality every child is entitled to) stated inter alia: 
 
While the purpose of this provision is to prevent a child from being afforded less 
protection by society and the State because he is stateless, it does not necessarily make it 
an obligation for States to give their nationality to every child born in their territory. 
However, States are required to adopt every appropriate measure, both internally and in 
                                                 
53
 See for example, Serena Forlati, “Nationality as a Human Right” in Alessandra Annoni & 
Serena Forlati, eds, The Changing Role of Nationality in International Law (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2013), 18 at 19 [Forlati]: the author identified the “reluctance shown by states in 
giving up their discretion in [nationality] matters” and “absence of universally accepted 
standards on attribution of nationality” as the reason for absence of clarity as to which nationality 
everyone is entitled to. Cf. Ashild Samnoy, “The Origins of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” in Gudmundur Alfredsson and Asbjorn Eide, eds., The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; A Common Standard of Achievements (The Hagus: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 3 at 
15: the author suggested that that the “hazy formulation” of the right to nationality in Article 15 
was designed to avoid controversy and to “allow ample room for interpretation”. 
54
 See page 37 above. 
55
 Chan, supra, note 2, at 3. 
56
 Ibid. 
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cooperation with other States, to ensure that every child has a nationality when he is 
born.
57
 
 
The failure of the relevant instruments to elaborate on which nationality everyone is entitled to 
also renders the right to nationality virtually unenforceable, and as aptly observed by Forlati, “[i]t 
is still difficult to identify in all situations the state against which affected individuals are entitled 
to invoke their right to acquire a nationality”.58      
 
2.1.1.2  Withholding Consent for Unambiguous Provisions  
 
A fundamental principle of international law is that consent of states is generally required in 
order for the state to be bound to observe principles of international law, especially in relation to 
treaty provisions.
59
 Thus, where a state is not party to the relevant international instrument, the 
default position of international law is that the instrument will not apply to that state – unless 
such instrument embodies customary international law or creates obligation erga omnes.
60
   
 
A review of the status of some relevant instruments shows that a vast majority of states generally 
do not consent to any instrument containing unambiguous provisions on the right to nationality, 
especially if such instrument seeks to impose any positive duty on them to grant nationality to 
                                                 
57
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “General Comment No. 
17: Rights of the child (Art. 24)” 4 July 1989 (Thirty-fifth session), online: UNHCR 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/cc0f1f8c391478b7c12563ed004b35e3?Ope
ndocument>. 
58
 Forlati, supra, note 53, at 20. See also Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, 
Humanity, and International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48-49 [Kesby]. 
59
 This principle is also expressed by the Latin maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, 
which means that a treaty applies only between the parties to it. See Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties ((1969), U.N.T.S. Vol. 1155, 331): “A treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”  
60
 See generally, Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 1 – 30 [Shaw]; Rafael Nieto-Navia, “International Peremptory Norms 
(Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law” in Vohrah Lal Chand et al, eds., Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man, Essays in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 595 [Nieto-Navia]; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 
6th ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1 – 25; Rebecca M.M. Wallace, International 
Law, 5th ed, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) [Wallace]; Mark Freeman & Gibran Van Ert, 
International Human Rights Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) [Freeman & van Ert]. 
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stateless persons. An example of the exercise of states’ power to withhold consent was used in 
relation to the existing stateless people during and after the UDHR debate. Following the 
rejection of the proposal to place the existing stateless people under the care of the newly 
established UN, the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1947 adopted a Resolution on 
Stateless Persons which called for “early consideration be given by the United Nations to the 
legal status of persons who do not enjoy the protection of any government, in particular pending 
the acquisition of nationality as regards their legal and social protection and their 
documentation.”61 In pursuance of this resolution, the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) adopted resolution 116 (VI) D on Stateless Persons in March 1948, wherein it noted 
the need to adopt “interim measures to afford protection to stateless persons”, and to take “joint 
and separate action… to ensure that everyone shall have an effective right to a nationality”. It 
also requested the Secretary-General to inter alia (a) “undertake a study of the existing situation 
in regard to the protection of stateless persons… and to make recommendations on the interim 
measures which might be taken by the United Nations”, and (b) “undertake a study of national 
legislation and international agreements and conventions relevant to statelessness, and to submit 
recommendations to the Council as to the desirability of concluding a further convention on this 
subject.”62  
 
Consequent upon the above mandate, the Secretary-General produced his 1949 Study of 
Statelessness,
63
 in which he outlined measures to improve the status of stateless persons and the 
elimination of statelessness.
64
 To improve the status of stateless persons, he recommended an 
international agreement that would determine the principal elements of the status of stateless 
persons, and also include rights to be granted to them.
65
 He also recommended two principles 
that will eliminate the sources of statelessness (a) every child must receive a nationality at 
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 See UNECOSOCOR , Third Year, sixth session, Supplement No. 1, 13 – 14.   
62
 Text of the resolution cited in Hugh Massey, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series: 
UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2010) 5, available online: Refworld <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bbf387d2.pdf>. 
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 United Nations Economic and Social Council, A Study of Statelessness, E/1112;E/1112/Add.1  
(August 1949), online: Refworld <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae68c2d0.pdf>. 
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 Ibid, at 10. 
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birth,
66
 and (b) no person should lose his/her nationality unless he/she has acquired a new one.
67
 
Pursuant to these recommendations, the International Law Commission (ILC) prepared some 
important instruments for adoption, including (a) the draft Convention on the Status of Stateless 
Person, (b) draft Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness, (c) Protocol on the 
Elimination of Present Statelessness, (d) Protocol on the Reduction of Present Statelessness, and 
(e) draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness.  
 
The preamble to the Draft Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness
68
 declared that 
“statelessness often results in suffering and hardship shocking to conscience and offensive to the 
dignity of man” and that “statelessness is inconsistent with the existing principle which 
postulates nationality as a condition of the enjoyment by the individual of certain rights 
recognized by international law”.69 Article 1 of the draft provides that “[a] person who would 
otherwise be stateless shall acquire at birth the nationality of the Party in whose territory he is 
born”. More importantly, Article 11 of the draft sought to establish, within the framework of the 
United Nations, an agency to act on behalf of stateless persons before Governments or before a 
tribunal which will also be established to decide any dispute between them concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention and to decide complaints presented by the agency 
on behalf of a person claiming to have been denied nationality in violation of the provisions of 
the draft convention. Similarly, Article 1 of the draft Protocol on the Elimination of Present 
Statelessness
70
 provides that “the Parties shall confer their nationality on stateless persons born 
in their territory before the coming into force of the Convention on the Elimination of Future 
Statelessness, if such persons did not acquire a nationality at birth”. Articles 5-8 of the draft 
oblige states to “reinstate into their nationality” stateless persons who have lost the nationality of 
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 Ibid, at 135 – 138. 
67
 Ibid, 138 – 140. See also Chan, supra, note 2, at 3 – 4.  
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the respective state as a result of enumerated factors such as: change in personal status, by 
renunciation, by seeking naturalization in a foreign country or by obtaining an expatriation 
permit, on the ground of departure, stay abroad, failure to register or any similar ground.
71
 
 
The above drafts not only sought to impose specific obligations on states in respect of 
“eliminating” both present and future statelessness, they also sought to establish an agency or 
tribunal to act on behalf of stateless persons against government. However, the drafts were 
vigorously opposed by some ILC members. According to Godwin-Gill: 
 
Some ILC members stressed the sovereignty and internal jurisdiction dimensions to 
nationality, and considered that the State could not be denied the right to deprive of their 
nationality anyone who had put themselves outside their national community. Other 
members stressed that, while deprivation should not be imposed as a penalty, nationality 
was nevertheless a privilege not to be accorded unless there were a real link between 
individual and State. In the eyes of some, the “mere fact of birth” or “mere habitual 
residence” in a country before the age of eighteen was not sufficient evidence of such a 
link. Others agreed, while noting also that approaches to the acquisition of nationality 
transcended purely legal principles.
72
 
 
 
The draft instruments on ‘elimination’ of statelessness were ultimately rejected because it was 
considered not “feasible to suggest measures for the total and immediate elimination of present 
statelessness”.73 The solutions offered by the draft Protocol on the Reduction of Present 
Statelessness were also considered not acceptable to states.
74
 Thus, at the United Nations 
Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness held in Geneva from 24 
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March to 18 April 1959, and in New York from 15 to 28 August 1961, the states delegates opted 
to use the draft convention on the reduction of statelessness as the basis for discussion, and 
focused on provisions aimed at reducing statelessness at birth.
75
 At the Conference, many states 
defended their power to deprive people of their nationality as being “essential to their vital 
interests”.76 The rejection of these drafts evidenced the desire of most states to hold on to their 
power to denationalize persons and also avoid any positive obligation to grant nationality to 
existing and future stateless people. Furthermore, as noted above, one reason for the conception 
of a right to nationality under the UDHR was to encourage states to grant nationality to existing 
stateless people. The rejection of these drafts arguably defeated this purpose and inevitably 
sealed the fate of the existing stateless people. 
 
Another evidence of the predisposition of states to use their sovereign power of consent is 
deducible from the numbers of states that have adopted or ratified the relevant international 
instruments on right to nationality and reduction of statelessness. For example, even though the 
Convention on the Reduction of (future) Statelessness (CRS) mainly seeks to “reduce” the 
increasing cases of statelessness without essentially negating the sovereignty of States in 
nationality matters, only 53 countries (excluding major powers like the US, China, India, Russia, 
and also Burma and Kuwait) are parties to the Convention to date.
77
 Even among the few states 
that have ratified the Convention, a large number of them made reservations to provisions that 
imposed obligations on them to grant nationality to persons born in their territory who would be 
otherwise stateless, or restrict their power to deprive people of their nationality.
78
 Similarly, only 
78 countries (excluding major powers like the US, Canada, Russia, India, and also Burma and 
Kuwait) are parties to the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (CRSSP), even 
though it merely seeks to ameliorate the travails of stateless persons without imposing any duty 
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on the states to grant them citizenship.
79
 In relation to regional instruments, neither the US nor 
Canada has adopted the American Convention. Similarly, even though the European Convention 
on Nationality affirms States’ sovereignty on nationality, regional powers like the UK, Russia, 
France, Spain, Italy, Greece, etc., have not ratified the Convention.
80
   
  
Another indication of the predisposition of states to use their sovereignty in this regard may be 
deduced from the numbers of reservations made to the provisions of the various international 
instruments on right to nationality. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a 
reservation as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or by an 
international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or 
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that organization”.81 According to 
Shaw, the “capacity of a state to make reservations to an international treaty illustrates the 
principle of sovereignty of states.”82 States generally exercise their sovereign power to make 
reservations as a means of refusing consent to unwanted provisions in a treaty, especially human 
rights instruments, so that they are not bound to observe such provisions.
83
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Some states have used this power to make reservations to reject obligations to respect the right to 
nationality provisions in some of the widely adopted international instruments, such as the 
ICCPR, CRC, and CEDAW. As stated above, under Article 9 of CEDAW contracting states 
were obliged to grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their 
children. However, Kuwait and virtually all the other Middle Eastern Countries made 
reservations to this provision.
84
 Kuwait also made similar reservations to Article 7 of the CRC 
which provides that every child has a right to nationality.
85
 
 
2.1.1.3 Absence of Effective Monitoring or Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
A corollary of the vagueness and imprecision of provisions relating to the right to nationality is 
the general absence of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in most instruments 
providing for the right to nationality. A review of the relevant instruments on the right to 
nationality reveals the extent to which states sovereignty stifles the enforcement of the right to 
nationality. First, while some instruments (especially those that provide for a general right to 
nationality such as the ICCPR, CRC, CEDAW, and CERD) contain provisions which establish 
monitoring agencies, such monitoring agencies usually adopt a cautious approach to the issue of 
right to nationality, that is, they either totally ignore the provision on the right to nationality or 
they affirm states sovereignty in this regard.  
 
For example, Article 17 of CEDAW establishes the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women to monitor “the progress made in the implementation” of the 
Convention. In its Recommendation No 21 on Article 9 of the Convention, which inter alia 
obliges states parties to “grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of 
                                                 
84
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their children”, the Committee made no reference to the obligation on the right to nationality.86 
Thus, the Committee failed to address the increasing number of statelessness arising from the 
discrimination against women; for example, children born of Kuwaiti women to stateless Bidoon 
fathers are stateless under Kuwaiti law. Similarly, and as noted above, the Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comment on Article 24(3) of the ICCPR affirmed states sovereignty in 
respect of acquisition of nationality in stating that the ICCPR does not necessarily make it an 
obligation for States to give their nationality to every child born in their territory.
87
 
 
Second, states generally vigorously opposed the establishment of any agency or tribunal with 
adjudicatory jurisdiction or oversight functions in respect of nationality matters. For example, as 
noted above, Article 11 of the two draft conventions on ‘elimination’ and ‘reduction’ of future 
statelessness sought to establish a tribunal which will decide complaints presented on behalf of a 
person claiming to have been denied nationality in violation of the provisions of the draft 
convention.
88
 However, the adopted CRS not only removed every reference to the establishment 
of such adjudicatory tribunal in its Article 11, it also whittled down the powers of the agency 
contemplated in the draft by providing merely for the establishment of a “body” to which a 
person claiming the benefit of the CRS may apply for the examination of his claim and for 
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assistance in presenting it to the appropriate authority.
89
 In spite of the whittling down, some 
states, for example France, Niger and Tunisia, still made reservations to Article 11 of the CRS!
90
  
  
The combined effect of the above-mentioned (i) vagueness and imprecision of provisions 
relating to the right to nationality, (ii) the predisposition of states to exercise of sovereign power 
to withhold consent, and (iii) the absence of effective implementation and monitoring 
mechanism, is that states still virtually have unbridled power to determine who and who are 
entitled to be their nationals. This, however, does not negate the existence or validity of this first 
element of the right to nationality under international law; it rather goes to the issue of 
enforceability. In other words, it is difficult to enforce the provisions of the relevant instruments 
against any state, like Latvia for example who, as shown in chapter two, has ratified all the 
relevant instruments without making any reservation. The level of difficulty increases in respect 
of Kuwait who has ratified, but made reservations to, some of the relevant international 
instruments. It increases further in relation to Burma who is not party to most of the relevant 
instruments. 
 
 
2.1.2 Prohibition against Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality 
 
As deducible from the review of the UDHR drafting committee proceedings, most states had no 
problem conceding to a prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality, perhaps due to 
the fact that the inclusion of the qualifier “arbitrary” to the provision implicitly acknowledges 
states’ sovereign power to denationalize – subject only to the qualification that the exercise of 
such power should not be ‘arbitrary’.  
 
One of the disputes that arose during the UDHR draft committee proceedings relates to the 
proper meaning of the word ‘arbitrary’ that qualifies the prohibition against deprivation of 
nationality. The USSR and Turkish delegates believed that it denotes ‘illegally’, while Uruguay 
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delegates invoked the ‘metaphysical’ to argue that the term involves principles of natural justice 
or natural law.
91
 The Greek delegate opined that the word arbitrary was “satisfactory because it 
covered all action not in conformity with the law”,92 while the French delegate (Cassin) believed 
that the word had a “twofold meaning: no one could be deprived of nationality contrary to 
existing laws, and those laws themselves must not be arbitrary”.93 Perhaps in deference to state 
sovereignty on nationality issues, Cassin further argued that the use of the word arbitrary “was an 
admonition to Governments; it did not represent any encroachment upon their rights”.94 
Ultimately, there was no consensus as to its meaning, although it was generally understood to 
denote something “unlawful”.95  
 
While it is unclear from the proceedings whether the ‘unlawful’-ness relates to municipal law or 
international law, Cassin’s insistence that the word is an “admonition to Governments” and that 
it does not encroach “upon their rights” tends to suggest that the unlawfulness does not relate to a 
breach of international law. It thus becomes arguable that the ‘arbitrary’ qualification means that 
such deprivation should not be contrary to the law of the relevant country, and as Cassin 
suggested the relevant law itself should also not be made arbitrarily.  
 
It is therefore arguable that even though modern citizenship laws contain provisions for loss or 
revocation of nationality,
96
 such provisions nonetheless are made in deference to this second 
element of the right to nationality, and they essentially comply with the aspirations of Article 15 
of the UDHR.  
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2.1.3 Right to Change Nationality 
 
Just like the second element, the review of UDHR drafting proceedings also suggests that most 
states had little problem with this third element (“right to change nationality”). There was hardly 
any opposition to this provision. This provision has the most successful impact on modern 
nationality laws, as the nationality laws of virtually all States allow individuals to renounce their 
nationality and thus generally give effect to every individual’s right to change nationality. For 
example, Gérard Depardieu, a famous French actor, recently (2013) renounced his French 
citizenship and accepted to become a Russian merely because he was reportedly ‘so exasperated’ 
with French taxes and the French government.
97
 Rene Gonzalez, a member of the “Cuban Five” 
spy group also recently renounced his United States citizenship in order to continue to stay in 
Cuba.
98
 Eduardo Saverin, one of Facebook's four co-founders, has renounced his U.S. citizenship 
allegedly to avoid paying US taxes.
99
  
 
Article 7 of CRS provides that the State law which permits renunciation of nationality should 
ensure that such renunciation is conditioned upon the person concerned possessing or acquiring 
another nationality. In compliance with this provision (or, at least bearing the provision in mind), 
the nationality laws of several countries, including those who are not even parties to the CRS, 
contain provisions which make renunciation of nationality subject to the acquisition of another 
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nationality.
100
 However, by way of protecting states’ interest and affirming state sovereignty, the 
nationality laws of some countries also contain provisions that invalidate any exercise of the 
right to change nationality when the relevant country is involved in a war.
101
 
 
3.0 IS THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?: 
IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
As noted in chapter two, some of the human rights provisions of the UDHR are now considered 
as customary international law.
102
 This raises the question of whether the right to nationality may 
be considered as being part of customary international law, in view of the plurality of 
international/regional instruments bordering on right to nationality and reduction of statelessness, 
and the impact of the right to nationality on modern nationality laws of states. The answer to this 
question will determine the extent to which (a) Burma is obligated to respect the right to 
nationality of the Rohingyas, since it is not a party to most of the relevant international 
instruments, and (b) the extent to which Kuwait is obligated to respect the right to nationality of 
the Bidoons, notwithstanding the reservations it has made in respect of the various international 
instruments. The purpose of this section is to examine the impact of states’ sovereignty on the 
question of whether the right to nationality forms part of customary international law. 
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Like many legal issues, the concept of customary international law is, as Wolfe succinctly puts it, 
a “notoriously controversial character”.103 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice
104
 describes customary international law as “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”. Like most authors, Lepard opines that a customary practice among states can 
evolve into a customary legal norm binding on all States if (a) the practice is consistent among 
States and endures over a period of time, and (b) States believe the practice is legally binding 
(opinio juris).
105
 More importantly, he also argued that “the general recognition by at least most 
states of a practice’s obligatory character is sufficient to bind all states, even those that have not 
explicitly consented to it, including new states, unless they qualify as ‘persistent objector’ to the 
practice.”106 That being the case, the right to nationality will be regarded as part of customary 
international law and will, thus, bind all states if there is “general practice” signaling recognition 
of the right by most states as some form of “legal obligation” (opinio juris).107  
 
In determining whether most states recognize the right to nationality as such, it is useful to, once 
again, consider some states’ practices in relation to each of the three elements of nationality 
discussed above. As previously noted, modern citizenship laws contain provisions which permit 
renunciation of citizenship. They also contain provisions relating to revocation or loss of 
nationality. While the extent to which presence of such provisions in modern nationality laws 
indicates states’ recognition of the right of every individual to change his/her nationality or 
states’ acceptance of the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality remains unclear, 
the existence of such provisions nonetheless greatly supports Forlati’s contention that the right to 
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“retain [prohibition against arbitrary deprivation] and to change” an individual’s nationality are 
“by now part of customary international law.”108  
 
The position of the first element (“everyone has a right to nationality”) is again problematic, 
especially in view of states practice on the vexed issue of citizenship. An indication of states 
practice on this issue is deducible from the apathetic response of the international community, 
represented by the UNGA, to Rohingyas’ nationality travails since 1992 when it passed 
Resolution 47/144 expressing “deep concern” about the Rohingyas’ plight.109 After this 
resolution, subsequent UNGA resolutions on the situation in Burma merely typically deplore 
“the continued violations of human rights” “directed against persons belonging to ethnic and 
religious minorities”110 without making any specific reference to the Rohingyas or their 
nationality travails; even though such resolutions were usually based on UN Special Rapporteurs 
reports which always contain detailed information on the nationality travails of the Rohingyas 
(sometimes referred to as “Muslim communities”).111 The UN Security Council (UNSC) has also 
held several proceedings and issued several statements on the human rights situation in Burma 
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without making any reference to the Rohingyas or their nationality travails.
112
 In other words, 
even though the UNGA/UNSC has always been aware of the nationality travails of the 
Rohingyas, UNGA/UNSC resolutions or statements usually avoid making any reference to them. 
 
There are two possible alternative explanations for the above failure to make any specific 
reference to the Rohingyas or their nationality travails. First, the continued allusion to “ethnic 
and religious minorities” in the UNGA resolutions suggests that the UNGA does not recognize 
the denationalization of the Rohingyas by the 1982 Citizenship Law – in which case, it continues 
to regard the Rohingyas as Burmese citizens. If this is the case, it would represent a fundamental 
departure from the traditional disposition of states not to interfere in other states’ exercise of a 
jealously guarded sovereign right to determine who their nationals are. The second possible 
explanation is that UNGA is adopting a cautious position by choosing to ignore the nationality 
travails of the Rohingyas, in line with the traditional attitude of states not to interfere in the 
nationality issues of another. This latter explanation seems to be the more likely reason for the 
failure to make any such reference. This suggests a general absence of states’ practice 
recognizing a ‘right’ to nationality as such.  
 
However, it is necessary to observe the relative improvement in international response via the 
UNGA resolutions to the Rohingyas nationality travails following the highly publicized ‘boat-
people’ incidence of January 2009.113 Consequently, post-2009 resolutions on Burma now make 
specific reference to the “Rohingya” and their nationality travails. For example, the UNGA in its 
Resolution of 15 November 2010 “[e]xpresses its concern about the continuing discrimination, 
human rights violations, violence, displacement and economic deprivation affecting numerous 
ethnic minorities, including, but not limited to, the Rohingya ethnic minority in Northern 
Rakhine State, and calls upon the Government of Myanmar to take immediate action to bring 
about an improvement in their respective situations, and to grant citizenship to the Rohingya 
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ethnic minority.”114 The Human Rights Council in March 2013 also passed a Resolution which 
urges the Burmese government to “repeal and/or amend laws that deny the Rohingya, inter alia, 
the right to birth registration, the ability to marry and freedom of movement, including equal 
access to citizenship, through a full review of the Citizenship Law of 1982 to ensure that it 
conforms to international obligations defined in treaties to which the Government of Myanmar is 
a party, including their right to a nationality”.115 Similarly, the UNGA Human Rights 
Committee, on 19 November 2013, passed a Resolution which also urges Burma to grant 
citizenship to the Rohingyas.
116
 The Burmese government rejected the above resolutions. 
 
Although the above recent resolutions are a welcome development which may suggest a gradual 
trend towards states’ recognition of nationality as a human right worthy of protection, the 
resolutions presently do not have any impact on the nationality travails of the Rohingyas, as the 
Burmese government still maintains that the Rohingyas are foreigners in Burma. It accuses the 
UN of impinging on its sovereignty by the above-mentioned resolutions.
117
  
 
Another indication of states’ practice suggesting absence of recognition is deducible from the 
number of states that have adopted or ratified the various international instruments on right to 
nationality and reduction of statelessness. For example, as stated above, only 53 and 78 countries 
(excluding major powers like the US, China, Canada India, Russia, and also Burma and Kuwait) 
                                                 
114
 UNGA, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar A/C.3/65/L.48/Rev.1 (November 2010), 
para. 14 [Limited]. See also UNGA, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar A/C.3/66/L.55 
(October 2011), para. 17 [Limited]. 
115
 UNGA, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar A/HRC/22/L.20/Rev.1 (March 2013), para. 8 
[Limited]. 
116
 GA/SHC/4091, 19 November 2013, online: UN 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gashc4091.doc.htm>; See also Michelle Nichols, 
“UN Committee Slaps Syria, Iran, North Korea, Myanmar for Human Rights Abuses” Reuters 
(19 November 2013), online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/20/us-rights-un-
idUSBRE9AJ01A20131120>. 
117
 See “Burma Rejects UN Resolution on Rohingya Muslims” Voice of America (21 November 
2013), online: VOA <http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-burma-rejects-un-resolution-on-
rohingya-muslims/1794749.html>; “Government says Myanmar won’t bend to UN pressure over 
ethnic Rohingya citizenship” Associated Press (21 November 2013), online: The Washington 
Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/government-says-myanmar-wont-
bend-to-un-pressure-over-ethnic-rohingya-citizenship/2013/11/21/af20821e-52ad-11e3-9ee6-
2580086d8254_story.html>. 
80 
 
are parties to the CRS and CRSSP respectively, even though both documents do not essentially 
challenge states’ power to regulate nationality or impose specific duty on the states to grant 
stateless persons citizenship.
118
 A further indication of some states’ practice suggesting absence 
of recognition is deducible from the reservations made to the various international instruments 
on right to nationality and reduction of statelessness, especially of some of the widely adopted 
international instruments, such as the ICCPR, CRC, and CEDAW, discussed above. 
 
Another relevant indication of states’ practice relates to the domestication or replication of 
virtually all the other human rights enumerated in the UDHR in the Constitutions or Bills of 
Rights of various countries, except the right to nationality, just as French Cassin observed, more 
than six decades ago.
119
 
 
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the Hague Convention, which affirms states 
sovereignty on nationality matters, is still a valid statement of international law today. Thus, 
international law presently seems to recognize the concept of nationality as a ‘privilege’ (as per 
the Hague Convention) and nationality as a ‘human right’ (as per Article 15 of the UDHR) 
simultaneously. A review of some international and regional judicial decisions indicates that 
courts generally oscillate between outrightly affirming the exclusive states sovereignty in respect 
of nationality on the one hand, and recognizing the dual conception of nationality, that is, both as 
a human right and a privilege, on the other. For example, the ICJ in Nottebohm affirms that every 
sovereign State has the right to “settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition 
of its nationality”.120 The European Court of Justice in Rottmann also held that “according to 
established case-law, it is for each Member State… to lay down the conditions for the acquisition 
and loss of nationality”.121 By contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Right (IACHR) held 
in a 1984 Advisory Opinion (Costa Rica)
122
 that: 
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[N]nationality is an inherent right of all human beings. Not only is nationality the basic 
requirement for the exercise of political rights, it also has an important bearing on the 
individual's legal capacity. Thus, despite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the 
conferral and regulation of nationality are matters for each state to decide, contemporary 
developments indicate that international law does impose certain limits on the broad 
powers enjoyed by the states in that area, and that the manners in which states regulate 
matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; 
those powers of the state are also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full 
protection of human rights. The classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an 
attribute granted by the state to its subjects, has gradually evolved to the point that 
nationality is today perceived as involving the jurisdiction of the state as well as human 
rights issues.
123
 
 
About two decades later (2005), the IACHR in Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic
124
 
also held that nationality is a “non-derogable” “fundamental human right enshrined in the 
American Convention, and other international instruments”.125 However, the court also held that 
the determination of who has a right to be a national “continues to fall within a State’s domestic 
jurisdiction”.126  
 
Like the international and regional courts/tribunal, some decisions of local courts also tend to 
affirm state sovereignty in respect of nationality at the expense of a human right conception of 
nationality. For example, in Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes
127
 the Dominican 
Supreme Court had to consider whether an act of Congress denying Dominican nationality to the 
children of non-resident aliens was contrary to the Constitution and international law. The 
petitioners had asked the court to strike down several articles of the Migration Act
128
 which 
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deprived children born in the country to non-residents of Dominican nationality, on the grounds 
that the provisions were contrary to Article 11(1) of the Constitution – which considered every 
person born within the territory of the Republic as Dominican nationals, based on principle of jus 
soli. The petitioners’ main contention was that the Migration Act was intended to restrict, limit, 
and exclude children born to the minority Haitian men and women resident in the Dominican 
Republic from Dominican nationality. In dismissing the case, the court held that every state was 
free to set the conditions under which individuals could become its nationals in international law 
and that this was supported in Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws.
129
 It also held that the Congress had not violated any principle 
relating to nationality against the children of nonresident aliens by denying them Dominican 
nationality. However, the court observes that the Dominican Republic is obliged to grant 
nationality to stateless individuals born in its territory, pursuant to the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, but that such obligation did not apply for children of Haitian origin, 
since they were Haitian nationals under the Haitian Constitution. Thus, Haitian children would 
not be rendered stateless by virtue of the Migration Act 2004.
130
 Similarly, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has also affirmed the sovereign power of the state to deprive a person of his 
naturalized citizenship obtained by fraud even when such deprivation would lead to 
statelessness.
131
  
 
The effect of the internationally recognized dual conception of nationality is that the ‘right to a 
nationality’ occupies a unique position in international law. Unlike other human rights, 
international law presently bestows a ‘right to nationality’ on ‘everyone’ on one hand, but 
snatches the right away with the other hand by its recognition of exclusive states’ sovereignty on 
nationality matters. The dual conception of nationality, in any case, does not indicate any general 
practice of states recognizing the provision that “everyone has a right to nationality” as a legally 
binding obligation, so as to justify a conclusion that it forms part of customary international law. 
 
                                                 
129
 Ibid, paras. 32 – 36. 
130
 Ibid, para. 38. 
131
 See O, Final judgment on individual constitutional complaint, 2 BvR 669/04; BVerfGE 116, 
34; ILDC 441 (DE 2006). 
83 
 
In the above premises, while it is arguable that some elements of the right to nationality, namely 
prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality and the right to change nationality, have 
attained the status of customary international law, the most important element (right to [acquire] 
a nationality) does not enjoy such status owing the overriding impact of states sovereignty. 
 
4.0  RESULTANT STATELESSNESS 
 
As shown above, the vagueness and imprecision of provisions relating to the right to nationality, 
as well as international law’s recognition of the dual conception of nationality, essentially result 
in a situation where states still have somewhat unbridled power to determine who is entitled to be 
their national. Although states apparently no longer enact legislation that explicitly denationalize 
people on racial, religious or ideological grounds as was the common case pre-UDHR,
132
 the 
experience of the Rohingyas, Bidoons and ‘Non-citizens’ suggests that states still denationalize 
people or ethnic groups (especially those considered disloyal for whatever reason), by sometimes 
subtle means. One way of doing so is to simply enact legislation that essentially excludes the 
targeted groups as nationals of the relevant state. This is what Blitz and Lynch referred to as the 
“process of exclusion”.133  
 
In other words, unlike the 1916 Portuguese decree, which for example, targeted all citizens born 
of a German father, or the 1935 Nazi Reich Citizenship Law which specifically targeted the Jews 
and Roma, some states – especially newly independent ones – usually denationalize targeted 
groups by enacting nationality legislation that simply identify a portion of the population in their 
territories as ‘citizens’, thereby excluding others. For example, as noted in chapter one, section 3 
of the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, as well as government policy, excludes the Rohingyas as 
citizens of Burma. Kuwaiti law places obstacles on the Nomadic Bidoon while Latvia uses 
language and previous employment with the former Soviet Union to exclude the Russian-
speaking ‘Non-citizens’.    
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The subtle nature of denationalization by the “process of exclusion” makes it look like the 
exercise of a specie of the right of a people to self-determination; in this case, the right of a 
people to determine who they are and who should be a part of them. This invokes a jealously-
guarded right of all states which no state is willing to put at risk by interfering in the nationality 
issues of other states. Hence, for example, the Feili Kurds were deprived of Iraqi nationality 
under Saddam Hussein who claimed they were Iranians, and were expelled to Iran without any 
international interference.
134
 The Black Mauritanians were also deprived of their nationality by 
the majority Arab-led government and expelled to neighbouring countries without any 
interference.
135
  
 
Another aspect of the above-mentioned subtle denationalization is that the use of validly enacted 
legislation, such as the Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law, gives a semblance of legitimacy to the 
denationalization.  In other words, such legislation will not, on the face of it, be considered be in 
violation of the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality. 
 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
The above discussion on the interplay between state sovereignty and each of the three elements 
of the right to nationality shows that, in spite of the vagueness and imprecision that characterize 
the right to nationality provisions, the concept of a right to nationality has tremendously 
impacted the development of the modern nationality laws of various states, especially in relation 
to the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of an individual’s nationality, and the preservation of 
an individual’s right to change his/her nationality.  
 
Although some authors have suggested that the states’ representatives at the UDHR drafting 
stage were quite confused as to the existence of a right to a nationality or its content, the 
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representatives nonetheless understood the draft Article 15 of the UDHR to constitute a 
statement of a general principle which was not supposed to contain any provision for 
implementation.
136
 Notwithstanding the representatives’ intentions, there is no doubt that, with 
the plurality of international instruments declaring a right to nationality and/or imposing 
obligation on states to reduced statelessness, Article 15 of the UDHR has also gone beyond the 
hopes and expectations of many of its drafters.
137
  
 
However, the confusion that characterized the right to nationality, starting at the drafting stage, is 
still present unto this day. Hence the concept of nationality in international law oscillates 
between being a ‘privilege’ doled out and withdraw-able within the whims and caprices of 
States, to a ‘human right’ everyone is entitled to under international law. As a result of this 
confusion, most literature adopt a cautious approach in their interpretation of the right to 
nationality. For example, Chan, after an extensive review of virtually all relevant international 
instruments, merely noted a “clear trend in international law towards a gradual recognition of an 
individual’s right to nationality.”138 In Van Vlymen, Justice Russell of the Federal Court 
(Canada), describes nationality as a “fledgling human right”.139 Forlati also noted that the 
“tension between the states’ discretion and acknowledgment of a fully fledged human right to 
nationality that emerge clearly as regard the acquisition of nationality” and the “doubt” it gave 
rise to.
140
 The French writer, Decaux, summed up the situation of the right to nationality thus: 
 
Le droit a la nationalité a un sujet et un objet, mais non un débiteur.
141
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Unlike most other internationally recognized human rights whose origins are traceable to the 
progressive historical Western documents on human rights, the right to nationality was borne out 
of the necessities of WWII. Again, the right to nationality fundamentally challenges the 
sovereign rights of states, resulting in a situation where no state wants to risk its own sovereignty 
by interfering in the nationality issues of another.  As the Swahili saying goes “where two 
elephants fight, the grass suffers”. Like the suffering grass, it is the stateless people like the 
Rohingyas, Bidoons and others who suffer the consequence of the conflict between the right to 
nationality and state sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TAKING RIGHT TO NATIONALITY SERIOUSLY: AN ERGA OMNES OBLIGATION? 
 
Not only did the loss of national rights in all instances entail the loss of human 
rights; the restoration of human rights…has been established so far only through 
the restoration or establishment of national rights. The conception of human 
rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down 
at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first 
time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific 
relationships- except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred 
in the abstract nakedness of being human.
1
  
 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, two main objectives for the emergence of nationality as a 
human right were to: (a) remedy the situation of the millions of stateless people who were 
refugees in various parts of Europe after the Second World War, and (b) prevent future 
statelessness.
2
 However, the continued existence of stateless groups like the Rohingyas and the 
Bidoons suggests that the intended use of the concept of a right to nationality to prevent future 
statelessness has not been achieved. This is due to the overbearing influence of states’ 
sovereignty on the general perception of the right to nationality. 
 
As also already observed, a fundamental rule of international law is that states are generally 
required to consent to the provisions of a treaty in order for the state to be bound by the treaty. A 
corollary of this rule is that where a state is not a party to a relevant international instrument, it 
will not be bound by its provisions.
3
 Burma has not ratified most of the relevant international 
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instruments relating to the right to nationality, while Kuwait made reservations to the relevant 
provisions in the few instruments it ratified.
4
 The effect of the aforementioned rule on states’ 
consent is that Burma and Kuwait are not obliged to observe the right to nationality of the 
Rohingyas and Bidoons respectively. Thus, the effective denationalization of the Rohingyas and 
the Biddons by virtue of their respective citizenship law is, based on the requirement of state 
consent, not in violation of international human rights law. However, one of the exceptions to the 
requirement of state consent is the concept of erga omnes obligation.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to make a case that the right to nationality should be taken 
seriously and the duty to protect the right should be protected as an erga omnes obligation. This 
involves an examination of the relationship between possession of nationality and the enjoyment 
of other rights, as well as the relationship between denationalization/statelessness and the duty to 
prevent acts of genocide – using the Rohingyas and other stateless people as a case study.  
 
1.0 THE CONCEPT OF ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS 
 
The Latin expression erga omnes is used to describe an obligation owed to all mankind and 
which all states have an interest in its enforcement.
5
 The term is used in contradistinction with 
the obligations of a state arising from, for example, bilateral treaties. The concept received 
judicial impetus in the dictum of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Barcelona Traction 
case
6
 where the court stated that: 
 
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field 
of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In 
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view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for 
example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.
7
 
 
The above dictum identifies two features of erga omnes obligations, (a) universality, in the sense 
that erga omnes obligations are binding on all states without exception, and (b) solidarity, in the 
sense that every State is deemed to have a legal interest in their protection.
8
 In order to further 
clarify the position of erga omnes obligations in international law, it useful to examine the 
similarities and difference between erga omnes obligations and jus cogen norms. 
 
1.1 Erga Omnes and Jus Cogens 
 
Also related to the concept of erga omnes obligations in international law is the concept of jus 
cogens (“the compelling law”). Jus cogens are “non-derogable rules of international ‘public 
policy’”,9 which according to Bassiouni, occupy “the highest hierarchical position among all 
other norms and principles” in international law.10 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention is 
generally regarded as a codification of the status of jus cogens under international law. It states 
that a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law (jus cogen).
11
 In order for a norm to qualify as jus cogen under Article 
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53 of the Vienna Convention, the norm must be: (a) “of general international law”, as opposed to 
regional international law,
12
 (b) “accepted and recognized” by the international community of 
States as a whole – this however does not mean that there must be a unanimous agreement by all 
states,
13
 (c) one of which “no derogation is permitted”, and which “can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”14 
 
Some authors have identified some similarities between the concepts of erga omnes obligations 
and jus cogens. For example, Ragazzi observes that they are both “meant to protect the common 
interests of States and basic moral values.”15 However there is some confusion on the exact 
nature of the relationship between the two concepts.
16
 While some scholars have asserted that 
there are important differences between the two concepts,
17
 others have argued that the two 
concepts refer to different aspects of the same rules, and are therefore coterminous.
18
 For 
example, according to Picone, “[t]he category of rules which impose obligations erga omnes has 
been kept distinct from the category of rules of jus cogens from the very beginning”.19 He argues 
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that there is no justification to postulate that the norms which impose obligations erga omnes are 
generally non-derogable.
20
 Similarly, Byers uses the mode of creation and the effect of the two 
rules to make distinction between jus cogens and erga omnes. According to him, jus cogens rules 
“are derived from the ‘process of customary international law’, which is itself part of an 
international constitutional order” while erga omnes rules may “be created either through the 
process of customary international law or by treaty”. 21 He concludes that while “jus cogens rules 
are necessarily erga omnes rules”, “erga omnes rules could exist which were not of a jus cogens 
character”22 and that “[u]nlike jus cogens rules, erga omnes rules operate to expand the scope of 
possible claimants in those situations where traditional rules of standing do not suffice to ensure 
that all rules of international law are capable of supporting effective inter-State claims.”23 Like 
Byers, Neito-Navia, has also argued that “although all norms of jus cogens are enforceable erga 
omnes not all erga omnes obligations are jus cogens.”24 To Zemanek, “all peremptory norms 
create obligations erga omnes, but not all erga omnes obligations derive from peremptory 
norms.”25 
 
Notwithstanding the confusion on the exact nature of the relationship between jus cogens and 
erga omnes, existing literature tend to agree on duty to observance of human rights as a point of 
convergence between the two concepts.
26
 However, not all norms of human rights can be 
included as jus cogens.
27
  
                                                                                                                                                             
erga omnes are peremptory or not”, as evidence that the Court “therefore does not intend to 
impose limits on the will of states: rather, it recognizes that they have functional powers… to be 
managed on behalf of the international community as a whole”. 
20
 Ibid, at 418. 
21
 Byers, supra, note 7, at 212. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid, at 212 – 213. 
24
 Nieto-Navia, supra, note 3, at 609.  
25
 Zemanek, supra, note 5, at 6. 
26
 See for example, Neito-Navia, supra, note 3, at 607; Theodor Meron, “On a Hierarchy of 
International Human Rights” (1988) 80:1 American Journal of International Law 1, at 14 
Meron]; Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar, eds., Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of 
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1.2 The Protection of Human Rights as Erga Omnes Obligation 
 
Scholars generally identify sources of international human rights law along the lines of the 
sources of international law itself set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). These are (a) international conventions, (b) international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised 
nations; (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
28
 However, the erga 
omnes rule in the Barcelona Traction case suggests that an obligation to protect basic human 
rights in international law may arise outside treaties and customary international law. Of 
particular importance to this thesis are: (a) the recognition of the rules concerning basic human 
rights, and (b) the rule outlawing genocide. 
 
There has been much debate on what constitutes the “basic rights” of the human person and the 
extent to which the ICJ intended to distinguish between basic rights and other rights.
29
 For 
example, according to Meron, it is unclear whether the “basic rights” “are synonymous with 
human rights tout court or are limited to rights intimately associated with the human person and 
human dignity and generally accepted, such as the protection from slavery and racial 
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“Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights” (1988-89) 12 Hastings International and 
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Materials, Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 170 -174; Henry Shue, “Basic Rights” in Rhonda L. 
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discrimination”.30 He argues that “[i]f the Court intended to set apart the basic rights of the 
human person, the inclusion of some human rights among them would perhaps depend on their 
acceptance into the corpus of general international law or on their incorporation into instruments 
of a universal or quasi-universal character; but a more subjective and difficult characterization 
would also have to be made, such as the nature of their association with the human person and 
human dignity.”31 Ragazzi also observed that some literature used the term “basic rights’ 
interchangeably with “fundamental rights” and “human rights”.32 He however opines that the 
ICJ, in confining its dictum to the basic rights of the human person, “seemed to convey the clear 
message that the character erga omnes does not apply indiscriminately to all principles and rules 
protecting human rights.”33 He examines the Restatement on foreign relations law adopted by the 
American Law Institute which, in listing the human rights that are protected by international 
customs and entail the responsibility of a law-breaker to all other States (erga omnes), mentions 
only a few other obligations than those listed by the ICJ. The additional obligations are ‘the 
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals’, ‘torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment’, ‘prolonged arbitrary detention’, and ‘a consistent pattern of 
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights’.34 According to him, this shows 
“that the Restatement, almost twenty years after the International Court’s dictum, took the same 
cautious approach and restricted the character erga omnes to only a few obligations in the area of 
human rights”.35 He however also observes that the Institute of International Law adopted a 
different approach when it adopted a resolution on human rights and non-intervention at its 
session in Santiago de Compostela in 1989. Article 1 of the Resolution reads thus:  
 
Human rights are a direct expression of the dignity of the human person. The obligation 
of States to ensure their observance derives from the recognition of this dignity as 
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. This international obligation, as expressed by the International Court of 
Justice, is erga omnes; it is incumbent upon every State in relation to the international 
community as a whole, and every State has a legal interest in the protection of human 
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rights. The obligation further implies a duty of solidarity among all States to ensure as 
rapidly as possible the effective protection of human rights throughout the world.
36
 
 
 
The above resolution tends to suggest that “the very obligation of States to ensure the protection 
of human rights is an obligation erga omnes” and it applies to every right recognized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
37
 The suggestion finds support in the works of some 
authors who have rejected any distinction between “basic rights” and other human rights,38 and 
the Vienna Declaration which states that all human rights are universal, indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated.
39
 Some authors have, however, rejected the notion of the 
indivisibility of human rights and instead argue that human rights are in hierarchical order.
40
 Just 
like jus cogens, it is doubtful if all human rights can be said to impose obligation erga omnes on 
states.
41
  
 
Leaving aside the debate as to whether all human rights may be said to be “fundamental” or 
“basic”, it is arguable that, by restricting its reference to basic human rights and listing a few 
specific examples in the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ implicitly rejected the idea that the 
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duty to protect all human rights constitutes obligations erga omnes. It, therefore, seems that the 
rights contemplated by the ICJ to constitute basic human rights are such that, as Ragazzi has 
suggested, would coincide with non-derogable rights in a public emergency.
42
  The rights would 
also be such that, according to Shue, the “enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all 
other rights”.43 O’Manique also describes such rights as those that are required for “good human 
development”.44  
 
Adopting Shue’s and O’Manique positions on what constitutes basic human rights, this chapter 
will examine whether the protection of the right to nationality qualifies as an erga omnes 
obligation. This will be done by: (a) examining the relationship between the right to nationality 
and the enjoyment of other rights for the purpose of contending that the right to nationality 
qualifies a basic right, and (b) examining the relationship between denationalization/statelessness 
and the erga omnes duty to prevent genocide, for the purpose of determining to the extent to 
which the practice of denationalizing certain ethnic groups qualifies as an early warning or step 
towards genocide. 
 
2.0 RIGHT TO NATIONALITY AS “BASIC RIGHT” 
 
Hannah Arendt was one of the millions of Jews who were stripped of their German citizenship 
by Nazi Germany in 1933. She became a naturalized US citizen in 1951.
45
 Her work, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism is a detailed reflection of her experience as a stateless person in pre-
UDHR Europe. She compares the travails of stateless people with the prevailing arguments, 
inspired by the American Bill of Rights (1789) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
(1789), that the rights of man are “inalienable”,46 “irreducible and undeducible from other rights 
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or law”,47 “independent of all governments”,48 “spring immediately from the ‘nature’ of man”,49 
“self-evident truths”,50 etc., and she concludes that “the world found nothing sacred in the 
abstract nakedness of being human”.51 According to her, the stateless person is an “anomaly” for 
whom the law has not made any provision, an “outlaw” who is “completely at the mercy of the 
police, which itself did not worry too much about committing a few illegal acts in order to 
diminish the country's burden of indesirables.”52 The “internment camp” was the only “country” 
the world could offer the stateless.
53
    
 
She identifies some of the losses suffered by the stateless, who she describes as “rightless”. 
According to her, the first loss was “the loss of their homes, and this meant the loss of the entire 
social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct 
place in the world.”54 This represents not just the loss of a home “but the impossibility of finding 
a new one” in the sense of there being “no place on earth where [they] could go without the 
severest restrictions, no country where they would be assimilated, no territory where they could 
found a new community of their own”.55 The second loss was “the loss of government 
protection, and this did not imply just the loss of legal status in their own, but in all countries”.56 
According to her, the calamity of the stateless people is: 
 
[N]ot that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality 
before the law and freedom of opinion—formulas which were designed to solve problems 
within given communities—but that they no longer belong to any community 
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whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law 
exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them.
57
  
 
 
It is tempting to argue that today’s world is markedly different from pre-UDHR Europe, which 
had influenced Arendt’s perception of the stateless people, with the adoption of the various 
international human rights instruments. For example, the UDHR declares that all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights,
58
 and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
59
 Article 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also obliges each State Party to 
the Covenant to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction enjoy all the rights recognized in the Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. According to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, “the 
rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of 
his or her nationality or statelessness”.60 Similarly, the UN Committee on the Right of the Child 
has also stated that “the enjoyment of rights stipulated in the Convention is not limited to 
children who are citizens of a State party and must therefore, if not explicitly stated otherwise in 
the Convention, also be available to all children - including asylum-seeking, refugee and migrant 
children – irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or statelessness”.61 
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The existence of various international human rights instruments which purport to apply to 
‘everyone’ has resulted in arguments regarding human rights based on ‘humanity’. For example, 
van Waas observes a “trend towards the denationalization” of human rights62 and concedes a 
“possible denationalization of rights”.63 Donnelly also declares that “[h]uman rights are, literally, 
the rights that one has simply because one is a human being.”64  
 
Against the backdrop of the above contrasting positions, the purpose of this chapter is to show 
that despite the everyone-ness claim of the various international human rights provisions, most of 
the rights couched as belonging to ‘everyone’ are, as van Waas beautifully puts it, “citizens 
rights dressed up as human rights”.65 This will involve an examination of the possession of 
nationality as a precursor to the enjoyment of other international human rights for the purpose of 
showing that the ‘right to nationality’ is properly described as the “right to have rights”66 and is 
therefore a basic right within the erga omnes rule.  
 
2.1 Freedom of Movement 
 
Article 13 of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone’ has the right to freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of each state, and that everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including their own, and to return to their country. This freedom of movement under the UDHR 
consists of three elements: (a) freedom to move freely and reside within the states, (b) right to 
return to one’s country, (c) freedom to leave any country. 
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2.1.1 Freedom to move freely and reside within the State 
 
Only the UDHR makes this right available to everyone: other international and regional human 
rights instruments make the rights applicable to citizens or ‘everyone lawfully within the 
territory’ of states.67 The use of the qualifying word ‘lawfully’ suggests the exclusion of 
unlawful residents. This effectively excludes the vast majority of stateless people, like the 
Bidoons who, as shown in chapter one, are classified as ‘illegal residents’ in Kuwait, and the 
Rohnigyas, who are also generally unlawful residents in the neighbouring countries where they 
fled to.
68
 Being regarded as unlawful residents, the Rohingyas and Bidoons are unable to move 
freely within their respective countries. Their unlawful residence also seems to preclude them 
from the application of Article 26 of the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons 
(CRSSP),
69
 which obliges contracting states to accord stateless persons ‘lawfully in its territory’ 
the right to choose their residence and move freely within its territory.
70
 Hence, available 
evidence suggests that the statelessness of stateless people like the Rohingyas usually make them 
victims of arbitrary arrests and detention.
71
 Indeed, most of them are sometimes confined to 
‘internment’ or refugee camps in neighbouring countries. 
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Even within their respective countries, the Rohingyas and the Bidoons do not enjoy any freedom 
to move within the country. In Burma, a 2004 Amnesty International report found that the 
citizens’ identity card functions as an “internal passport” which enables people to freely move 
from place to place.
72
  However, the Rohingyas do not have this important “internal passport” by 
reason of their denationalization, thus they “must apply for permission” to leave their village in 
Northern Arakan State, even if it is just to go to another nearby village.
73
 The report also 
observes that when the Rohingyas want to travel to a village in the same township they need to 
apply for “a local travel pass”, but if they want to go further, for example to another township, 
they have to apply for a different kind of travel permit known as ‘Form 4’ at the Immigration 
Department at the NaSaKa camp.
74
 They are also required to state their reasons for the travel and 
pay for the Form 4. This practice does not extend to other residents of Arakan State.
75
 
 
2.1.2  Right to return to one’s country 
 
One of the most significant implications of being a citizen of a country is the right to enter the 
country.
76
 Arendt describes this as a right to a “place in the world”.77 A state’s duty to admit its 
nationals has been described as “the essence of nationality”.78 This right to return to one’s 
country also implies the right to ‘remain’ in the country and not be expelled from it. This right is 
also unavailable to stateless people like the Rohingyas and the Bidoons who are regarded as 
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citizens of nowhere. The dilemma of the stateless in this regard was aptly explained by van Waas 
thus:  
[W]hile citizens enjoy the right to (re)enter and remain in their country of nationality, 
states remain free to “set the conditions for entry and residence of aliens [and retain] the 
right to expel them”. An individual may, therefore, be refused admittance to — or be 
expelled from — a state of which he is not a national. Where the stateless are concerned, 
that is, every state. The stateless are, once more, the victims of a hidden exclusion clause 
and find themselves without any automatic and unqualified right to (re)enter or remain on 
the soil of any state.
79
 
 
 
2.1.3 Freedom to leave ‘own’ or ‘any’ country 
 
Like the UDHR, other international and regional human rights instruments provide that everyone 
has a right to leave any country, including his own
80
 or that no one should be ‘arbitrarily or 
unlawfully prevented’ to leave any country.81  For stateless persons, the enjoyment of this rights 
“becomes a practical impossibility”82 for various reasons. First, they do not ‘own’ any country 
from which they have right of emigration. Second, and more importantly, the absence of their 
‘own’ country also means that they are usually unable to obtain international passports, which in 
modern times is the most acceptable and valid international travel document. Regarding the right 
to leave ‘any’ country, the inability to obtain international passports also invariably impedes the 
freedom of stateless persons to leave ‘any’ country. However, Article 28 of the CRSSP provides 
thus:  
 
The Contracting States shall issue to stateless persons lawfully staying in their territory 
travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling 
reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the 
Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The Contracting 
States may issue such a travel document to any other stateless person in their territory and 
they shall in particular give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel 
document to stateless persons in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel 
document from the country of their lawful residence.   
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This article seems to recognize the reality that the vast majority of stateless persons are not 
‘lawfully staying’ in the territory of contracting states, hence its provision that ‘any other 
stateless person’ in the territory should be given ‘sympathetic consideration’. It also seeks to 
tackle some of the challenges facing stateless persons living unlawfully in the territory of 
contracting states. Unfortunately, and like other provisions relating to stateless people, some 
contracting states have invoked their ‘sovereignty’ to reduce the effectiveness of this provision. 
Austria, for example, declared that this provision shall apply only to stateless persons ‘lawfully’ 
in its territory.
83
 Bulgaria declared that it shall only apply to persons the country has “granted the 
status of stateless person” and who also have “permanent or long-term residence permit in 
accordance with the national legislation of the Republic of Bulgaria.”84 For Czech Republic, the 
provision is only applicable to stateless persons having “permanent residence permit”,85 while 
Finland declared it will not issue such documents at all.
86
  
 
The effect of the above is that the vast majority of stateless persons around the world do not have 
access to valid travel documents, which results in the stateless persons virtually having no 
“freedom” to move from country to country. The predicament of an average stateless person is 
aptly described by a Human Rights Watch’s reported testimony of an ‘undocumented Royingya 
man in Kuala Lumpur’:  
 
In 1990 I was arrested and because there was no detention camp I was sent to Pudu jail. I 
was coming from work when the police asked for my passport. I was doing daily work-
construction. The police arrested me for a passport case. I didn't see a judge or 
magistrate, and I didn't have a charge or a sentence. After about four months in jail, 
immigration took me to the Thai border. Other Rohingya, Burmese, Pakistanis, and a few 
Indonesians were there as well.  
In 1993 I was arrested on my way home from work. I was in Pudu jail for about three 
months and was then sent to the Thai border.  
In 1995 I was sent to the Kajang immigration camp. It was also a passport case, and I was 
brought to the court. In court the magistrate asked me if I was arrested two other times, 
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and I said "yes." He asked when I came and if I had travel documents. I said that I had 
none because I am Rohingya and explained that I couldn't stay in Burma. The magistrate 
asked me if I was guilty of illegal entry, and I said "yes." He sentenced me to two months 
in Kajang prison. I did not have a lawyer. After prison I was sent to Kajang immigration 
camp for eight months. With eighty other Rohingya I was then deported to the Thai 
border.
87
 
 
2.2 Right to take part in Government and access to Civil Service
88
 
 
Article 21 of the UDHR states that everyone has the right to take part in the government of their 
country and also that everyone has the right of equal access to public service in their country. 
This political right includes the right to vote and be voted for, and also the right to work in public 
service. It seems the modern expression of this right has moved beyond merely queuing at 
polling stations or having one’s name on the ballot paper as a candidate, rather, it now 
encompasses the right to be heard in the running of state affairs, right to hold the government 
accountable to its citizens for its various actions and policies. This modern expression is 
presently vivid in the on-going Arab Spring and the various versions of Occupy (Wall Street) 
movements. The Arab Spring and the Occupy (Wall Street) movements have become an avenue 
for people in the Middle East and the Western world to assert their socio-political rights to take 
part in the management of their affairs, as well as to hold the government accountable to its 
citizens. 
 
Although the UDHR claims that this right is for everyone, other international and regional 
human rights instruments have restricted the application of this right to ‘citizens’ only.89 
According to Rudan, “political rights constitute a fundamental feature of the modern idea of 
citizenship. Both the right to vote and the right to hold public office can be restricted on the basis 
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of nationality.”90 The limited application of this right effectively means that stateless persons, 
who in any event do not have any country to call their ‘own’, are excluded from the application 
of the right to participate in ‘the government of their country’.91 In other words, stateless people 
like the Rohingyas and Bidoons are unable to enjoy this right because they have no country or 
government. Again, with the restriction of the application this right to ‘citizens’, they are also not 
usually in a position to protest against the government of their respective states or wherever they 
find themselves as ‘lawful’ or ‘unlawful’ residents.  
 
2.3 Employment Rights 
 
Article 23 of the UDHR encapsulates modern employment rights under international human 
rights law. It provides for the “right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment”. Even though the 
UDHR claims the right is for ‘everyone’, some other international and regional human rights 
instruments make the right available only to citizens, or at least make a distinction between the 
citizen’s rights and that of ‘everyone’. For example, Article 15 of the European Convention 
provides that (a) everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or 
accepted occupation, and (b) every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to 
work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State. 
Similarly, Article 34 of the Arab Charter provides that “[e]very citizen shall have the right to 
work. The State undertakes to ensure employment for as many employment seekers as possible, 
while ensuring maximum state production, and the freedom to work and equality of opportunity 
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, 
affiliation to a trade union, national or social origin, handicap or other status”. 
 
Notwithstanding the ‘everyone’ or ‘as many employment seekers’ provision in the EU and Arab 
instruments respectively, stateless people like the Rohingyas and the Bidoons do not enjoy any 
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such rights.
92
 Available Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports show that the 
Rohingyas and the Bidoons are severely restricted from seeking employment.
93
  
 
Furthermore, and as observed above, most stateless individuals such as the Rohingyas and 
Bidoons are largely uneducated and unskilled, and as a result they do not really have any ‘free 
choice of employment’, even in places where they are allowed to work. Thus, they are usually 
consigned to doing mostly menial, unskilled, hard labor jobs. 
 
2.4 Right to Social Security 
 
Articles 22 and 25 of the UDHR provide that everyone has the right to social security, the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. Article 9 of the ICESCR also obliges states 
parties to “recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance”.94 While 
it is acknowledged that the right to social security is generally not available in most countries, in 
the few countries that recognize and protect the right, stateless persons are not entitled to such 
right.
95
 Under the European Convention, for example, the right is available only to “everyone 
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residing or moving legally” within the European Union and its application is subject to “national 
laws and practice”.96 
 
2.5 Right to Recognition everywhere as a Person before the Law 
 
Article 6 of the UDHR provides that “everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a 
person before the law”. Like the UDHR, other international and regional human rights 
instruments also make this right available to ‘everyone’.97 This right is one of the somewhat 
unique rights that arose directly from the atrocities of Nazi Germany;
98
 one of which was a 
reported case in which a German court reportedly declared a person “legally dead”, and “of 
complete legal incompetence” and “lack of rights” simply because he was a Jew.99 The reported 
reasoning of Nazi German Court was that “[j]ust as death makes someone incapable of carrying 
on physically… being a Jew made [the] man incapable of ‘carrying out his duties’ as the director 
of a film. His contract with the film production company was canceled because the man’s 
Jewishness made him legally dead.”100 The right, as conceived in the UDHR, was intended to 
remove any such incapacity or disability and assert instead that everyone has “the ability ‘to be a 
bearer of rights, obligations and responsibilities’”.101 The right is known to include, “as a rule, 
the capacity to be a party to judicial proceedings”, that is, capacity to sue and be sued.102 
                                                                                                                                                             
Latvia, Romanian, etc., raised different objections and reservations to the applicability of 
Articles 24 and 25 to stateless persons in their territory. 
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Closely related to this right of recognition is the principle that all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights stated in Article 1 of the UDHR.
103
 In other words, every person 
or Homo sapiens is entitled to recognition as a ‘person’ and to be treated as having equal rights 
and obligation under the law, especially in relation to capacity to institute and defend legal 
proceedings. ‘Legal proceedings’ in this sense should be taken as relating to civil cases only. In 
relation to criminal proceedings, Arendt explains the status of the stateless person thus: 
 
The best criterion by which to decide whether someone has been forced outside the pale 
of the law is to ask if he would benefit by committing a crime. If a small burglary is 
likely to improve his legal position, at least temporarily, one may be sure he has been 
deprived of human rights. For then a criminal offense becomes the best opportunity to 
regain some kind of human equality, even if it be as a recognized exception to the norm. 
The one important fact is that this exception is provided for by law. As a criminal even a 
stateless person will not be treated worse than another criminal, that is, he will be treated 
like everybody else. Only as an offender against the law can he gain protection from it. 
As long as his trial and his sentence last, he will be safe from that arbitrary police rule 
against which there are no lawyers and no appeals. The same man who was in jail 
yesterday because of his mere presence in this world, who had no rights whatever and 
lived under threat of deportation, or who was dispatched without sentence and without 
trial to some kind of internment because he had tried to work and make a living, may 
become almost a full-fledged citizen because of a little theft. Even if he is penniless he 
can now get a lawyer, complain about his jailers, and he will be listened to respectfully. 
He is no longer the scum of the earth but important enough to be informed of all the 
details of the law under which he will be tried. He has become a respectable person.
104
 
 
 
Thus, stateless people tend to suffer no discrimination in criminal proceedings. On the contrary, 
and as suggested by Arendt, committing crimes tend to be beneficial to their status. However, in 
relation to other proceedings, available evidence suggests that the right of recognition as a person 
before the law is generally unavailable for stateless people, who as beautifully captured by 
Arendt, “the world has found nothing sacred in the[ir] abstract nakedness”.105 At the inter-state 
level, for example, there is a dictum of an international arbitral tribunal which declared that a 
state “does not commit an international delinquency in inflicting an injury upon an individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; A Common Standard of Achievements (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1999), 147 – 151 [Bogdan & Oslen].  
103
 Bogdan & Oslen, supra, note 102, at 147. 
104
 Arendt, supra, note 1, at 286 – 287. 
105
 Ibid, 299. 
108 
 
lacking nationality, and consequently, no state is empowered to intervene or complain on his 
behalf either before or after the injury”.106 Again, available evidence also suggests that stateless 
persons lack the requisite capacity to institute or defend an action in some jurisdictions. For 
example, Biancheria reviews a host of United States judicial decisions relating to the provisions 
of the United States Judicial Code,
107
 which govern suits involving foreign parties.
108
 She argues 
that the provision denies “persons considered stateless” access to the federal judicial system.109 
She concludes that “[t]he denial of access to federal courts exacerbates existing problems 
experienced by persons who are deemed stateless, a legal status which ‘entails a most severe and 
dramatic deprivation of the power of the individual’”.110 This position was observed by the Inter-
American Court for Human Rights in Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic 
when it held that “[a] stateless person, ex definitione, does not have recognized juridical 
personality, because he has not established a juridical and political connection with any State; 
thus nationality is a prerequisite for recognition of juridical personality”.111 
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In modern times, possession of valid and proper legal identification documents is crucial to the 
exercise of this right of recognition as a person before the law, such that absence of proper 
identification documents becomes synonymous with nonexistence as a person. Hence, 
registration of births, marriage and death, possession of driver’s license, passport etc., are now 
seen to be sine qua non to recognition as a person before the law.
112
 For example, in March 
2013, the UN Human Rights Council passed a Resolution on this right to recognition as a person 
before the law,
113
 which states that it is: 
 
Recognizing the importance of birth registration, including late birth registration and 
provision of documents of proof of birth, as a means for providing an official record of 
the existence of a person and the recognition of that individual as a person before the law; 
expressing concern that unregistered individuals have limited or no access to services and 
enjoyment of all the rights to which they are entitled; also taking into consideration that 
persons without birth registration are vulnerable to lack of protection; and aware that 
registering a person’s birth is a vital step towards the promotion and protection of all his 
or her human rights, and protection from violence, exploitation and abuse.
114
  
 
A similar resolution passed in 2012 also “[took] into consideration that persons without birth 
registration may be vulnerable to statelessness and associated lack of protection; and [is] aware 
that registering a person’s birth is a vital step towards his or her protection”.115 Blitz, in his report 
for Refugee International sums up the position of stateless people in this regard as follows: 
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All too often, the births, marriages, and deaths of stateless people are not certified and, as 
a result, many stateless persons lack even basic documentation. This lack of identification 
means that they are often powerless to seek redress through the courts.
116
 
 
 
In relation to the Rohingyas and Bidoons, they are denied access to crucial legal identification 
documents by the Burmese and Kuwaiti governments respectively. This denial effectively robs 
them of any means to assert their right to recognition as persons before the law since they are 
unable to prove their ‘existence’. For example, and as noted in chapter one, a 2005 Parliamentary 
Committee reported that the Bidoons “are not allowed to get driving licenses or any other form 
of identification from government offices… are also deprived of any right of possession of 
personal identity or anything to prove their legal residence. They cannot register births, 
marriages, divorces and death”.117 Although some Rohingyas have government-issued “white 
card” or “temporary registration cards” which do not imply any citizenship rights,118 available 
evidence suggests that they also suffer severe restriction in registering births, marriage and 
death.
119
 According to a Human Rights Watch Report, “[m]ost Rohingya lack formal documents, 
and even those who come from families that have lived in Burma for generations do not have 
any way of providing ‘conclusive evidence’ of their lineage in Burma prior to 1948, let alone 
prior to 1823, denying them Burmese citizenship”.120 The report also found many Rohingyas lost 
their documents in arson attacks during the violence of June 2012, or had the documents forcibly 
taken away from them by local authorities.
121
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2.6 Freedom against (Racial) Discrimination 
 
The prohibition against discrimination in the application of human rights provisions has become 
a fundamental principle of international human rights law. Hence, virtually all international and 
regional human rights contain provisions prohibiting discrimination. For example, Article 2 of 
the UDHR declares that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status or international 
status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-
self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty”.122 Article 1 of the American 
Convention also provides that the States Parties to the Convention “undertake to respect the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic 
status, birth, or any other social condition”. More importantly, sub-article 2 states that “[f]or the 
purposes of this Convention, ‘person’ means every human being”.123 The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
124
 defines ‘racial discrimination’ as “any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”.125 Thus, the crux of this 
prohibition against discrimination is that all persons or, in the words of the American 
Convention, ‘every human being’ is entitled to the human rights set out in the relevant 
instruments. Some authors have rightly observed that this rule against discrimination is now part 
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of customary international law.
126
 And as noted above, the decision of the ICJ in the Barcelona 
Traction case specifically referred to protection of this right as an erga omnes obligation. 
 
However, available evidence suggests that the Rohingyas and Biddons do not enjoy this right 
within and outside their respective countries, by reason of their statelessness. As shown in 
chapter one, the Rohingyas and Bidoons, in Burma and Kuwait respectively, are not allowed to 
participate in the political affairs of their respective countries. Unlike other ethnic groups in their 
respective countries, they face severe restriction in areas of access to health care, education, 
employment, freedom of movement, etc., because they are not regarded as citizens of their 
respective countries. 
 
Also relevant is the actual and potential discrimination the Rohingyas and Bidoon face outside 
their borders as a result of their statelessness. Arendt observes the ‘damage’ “statelessness did to 
the time-honored and necessary distinctions between nationals and foreigners, and to the 
sovereign right of states in matters of nationality and expulsion” and how the stateless occupy a 
unique disadvantaged position that makes them to be treated differently in international law.
127
 In 
other words, because they are stateless, they are treated differently or discriminatorily from other 
aliens/foreigners by various nations. For example, Italy is a party to both the 1954 Convention on 
the Status of Stateless Person and the Convention on the Relating to the Status of Refugees.
128
 
Articles 17 and 18 of both conventions deal with the right to employment of stateless persons 
and refugees in the territory of contracting States respectively. While Italy accepted to “accord to 
a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less 
favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances”, it entered a 
reservation to a similar provision in respect of stateless people. Thus, Italy effectively does not 
allow stateless people to enjoy the same rights available to ‘refugees’ and other aliens.  
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2.7 Right to Education 
 
Article 26 of the UDHR provides that everyone has a right to education which shall be free and 
compulsory, at least in the elementary stage. It also provides that “higher education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit”. Apart from the UDHR, some regional instruments 
(the Africa Charter and Europe Convention) also make the right available to ‘everyone’ or ‘every 
individual’.129 However, in practice, the statelessness of the Rohingyas and the Bidoons excludes 
them from the application of this right to education.
130
 A recent Human Rights Watch report 
(2013) finds that the Burmese government has “systematically violated the Rohingyas’ right to 
education” and “education for their children has been unavailable”.131 The violations, according 
to the report, “stem from the Rohingya’s lack of Burmese citizenship, and are discriminatory 
measures based on the racial and religious identity of the group”.132 Similarly, the statelessness 
of the Bidoons has also impeded their qualification for the exercise of this right to education in 
Kuwait.
133
   
 
It is also necessary to note the effect of globalization on contemporary education. As a result, it 
is common place to find nationals from different countries in several universities. It is thus 
arguable that the modern expression of the right of “access to higher education” under Article 26 
of the UDHR includes application for admission to foreign universities. However and 
unfortunately, stateless persons are unwittingly excluded from exercising this right in its modern 
form, that is, to seek “higher education” abroad, due to the admission process adopted by most 
universities: online application for admission. This is because it is virtually impossible to submit 
an online application for admission for some universities without stating one’s citizenship. In this 
respect, some schools do not have ‘Stateless’ as a ‘country’ option, in order to accommodate 
stateless persons. For these schools, unless the prospective applicant indicates his/her 
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‘citizenship’, he/she cannot proceed to the next stage of the application.134 Again, even the few 
schools that have ‘stateless’ as an option, still require prospective applicants to enter passport or 
travelling document number.
135
 As shown previously, a vast majority of stateless people do not 
have valid travel or legal documents. This effectively prevents them from exercising the right to 
seek higher education in foreign universities.  
 
The above discussion, on the relationship between the right to nationality and the enjoyment of 
other international human rights, shows that the right to nationality is not only “essential to the 
enjoyment of all other rights”, it is also required for “good human development”.136 For this 
reason, the right to nationality is a basic human right for the purpose of determining erga omnes 
obligation – according to the Barcelona Traction case.  
 
3.0 DENATIONALIZATION: A STEP TOWARDS GENOCIDE? 
 
As noted above, the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case specifically referred to the outlawing of 
acts of genocide as erga omnes obligation. Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that the term ‘genocide’ means: 
 
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
137
  
 
According to Kirsch, the above definition represents the ‘legal’ concept of genocide.138 He notes 
that “most people do not refer to a legal definition when talking about genocide”,139 but rather 
they use the “social concept” which is used “simply to describes the occurrence of mass killings 
or ethnic cleansing based on discriminatory motives”.140 Genocide, according to him, does not 
require “successful destruction of a whole race or ethnicity nor even that crimes have occurred 
on a mass scale”. It “simply calls for a serious attack on members of a national, ethical, racial or 
religious group”.141 There is also the mens rea requirement of genocide; this means that the 
perpetrators must act with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group as such.
142
 This also involves a ‘systemic’ operation, that is, a ‘plan’ to commit 
genocide.
143
 Proof of intent may be inferred from “the scale of atrocities committed, the 
systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a particular group, or the 
repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts”.144  
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Dr. Stanton, the President of Genocide Watch, has outlined what he called the “eight stages or 
operational processes” of genocide. These are: (i) classification, (ii) symbolization, (iii) 
dehumanization, (iv) organization, (v) polarization, (vi) preparation, (vii) extermination, and 
(viii) denial.
145
 The first six have been described as ‘Early Warnings’.146  
 
At the ‘Classification’ stage, social groups are classified into the “us versus them”. This 
classification becomes symbolized at the ‘Symbolization’ stage.147 During the Symbolization 
state, the targeted group is often required to wear an identifying symbol or distinctive clothing, 
for example the yellow star by the Jews of Nazi Germany. The Khmer Rouge forced people from 
the Eastern Zone to wear a blue-checked scarf, marking them for forced relocation and 
elimination. They may also be given a special ID card.
148
 
 
According to Stanton, ‘Dehumanization’ is “where the death spiral of genocide begins”.149 The 
target group is “dehumanized” and called the “names of animals or likened to a disease: vermin 
or rats, cancer or plague, or in Rwanda, ‘inyenzi’ — cockroaches”.150 This stage is necessary to 
give “ideological justification to the genocidaires” and to overcome the “normal human revulsion 
against murder”.151 At this stage too, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify 
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the target group and depict them as ‘outsiders’ or some ‘devils’ that must be resisted. For 
example, prior to the Rwanda genocide, the Hutu Power hate newspaper, Kangura, published the 
“Ten Commandments of the Hutu” which, amongst others, expounded a myth that the Tutsis had 
invaded the country from Ethiopia. Tutsis were also referred to as “devils”, who ate the vital 
organs of Hutus.
152
 The next stage is ‘Organization’. Genocide is always organized, often by the 
state, or though militias who are often trained and armed by the state.
153
 During the 
‘Polarization’ stage, there is a “systematic elimination of moderates who would slow” the 
“downward cycle of killings until, like a whirlpool, it reaches the vortex of mass murder”.154 At 
this stage, there could also be killings by one group in order to provoke revenge killings by the 
other. Such massacres are aimed at polarization.
155
 
 
During the ‘Preparation’ stage, death lists are compiled, houses marked, and maps drawn up for 
the purpose of identification. Trial massacres may also be conducted, according to Stanton, “both 
as training for the genocidists, and to test whether there will be any response, such as arrests, 
international denunciations, or sanctions. If the murderers get away with their crimes, if there is 
impunity, it is a green light to finish the genocide”.156 Preparation may also include herding of 
the victims into ghettos, stadiums, or churches.
157
 ‘Extermination’ stage is, ‘the final solution’: 
the actual killing which is legally defined as genocide. This is followed by ‘Denial’. At this stage 
the mass graves are dug up and hidden. The historical records are burned, or closed to 
historians.
158
  
 
It is necessary to recall that one of the issues that emerged from the Nuremburg Trials was the 
argument that the Holocaust did not start with the inhuman hauling of the victims into the gas 
chambers, but rather it actually started with the 1935 Reich Citizenship Law which 
denationalized a large number of Jews and Romas.
159
 Thus, denationalization was seen as the 
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first step towards the Holocaust, as it laid the foundation for the massive deportations of the 
victims to concentration camps, and there was nothing the international community could do in 
aid of the denationalized people,
160
 perhaps because, as noted above, a state is deemed not to 
have committed “an international delinquency in inflicting an injury upon an individual lacking 
nationality”.161  
 
Using the events that preceded the holocaust, as well as other incidences and allegations of 
genocide in the twentieth century, the denationalization of a targeted ethnic group by a state 
warrants the question whether it is an ‘early warning’ or ‘step’ towards genocide. The next 
section will examine this question in relation to the Rohingyas. 
 
3.1 ‘Genocide’ Against the Rohingyas? 
 
Although the Rohingyas have had a history of ethnic clashes with other ethnic groups in Burma, 
their situation has been worsened by the Citizenship Law 1982, which formally denationalized 
the Rohinyas – making the Rohingyas the “them” or “outsiders” in the us versus them 
stratification. They constantly suffer violence in the hands of Burmese Security agents 
(especially the dreaded NaSaKa) and other militia, whose campaigns of violence against them 
usually include mass murder, rape, torture, degrading treatment, and forced displacement. This 
suffering, as reportedly admitted recently by the Burmese information minister, is as a result of 
their statelessness.
162
 However, the increased intensity of the violent attacks on the Rohingyas in 
recent times has triggered genocide alerts from human rights agencies.
163
  
 
The Rohingyas, being generally Muslims, are classified as the “other” or “them” in Buddhists-
dominated Burma. The ccontinuous reference to the Rohingyas as “Bengalis” by Burmese 
government falls under symbolization and this ‘symbolization’ has become the basis for 
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dehumanizing the Rohingyas through hate speech and propaganda which, as noted above, is one 
of the features of the dehumanization stage. For example, a recent 2013 Human Rights Watch 
report observes that “[b]eginning in June 2012, Arakanese political parties, local monks’ 
associations, and Arakanese civic groups made public statements and issued numerous 
pamphlets that directly or indirectly urged the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya from Arakan State 
and the country. The statements and pamphlets typically deny the existence of the Rohingya 
ethnicity, demonize the Rohingya, and call for their removal from the country”.164 The report 
also observes that local Buddhist monks have circulated pamphlets telling the local Arakanese 
population that they “must not” do business with or associate with the “Bengalis” [Rohingya] 
because “the ‘Bengalis’ [Rohingya] who dwell on Arakanese land, drink Arakanese water, and 
rest under Arakanese shadows are now working for the extinction of the Arakanese”.165 
 
The numerous hate speeches and propaganda may have influenced the organized or coordinated 
mob attacks against the Rohingyas following the alleged rape and murder of an Arakan woman 
in May 2012 by ‘Muslims’.166 The coordinated attacks resulted in several deaths and displaced 
about 100,000 Rohingyas. More importantly, Human Rights Watch confirmed that local police 
and soldiers stood by and watched the killings without intervening.
167
 Available reports suggest 
that the hate speeches have also polarized Arakan society. Human Rights Watch observed cases 
where the local political parties have “issued warnings and threats against Arakanese found to be 
aiding or associating with Rohingya in any way”.168 Two photos have emerged online which 
reportedly show two Arakanese men, who were found providing food to Rohingyas, shackled 
and a homemade sign placed around the neck of one of them stating “I am a traitor and slave of 
kalar”.169 According to the report, “local Arakanese sympathetic to the plight of the Rohingya 
explained to Human Rights Watch that it would be extremely dangerous for them to go near the 
Rohingyas [internally displaced persons] camps, let alone provide aid. They feared they might 
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experience violence from their own community that would regard their actions as 
‘traitorous’.”170 
 
The preparation stage seems to have started. On 5 July 2012, Buddhist monks representing the 
sangha in Rathedaung Township reportedly held a meeting and subsequently issued a 12-point 
statement which “unabashedly” set out a plan for “‘Arakan Ethnic Cleansing Program’ of bad 
pagan Bengali (kalar)”.171 This was followed by another two-day public meeting “billed as the 
largest public meeting in modern Arakan history”. The meeting was held in late September 2012 
and the “discussion focused almost completely on the Rohingya”.172 The public statement 
released after the meeting calls for the establishment of a “rule to control the birth rate of the 
Muslim Bengali community living in Arakan”.173 It also calls for the establishment of a “peoples 
militia” in all ethnic villages and for the supply of “sophisticated arms” to “the people’s 
militia”.174 The statement also calls for strict adherence to the 1982 Citizenship Law, which has 
effectively prevented the Rohingya from obtaining Burmese citizenship.
175
 In addition, as noted 
in chapter one, there has been several mass killings of the Rohingyas over a long period of 
time.
176
 Such killing may be evidence of “trial massacres”, which Genocide Watch has argued is 
used to “test” whether there will be any response, such as arrests, international denunciations, or 
sanctions.
177
 
 
The question now is: has the “final solution” or “extermination” stage started? This stage is the 
actual killing or commission of other acts that fall within the legal definition of “genocide” set 
out above. As rightly observed by Kirsch, ‘genocide’ “carries an unmatched rhetorical power and 
politicians and diplomats all over the world are aware of the stigma brought about by allegations 
that genocide has been committed.”178 Thus, an allegation of “genocide” is a very serious one 
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and this, perhaps, calls for the adoption of a cautious approach in describing the often reported 
mass killings of the Rohingyas. Various human rights agencies seem to have adopted this 
cautious approach. For example, there is a 2006 report which concludes that “[t]he campaign of 
displacement, denial of culture and identity, restrictions on the right to marry and form a family, 
killings, rape, torture and denial of food are a slow-burning genocide – ‘deliberately inflict[ing] 
on the group [Rohingya and Arakan Muslims] conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part’.”179 Similarly, a 2010 report found “reliable body of 
evidence of acts constituting a widespread or systematic attack against the Rohingya civilian 
population in North Arakan State. These appear to satisfy the requirements under international 
law and confirm the perpetration of crimes against humanity.”180 There is also the recent 2013 
Human Rights Watch report, which although setting out gory details of mass killings of the 
Rohingyas by security forces and militia,
181
 concludes that “the criminal acts committed against 
the Rohingya and Kaman Muslim communities in Arakan State beginning in June 2012 amount 
to crimes against humanity carried out as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing”.182 In other 
words, most reports ostensibly stop short of calling actual violence against the Rohingyas 
“genocide” but rather use terms like “crimes against humanity” 183 or “ethnic cleansing”.184 The 
same lens of “ethnic cleansing” has been used in recent reports (2013) which have revealed that 
the Burmese government had discriminatorily imposed a two-child limit on the Rohingyas.
185
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According to Brad Adams, the Asian director at Human Rights Watch, “[i]mplementation of this 
callous and cruel two-child policy against the Rohingya is another example of the systematic and 
wide ranging persecution of this group, who have recently been the target of an ethnic cleansing 
campaign.”186 
 
Scholars have noted the similarities and difference between “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”. 
According to Lieberman, “[e]thnic cleansing shares with genocide the goal of achieving purity 
but the two can differ in their ultimate aims: ethnic cleansing seeks the forced removal of an 
undesired group or groups where genocide pursues the group's ‘destruction’. Ethnic cleansing 
and genocide therefore fall along a spectrum of violence against groups with genocide lying on 
the far end of the spectrum.”187 Schabas also drew a distinction between the two based on intent. 
According to him, whilst the intent of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is to drive out a population, the specific 
intent of genocide is to destroy it.
188
 On the other hand, Blum et al have argued that “ethnic 
cleansing” is an euphemism for genocide and its use “signals the lack of will to stop genocide, 
resulting in huge increases in deaths, and undermines international legal obligations of 
acknowledging genocide”.189 They also argued that the distinction that has been drawn between 
genocide and ethnic cleansing “ignores the fact that genocidal massacres often have both 
intents”, that is, genocidal massacres may seek to “intentionally destroy a substantial part of an 
ethnic group, the specific intent necessary to prove genocide, and also have the intent to terrorize 
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a population into flight or forced deportation.”190 Some authors also have noted the similarities 
and distinction between “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” . According to Wald, crimes 
against humanity “require that the acts prosecuted be part of a systematic or widespread attack 
against a civilian population (and the perpetrator knows about the wider campaign). Genocide 
requires that the acts (which can only be the specific five listed) be committed against a racial, 
religious, national or ethnic group and be done with the specific intent of destroying the group in 
whole or in part ‘as such’.”191 
 
In the above premise, it seems that a finding of “intent to destroy, in whole or in part” is key to 
the determination of whether or not ‘genocide’ in the legal sense has been committed or started 
against the Rohingyas. Although, as noted above, the Rohingyas have been victims of massacres, 
discriminatory birth-control, restricted marriages, forced displacement, forced labor etc., it is 
difficult to assert that their travails evidence the requisite “intent to destroy”. The ultimate aim of 
the mass murder and other human rights violations seem to be to drive the Rohingyas out of 
Burma. This aim tends to align with the definition of ethnic cleansing which according to a UN 
General Assembly is also “a form of genocide”.192 It also aligns with crime against humanity. 
However, it is hardly disputable that the Rohingyas are just a step away from being victims of 
genocide based on the Genocide Watch scale.  
 
It is useful to bear in mind that the foregoing is not intended to suggest that denationalization has 
always preceded every genocidal event in the past. For example the victims of the 1994 
Rwandan genocide (Tutsi and moderate Hutus) were not denationalized prior to the genocide. 
The 1995 Bosnian genocide was not also preceded by denationalization. However, a review of 
previous cases of genocide would suggest that genocide usually involves the “us versus them” 
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classification and nationality has been a major factor in this classification. For example, as noted 
above, one of the propaganda against the Tutsi prior to the Rwanda genocide was that they were 
foreigners from Ethiopia.
193
 Thus, the conception of the genocidal victims as not being “one of 
us” dehumanizes them and also removes the natural repulsion that would have accompanied the 
killing of “one of us”.  
 
In the case of the Rohingyas, their denationalization or condition of statelessness complicates 
issues for them as genocide victims: not only are they not “one of us” (in Burma), they are also 
not “one of” any other “us” in the community of nations. This results in a somewhat neither here 
nor there situation for stateless genocidal victims. In other words, the statelessness of genocide 
victims makes it difficult to properly classify their travails under international law. For example, 
if the ostensible aim of the persecution is to drive the otherwise stateless genocide victims out of 
the country, the “genocide” may become blurred by the perception of their travails as an exercise 
of the right of every sovereign nation to expel foreigners from their country. The resultant effect 
of this blurred conception is that, at worst, the genocidal actions will be seen as “ethnic 
cleansing” which unlike genocide does not usually evoke too much international pressure or 
intervention.
194
  
 
Another complication that may arise from the statelessness of genocide victims relates to 
difficulty in finding legal bases for other nations to intervene on their behalf, especially in view 
of the dictum in the Dickson Car Wheel case that a state “does not commit an international 
delinquency in inflicting an injury upon an individual lacking nationality, and consequently no 
state is empowered to intervene or complain on his behalf either before or after the injury”.195 
This difficulty may also affect the ability of states to invoke the international humanitarian law 
doctrine of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) on behalf of stateless people.  
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The doctrine of R2P was accepted by the UNGA at the 2005 World Submit.
196
 The Submit 
Outcome Document sets out the “three pillars” of R2P. These are: (a) each individual State has 
the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity, (b) the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 
help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early 
warning capability, and (c) the international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, to help to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity - 
this may include the use of military action, where peaceful means are inadequate and the national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.
197
 The formulation of these three pillars is greatly 
influenced by a 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS).
198
  
 
Although the Outcome Document made reference to “its population”, a review of the ICISS 
report, as well as some other literatures on R2P, suggests that the ICISS report contemplates the 
responsibility of the state to its “citizens”. In other words, a state must have failed in its duty to 
protect its “citizens” before R2P may be invoked by the international community.199 However, it 
                                                 
196 For general information on the evolution of R2P in international law, see Jennifer M. Welsh, 
“Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Where Expectations Meet Reality” (2010) 24:4 
Ethics & International Affairs 415 – 430 [Welsh, 2010]; Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to 
Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101:1 AJIL 99 at 99 – 102 [Stahn]; 
Luke Glanville, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders” (2012) Human Rights Law 
Review 1 at 8 – 15 [Glanville]. 
197 UNGA, World Submit Outcome, A/Res/60/1, 25 October 2005, paras 138 – 139, online: UN 
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf> (emphasis supplied). 
198 See Glanville, supra, note 196, at 21; Welsh, 2010 supra, note 196, at 417 – 418; Stahn, 
supra, note 196, at 99. See also Jennifer Welsh, “The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (2002) 57:4 
International Journal 489 – 512 [Welsh, 2002].  
199
 See, ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (A Report International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty) (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) 
VIII: the “central theme” of the report is “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to 
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from 
starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne 
by the broader community of states” (emphasis supplied). At 13, the report also notes: “Thinking 
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seems there is a move toward expanding the meaning of the term “its population” in the 
Outcome Document. For example, a report of the UN Secretary General (2013) declares that 
“‘populations’ refers not only to citizens or civilians but to all populations within State 
borders”.200 The movement from “its population” to “all populations within State borders” is 
ostensibly to ensure that states have responsibilities to protect foreigners as well.  However, in 
view of the fact that the stateless Rohingyas are regarded as illegal residents/immigrants in 
Burma, their statelessness complicates the question of whether they may be properly regarded as 
Burma’s “own” population for the purpose of invoking any R2P.  
 
Furthermore, historical evidence also suggests that the stateless genocide victims seldom have 
anywhere to run to. In other words, as Arendt aptly describes them, the stateless genocidal 
victims are often “indesirables” to most countries.201 They are indesirable because most 
countries do not want them and would not offer them refuge, when they flee persecution. This, as 
shown in chapter two, is also because unlike other refugees who could be expelled to their 
country, the stateless cannot be repatriated to any country. Thus, on the whole, the statelessness 
of (potential) genocide victims like the Rohingyas (potentially) puts them in a worse position.   
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of the use of the right to nationality to 
remedy existing statelessness has been hampered by the vagueness and imprecision of its terms, 
                                                                                                                                                             
of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, 
has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the 
functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, 
it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to 
the international community through the UN.” (emphasis supplied); Stahn, supra, note 196, at 
101: “Under the concept of responsibility to protect, matters affecting the life of the citizens and 
subjects of a state are no longer exclusively subject to the discretion of the domestic ruler but are 
perceived as issues of concern to the broader inter-national community”. See also Welsh, 2010, 
supra, note 196, at 416 – 17; Welsh, 2002 supra, note 198, at 493.  
200 UNGA/SC, “Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention, Report of the 
Secretary-General” A/67/929- S/2013/339, 9 July 2013, para. 5, online: Responsibility to Protect 
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/UNSG%20Report%20on%20RtoP%20and%20State%20Resp
onsibility%20and%20Prevention%281%29.pdf>. 
201
 Arendt, supra, note 1, at 283. 
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states overtly exercising their sovereignty by withholding consent for unambiguous provisions 
that create positive obligations to grant nationality, and the absence of effective monitoring or 
enforcement mechanisms. This has created a lot of confusion regarding the status of the right to 
nationality under international law, hence most literature adopt a cautious approach in their 
interpretation of the right to nationality, ranging from a “trend towards recognition”202 to 
“fledgling human right”203 to a “doubt” as to what the right entails.204 The confusion has created 
a lacuna that accounts for the existence of stateless groups like the Rohingyas, Bidoons and the 
‘Non-Citizens’ of Latvia. 
 
Although there may be confusion regarding the status of the right to nationality, there is, 
however, no confusion as to the suffering that arises from failure to protect this right. In fact, 
Arendt does not seem to have exaggerated when she argued that the loss of right to nationality 
entails the loss of all human rights.
205
 This is because as shown above, despite the existence of 
several international human rights instruments which purport to be applicable to ‘everyone’, 
stateless persons like the Rohingyas are still an “anomaly” who do not fit smoothly into the legal 
or social life of their country of sojourn.
206
 They are indeed “defenceless beings, who have no 
clearly defined rights and live by virtue of good-will and tolerance”.207 
 
From the above discussion of right to nationality as a basic human right, it is clear that the 
statelessness of stateless people deprives them of freedom of movement, right to work, right to 
vote and be voted for, access to civil service, right to education, right to social security, freedom 
from discrimination, and recognition as a person before the law. The inability of stateless people 
to possess these rights is enough justification to regard the protection of the right to nationality as 
                                                 
202
 Johannes M.M. Chan, “The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right; the Trend towards 
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204
 Serena Forlati, “Nationality as a Human Right” in Alessandra Annoni & Serena Forlati, eds., 
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erga omnes obligation, on account of being a basic right referred to by the decision of the ICJ in 
the Barcelona Traction case.  
 
Similarly, as shown above, lessons learned from the events preceding most genocidal incidents 
of the 20th century, suggest that denationalization could well be an ‘early warning’ or ‘step 
towards’ genocide. It has also been shown that the statelessness of people like the Rohingyas 
puts them in a more vulnerable position on the issue of genocide. Thus, protecting the right to 
nationality of vulnerable stateless people may serve to prevent genocide, and on this ground 
alone or in combination with the basic human rights argument, the protection of the right to 
nationality may also be regarded as an erga omnes obligation. 
 
In view of previous discussion on the confusion surrounding the status of the right to nationality, 
one may raise questions about the impact of a duty to protect the right to nationality as an erga 
omnes obligation on this confusion. In other words, questions may arise regarding the extent to 
which protection of the right to nationality as erga omnes obligation may be used to remedy the 
vagueness and imprecision of the right, the use of state sovereignty to withhold consent, and the 
absence of effective enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. Although the conception of a duty 
to protect the right to nationality as erga omnes obligation does not ipso facto remove the 
challenges arising from the vague or imprecision of the right, the erga omnes conception of a 
duty to protect the right is useful in respect of state sovereignty and enforcement mechanism.  
 
As noted above, Burma is not a party to most of the relevant international instruments relating to 
right to nationality while Kuwait made reservations to the relevant provisions. Thus, neither of 
them is ordinarily bound to observe international law provisions relating to right to nationality. 
By contrast, the conception of a duty to protect the right to nationality as erga omnes obligation 
will dispense with the requirement of states’ consent. As a result, Burma and Kuwait may still be 
regarded to be in breach of a binding international law obligation if they fail to respect the right 
to nationality of the Rohingyas and Bidoons respectively. The right will also not be affected by 
contrary local legislation and/or government policy.  
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Again as noted in previous chapters, one of the impacts of states’ sovereignty on the right to 
nationality is the absence of effective enforcement and monitoring mechanism.
208
 A corollary of 
this impact is that states are generally unwilling to interfere in the nationality dispute of others 
and, even if they desire to do so, their ability to interfere is hampered by international law rules 
which require states to have locus standi in order to be able to maintain any action for alleged 
violations of human rights norms. By contrast, the conception of a duty to protect the right to 
nationality as erga omnes will empower all states to act on behalf of stateless people. This is 
because, as De Schutter aptly observed, “the effect of obligations being erga omnes concerns the 
question of standing: all states have a legal interest in using any available remedies in order to 
ensure that the obligations are complied with”.209 Thus, if one accepts the proposition that the 
duty to protect the right to nationality is an erga omnes obligation, it will mean that all humanity, 
including states, NGOs, and individuals can employ all measures against any state that violates 
the rights.
210
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against the Government, 
in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right is necessary to protect his 
dignity, or his standing as equally entitled to concern and respect, or some other 
personal value of like consequence… So, if rights make sense at all, then the 
invasion of a relatively important right must be a very serious matter. It means 
treating a man as less than a man, or less worthy of concern than other men.
1
 
 
As seen from previous chapters, there are several international and regional instruments which 
provide for a right to nationality and also seek to ameliorate the harsh effects of statelessness. 
However, these instruments have not had much impact in reducing incidence of statelessness 
mainly because the principle of State sovereignty in relation to the grant or revocation of 
nationality still seems to hold sway. Thus, states still exercise much discretion on the issue of 
citizenship and the exercise of this discretion is virtually mutually incompatible with the very 
purport of a general right to nationality. The incompatibility of states sovereignty on nationality 
with the right is further strengthened by the vagueness and imprecision of the instruments 
relating to the right. It is also strengthened by the principle of international law which allows 
states to overtly exercise their sovereignty to withhold consent to any unambiguous provision 
that imposes a positive obligation on them to grant their nationality to potential stateless people 
or to accept as nationals groups they feel are not part of ‘them’, as well as the absence of 
effective monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The situation is worse where a country, for example Burma, is not party to the relevant 
international instruments dealing with nationality and statelessness. The effect of not being a 
party to the relevant instruments is that the country is not under any obligation to respect the 
‘right to nationality’ of the stateless Rohingyas under international law – except, as discussed in 
chapters three and four, the right to nationality is seen as part of customary international law 
and/or where a duty to protect the right is an erga omnes obligation. 
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 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 199 
[Dworkin]. 
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The above mutually incompatible combination of states sovereignty and the right to nationality 
in international law creates a lacuna which allows the continued existence of stateless groups like 
the Rohingyas, Bidoons and the ‘Non-Citizens’ of Latvia in Burma, Kuwait and Latvia 
respectively. As a result of the lacuna, a state like Burma could by the application of its 
citizenship law validly exclude some groups from its nationality because they are not as “fair and 
soft, good looking as well [as ‘us’]” or because “they are as ugly as ogres”.2 Thus, 
notwithstanding the modern concept of nationality which emphasizes the idea of individuals 
coming under the protection or jurisdiction of a given state, usually for the purpose of inter-state 
relations,
3
 the traditional concept of nationality which denotes being a part of a people who share 
some common characteristics,
4
 that is, a common ancestry, language, territory, religion, value, 
and culture still continue to hold sway today. Nationality is also seen as a form of identification 
and exclusion, hence the continued existence of stateless people like the Rohingyas and the 
Bidoons – in a world which recognizes a right to nationality.  
 
Their continued existence exposes the inadequacy of the present state of international law to 
protect the right to nationality of stateless people. This inadequacy highlights the need for a 
robust approach to tackle the problem and undesirable effects of statelessness. The purpose of 
                                                 
2
 See a Letter from Ye Myint Aung, Consul General of Myanmar in Hong Kong, to heads of 
Mission, Consul Corps, Hong Kong and Macau SAR, February 9, 2009, suggesting a reason of 
rejecting the Rohingyas as Burmese citizens. Content of the letter is quoted in Human Rights 
Watch, “Perilous Plight: Burma’s Rohingya take to the Seas” (May 2009), 7. 
3
 Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, Statelessness: With Special Reference to the United States (New 
York: American University Graduate School, 1934) 6 – 7 [Seckler-Hudson]. See also Paul Weis, 
Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Westport: Hyperion Press, 1979), 13 [Weis], 
Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 43 [Kesby]; see also A.M.Boll, Multiple Nationality 
and International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 61 – 69; Ian Brownlie, ‘The Relations 
of Nationality in Public International Law’ (1963) 39 BYIL 284, 319. 
4
 Guido Zernatto & Alfonso G. Mistretta, “Nation: The History of a Word” (1944) 6 The Review 
of Politics 351; David Dudley Field, Outlines of an International Code, 2d ed (New York: Baker, 
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this section is to examine some of the measures that may be taken to give effect to the right to 
nationality and tackle continued statelessness. The measures will be examined under two broad 
headings, namely, (a) changing the perception of (right to) nationality, and (b) remedial 
measures. 
 
1.0 CHANGING THE PERCEPTION OF (RIGHT TO) NATIONALITY 
 
The starting point of the robust approach, necessary to tackle continued statelessness, is to 
change the perception of nationality. As noted above, even in face of various international and 
regional instruments providing for a right to nationality, the concept of nationality still continues 
to be inextricably tied to the state. Hence existing literature and some judicial decisions still 
assert the principle of nationality being within the exclusive preserve of states – although some 
do have a caveat that states should exercise this sovereignty in compliance with their human 
rights obligations.
5
 It is submitted that this pro-states sovereignty-centered conception of 
nationality greatly diminishes the status of nationality as an independent enforceable human right 
in international law.    
 
In view of the above, this thesis advocates a human rights-centered perception of nationality, and 
that statelessness should be seen in its true light, that is, as a violation of a human right rather 
than the undesirable consequence of the exercise of states sovereignty. In order to be more 
effective, the pro-human rights perception of nationality should include the factors discussed 
below. 
 
1.1 Taking Rights and Suffering Seriously 
 
The first aspect of changed perception necessary for a robust approach to tackle continued 
statelessness is to take everyone’s right to nationality seriously, as well as the suffering that 
arises from failure to give effect to the right. Dworkin, as noted above, has argued that 
“fundamental” rights should be taken seriously in order to avoid treating a person as being “less 
                                                 
5
 See pages 80 – 83 above. 
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than a man, or less worthy of concern than other men”.6 Fundamental right, according to him, is 
one which is “necessary” to protect a person’s dignity or his ability to be treated equally in 
relation to others.
7
 
 
As already stated, although the status of the right to nationality in itself may 
be unclear, confusing or debatable, there is hardly any confusion regarding the effect of failure to 
protect this right. The failure to protect results in a situation where a class of people have lost “all 
human rights”8 and are therefore not entitled to other universally acclaimed rights, such as, 
freedom of movement, right to work, right to vote and be voted for, access to civil service, right 
to education, right to social security, freedom against discrimination, and recognition as a person 
before the law.
9
 The loss of these human rights ostensibly makes the stateless people unequal and 
“less worthy” than others. Hence, the right to nationality should be taken seriously, not only 
because it is a right in itself, but also because it is necessary to protect a person’s dignity and his 
ability to treated equally in relation to other rights. 
 
As discussed in chapter one, Baxi has also argued that taking rights seriously requires taking 
suffering seriously.
10
 He used the idea of a taking suffering seriously to advocate a liberal 
interpretation of statutory provisions, in this case international instruments, with a strong bias in 
favour of human rights.
11
 Felice has also used a similar idea to advocate the recognition of group 
suffering and protection of collective rights, that is, the need to protect an entire vulnerable 
group, so that more individuals within the group will be protected.
12
 The combination of Baxi 
and Felice’s positions postulates that taking rights seriously requires taking [group] suffering 
seriously. As seen in previous chapters, the statelessness of people, like the Burmese Rohingyas 
and Kuwaiti Bidoons, not only deprived them of virtually all human rights; it also makes them 
vulnerable to genocide and other crimes against humanity. This deprivation or vulnerability 
necessitates taking their suffering seriously. Taking the suffering of stateless people seriously 
                                                 
6
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7
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requires empathizing with them and taking all necessary steps to ameliorate the suffering that 
arise from their inability to enjoy the right to nationality.  
 
1.2 Invoking the Principle of Erga Omnes Obligations 
 
A corollary to taking the right to nationality seriously is the recognition of a duty to protect the 
right as an erga omnes obligation. This is the second aspect of changed perception necessary for 
effectively tackling the continued statelessness of stateless people like the Rohingyas, Bidoons 
and the Non-citizens of Latvia.  
 
As noted previously, one of the major challenges besetting the right to nationality is the 
vagueness and imprecision of its provisions, that is, the failure of the relevant instruments to 
specify which nationality every person is entitled to under the instrument. This is in addition to 
the negative impact of states’ sovereignty on the right to nationality that has resulted in the 
statelessness of groups like the Rohingyas, Bidoons and Non-citizens of Latvia. In other words, a 
pro-human rights perception of nationality has to tackle the stark reality of Burma not being a 
party to most of the relevant instruments, Kuwait refusing to accept any obligation by entering 
reservations to the operative provisions, and Latvia using language and previous employment to 
exclude the ‘Non-citizens’ from its nationality. As noted in previous chapters, these states’ 
actions are ordinarily valid exercises of states sovereignty, but they also have adverse impacts on 
the right to nationality and have resulted in the suffering of the affected stateless people.    
 
One of the ways of reducing, if not absolutely remedying, the above negative impact of states 
sovereignty is to recognize and treat the protection of right to nationality as an erga omnes 
obligation. As shown in chapter four, the right to nationality is a basic right, as a result of its 
relationship with the enjoyment of other human rights. It is also closely linked with duty to 
prevent genocide. These two characteristics of the right to nationality fall within the examples of 
erga omnes obligations given by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction 
case.
13
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One main advantage of recognizing the protection of right to nationality as an erga omnes 
obligation is that, apart from dealing with adverse exercise of states sovereignty, it gives all 
humanity a legal interest in the protection of the right to nationality. In other words, an erga 
omnes approach to protecting the right allows other states, NGOs, individuals, and others to take 
steps to ensure that states, for example Burma and Kuwait, respect the right to nationality of 
stateless people. Some of the steps are discussed below.  
 
2.0 REMEDIAL MEASURES 
 
The remedial measures are necessary steps to be taken to ameliorate the suffering of stateless 
people. This includes both legal and socio-political measures to give effect to the right to 
nationality of stateless people. This is in tandem with existing literature which also contain 
diverse suggestions for dealing with the suffering arising from statelessness. For example, the 
Secretary-General’s 1949 Study of Statelessness14 suggested the adoption of both legal and socio-
political measures to improve of the status of stateless persons and to take steps towards the 
elimination of future statelessness as means of dealing with the anomaly of statelessness.
15
 
Weissbrodt suggested the adoption of “preemptive”, “minimizing” and “naturalizing” methods 
of dealing with the problem.
16
  The legal and socio-political measures would include a wide 
range of legislative, judicial, diplomatic, and other measures that may be employed to give effect 
to the right to nationality of stateless people.  
 
However, the necessary steps taken to ameliorate the suffering of stateless people must take into 
account the unique sets of facts surrounding the various stateless groups. This is because, as seen 
from previous chapters, even though the Rohingyas, Bidoons and Non-citizens of Latvia share 
statelessness in common, each of them occupies peculiar situations in their respective countries. 
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 United Nations Economic and Social Council, A Study of Statelessness, E/1112;E/1112/Add.1  
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For example, the Bidoons and the Rohingyas are regarded as illegal immigrants in Kuwait and 
Burma respectively, whereas the ‘Non-Citizens’ of Latvia are lawful residents in Latvia and do, 
in fact, have some basic rights. Second, Latvia, being a party to most of the relevant instruments 
on right to nationality and prevention of statelessness, is ordinarily bound by their provisions, 
unlike both Kuwait and Burma. Also, the stateless ‘Non-citizens’ of Latvia do not pass their 
statelessness to their children because children born after Latvia’s independence (August 21, 
1991) to parents who are both non-citizens are entitled to Latvian citizenship upon request of the 
parents by virtue of section 3(1) of Latvia Citizenship law, which itself is in accordance with 
Latvia’s obligation under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS).17 Some of the 
remedial measures that may be adopted are discussed below. 
 
2.1 Necessary Clarification through a UN Instrument 
 
As noted previously, one of the major challenges besetting the right to nationality is the 
vagueness and imprecision of its provisions. One way of obviating this challenge is the adoption 
of an international (supplementary) instrument to clear this ambiguity. The aim of the instrument 
is to identify the state with the duty to grant nationality, in any given circumstance. One way of 
achieving this aim is by incorporating, what some authors have described as, the doctrine of 
“substantial connection” or “genuine and effective link”.18  
 
The origin of the doctrine of effective link in relation to nationality is generally credited to the 
decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala).
19
 In the case, Liechtenstein claimed restitution and compensation on the ground that 
the Government of Guatemala had “acted towards the person and property of Mr. Friedrich 
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Nottebohm, a [naturalized] citizen of Liechtenstein, in a manner contrary to international law”.20 
The issue turned on whether the naturalization was effective and whether Nottebohm had real 
and effective links with Liechtenstein, the basis upon which Liechtenstein could exercise 
diplomatic protection on his behalf. The Court ruled the claim inadmissible because the “sole 
aim” of the naturalization was “coming within the protection of Liechtenstein but not of 
becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of life, or of assuming its obligations” 
and for this reason “Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such 
circumstances.”21 The court also held:  
 
International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous cases of dual 
nationality, where the question arose with regard to the exercise of protection. They have 
given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the 
facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the 
States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and 
their importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitua1 residence of the 
individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre 
of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him 
for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
22
 
 
 
The Nottebohm decision has come under severe scholarly criticism mainly because of its 
suggestion that recognition of the process of citizenship by naturalization by some other states 
was necessary for the naturalization to be effective.
23
 Nonetheless, some literature have 
embraced the doctrine of effective link established in the case and have used it in their argument 
in support of the right to nationality and duty to avoid statelessness, especially in relation to state 
succession. For example, Brownlie has argued that successor states are obliged to confer 
nationality on nationals of their predecessor state who have effective links to the successor 
states’ territory.24 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly has issued a resolution which “urges that, upon a change in sovereignty, all persons 
who have a genuine and effective link with a new State should acquire the citizenship of that 
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State”.25 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has also issued a 
legal opinion which declared “that residence and the genuine effective link [are] the key factors 
for determination of nationality in the context of State succession”.26 
 
While some other literature do not make direct reference to the doctrine, they nonetheless 
embrace some aspects of the doctrine, especially in relation to territory, for the purpose of 
determining which state has the duty to confer nationality in relation to state succession. For 
example, the draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to Succession of States
27
 
provides that “every individual who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality 
of the predecessor State, irrespective of the mode of acquisition of that nationality, has the right 
to the nationality of at least one of the States concerned”28 and “persons concerned having their 
habitual residence in the territory affected by the succession of States are presumed to acquire 
the nationality of the successor State on the date of such succession”.29 Inspired by the draft 
Articles, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in 
Relation to State Succession.
30
 The Convention was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 
15 March 2006 and it entered into force on 1 May 2009.
31
 Article 2 of the Convention provides 
that “everyone who, at the time of the State succession, had the nationality of the predecessor 
State and who has or would become stateless as a result of the State succession has the right to 
                                                 
25
 Blackman, supra, note 18, at 1164, citing Erika B. Schlager, “The Rights to Have Rights: 
Citizenship in Newly Independent OSCE Countries” (1997) 8 Helsinki Monitor 19 at 23. 
26
 Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The Czech and Slovak Citizenship Laws 
and the Problem of Statelessness (February 1996), 12, quoted in Blacknman, supra, note 18, 
1164. 
27
 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States with 
commentaries (1999) Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-first session, 
in 1999, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering 
the work of that session (at para. 48). The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft 
articles, appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, vol. II, Part Two. 
28
 Ibid, Article 1. 
29
 Ibid, Article 5. 
30
 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in 
Relation to State Succession, 15 March 2006, CETS 200, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4444c8584.html [accessed 18 September 2013].  
31
 Ibid. However, only 6 countries, namely Austria, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherland 
and Norway, have ratified the Convention. Germany and Ukraine have signed but not yet ratified 
it. Status update as at 18 September 2013 available online: COE  
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=200&CM=8&CL=ENG>. 
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the nationality of a State concerned, in accordance with the following articles”. Under Article 3, 
states are obliged to “take all appropriate measures to prevent persons who, at the time of the 
State succession, had the nationality of the predecessor State, from becoming stateless as a result 
of the succession”. Article 4 prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status. More importantly, Article 5 sets out the responsibility of the 
successor state, it provides that:  
 
1. A successor State shall grant its nationality to persons who, at the time of the State 
succession, had the nationality of the predecessor State, and who have or would become 
stateless as a result of the State succession if at that time: 
a. they were habitually resident in the territory which has become territory of the 
successor State, or 
b. they were not habitually resident in any State concerned but had an appropriate 
connection with the successor State. 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph b, an appropriate connection includes inter 
alia: 
a. a legal bond to a territorial unit of a predecessor State which has become territory 
of the successor State; 
b. birth on the territory which has become territory of the successor State; 
c. last habitual residence on the territory of the predecessor State which has become 
territory of the successor State. 
 
 
The above provisions are ostensibly in tandem with the doctrine of genuine and effective link 
and they will reduce, if not absolutely remove, any ambiguity regarding which nationality 
stateless persons in such circumstances are entitled to. Thus, the provisions are a suitable model 
for any proposed UN sponsored instrument which may be adopted for the purpose of specifying 
the nationality which stateless persons, or indeed everyone, is entitled to. As Weissbrodt 
succinctly puts it: 
 
One way to ensure that stateless persons realize their right to a nationality… is through 
the doctrine of genuine and effective link. According to this doctrine, a person should be 
eligible to receive citizenship from states with which she or he has a substantial 
connection or a genuine and effective link... A substantial link or connection to a state 
can be forged by, for example, long term habitation in a state without a more substantial 
link to another state, descent from a state’s citizen, birth within a state territory, or 
citizenship in a country’s former federal state. 
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The doctrine of genuine and effective link is a viable solution to the problem of 
statelessness because it is generally ‘not difficult to determine to which state an 
individual has genuine effective link for the purpose of nationality decisions.
32
  
 
2.1.1 A UN Declaration or Convention? 
 
As seen in previous chapters, attempts to tackle or eliminate statelessness through the conception 
of a right to nationality have been largely unsuccessful due to the overt use of state sovereignty 
to withhold consent to binding instruments relating to the right to nationality. Hence very few 
states have ratified most of the relevant international instruments.
33
 This necessitates raising 
questions regarding the nature of the proposed UN instrument that would incorporate the above-
mentioned doctrine of effective link: should it be a Declaration or (binding) Convention? 
 
As already noted, unlike treaties (conventions) which are binding on state parties, UN 
Declarations are generally not binding on states.
34
 Thus a binding instrument (convention) would 
ordinarily be preferable to a usually non-binding Declaration for the purpose of incorporating the 
doctrine of effective link to identify the duty-bearer in respect of a right to nationality. However, 
judging from the outcome of review of states’ attitude to international/regional conventions with 
provisions relating to right to nationality and reduction or elimination of statelessness in previous 
chapters,
35
 it will be difficult (but not impossible) to achieve the desired aim of incorporating 
effective link through a binding convention – since there is a high probability that the proposed 
convention would suffer the same fate as the existing ones, that is, it may be ratified by very few 
states. 
                                                 
32
 Weissbrodt, supra, note 16, at 107 – 108 (footnotes omitted). 
33
 See pages 64 – 70 above. 
34
 See generally, See Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 93ff; Gregory J. Kerwin “The Role of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts” 
(1983) Duke Law Journal 876 at 877 – 880 [Kerwin]; Obed Y. Asamoah, The Legal Significance 
of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1966) 19 – 25; Stephen M. Schwebel, “The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General 
Assembly on Customary International Law” (1979) 73 Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L 301 – 309; Oscar 
Schachter, “The Evolving International Law of Development” (1976) 15:1 Colum. J. of 
Transnat’l L. 1 at 4 – 6. 
35
 See pages 35 – 38, 59 – 67 for the review of proceedings of the drafting committees of the 
relevant international instruments. 
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In order to avoid the usual wrangling that bedeviled the adoption and ratification of international 
instruments on right to nationality,
36
 a UN Declaration to incorporate the doctrine of effective 
link appears to be the most realistic option. This is because the process leading to the adoption of 
UN Declarations is generally not as cumbersome and complicated as that of binding instruments, 
due to a variety of reasons. First, UN Declarations relating to human rights generally take effects 
when the draft is approved by a simple majority of states at the General Assembly,
37
 whereas, in 
the case of a draft convention, the adoption of a resolution of the General Assembly is usually 
simply a preliminary step, as the draft instrument must be ratified by the requisite number of 
states (governments) in order to become effective and binding on states parties.
38
 Second, it is 
much easier to obtain a UN Declaration because experience suggests that, when faced with a 
non-binding draft UN instrument relating to human rights which they do not approve of, most 
states usually abstain from voting instead of casting opposing votes.
39
 For example, a review of 
the UDHR proceedings reveals that the Soviet Union, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Poland, 
amongst others, opposed various aspects of the drafts of the UDHR. However, they abstained 
from voting on the UDHR instead of voting against it. Hence the UDHR was passed with 48 
votes, 0 against and 8 abstentions.
40
 Third, even though UN Declarations are generally non-
binding, they do have significant influence the formation of customary international law.
41
 
According to Joyner, they “may stimulate action towards, or provide an incipient step for the 
                                                 
36
 See pages 60 – 63 above for examples of such wrangling. 
37
 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 945 No 7, Article 18(3). 
38
 See generally Shaw, supra, note 34, at 907 – 913;  United Nations, Final Clauses of 
Multilateral Treaties: Handbook (2003), 1 – 10, online: UN Treaty 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Origins, Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 21 – 28 [Morsink]. 
41
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genesis of customary international law”.42 They may also form part of evidence that nations have 
created a principle of customary international law.
43
  
 
 
2.2 Establish a “World Court of Human Rights” or Expand the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)? 
 
As previously observed, most relevant instruments relating to right to a nationality do not have 
effective enforcement and monitoring mechanisms; they either do not contain any enforcement 
or monitoring provisions at all, or the few that contain monitoring or enforcement procedures 
limit the parties entitled to bring any action to enforce the provisions of the instruments to states. 
By contrast, most regional human rights instruments, such as the European, American and 
African human rights conventions, establish tribunals with jurisdictions to entertain application 
from individuals. However, Asia does not have any human right instruments while the Arab 
world, though having a human right instrument, is yet to set up a monitoring agency. Hence, 
neither the Rohingyas nor the Bidoons have any international/regional forums to enforce their 
right to nationality. As a way to remedy situations of absence of international forum to ventilate 
grievances, some authors have advocated the establishment of a “World Court of Human Rights” 
or an “International Court of Human Rights”.44 
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 Christopher C. Joyner “U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: 
Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation” (1981) 11 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 445 at 
459. 
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 Kerwin, supra, note 34, 880 n. 26.  
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Agenda for Human Rights (2009), 7 – 17, online: UDHR60 
<http://www.udhr60.ch/report/hrCourt_scheinin0609.pdf>; Manfred Nowak & Julia Kozma, “A 
World Court of Human Rights” Swiss Initiative to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the 
UDHR Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human Rights (2009), 13 – 28, online: UDHR60 
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The idea of a world court of human rights was first mooted in 1947 by the Australian 
government, during the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946.
45
 Led by H.V. Evatt, 
Australian Deputy Prime Minister, the Australian delegation proposed the creation of a “Court of 
Civic Rights” to hear complaints and enforce the human rights clauses in the peace agreements.46 
One of the grounds for their proposal was that where there is a right there ought to be a judicial 
remedy.
47
 According to Devereux,  
 
Evatt and other Australian delegates rejected the utility of political remedies (such as 
General Assembly discussion) to deal with human rights abuses…Negotiations between 
parties (particularly state parties) was also derided as providing second-class 
justice…Diplomatic redress was insufficient…National governments alone could not be 
trusted to protect human rights since individuals would be subject to the arbitrary will of 
a majority. A court, on the other hand, would not only serve to give individuals remedies, 
but would serve as a deterrent to would be perpetrators of abuse.
48
  
 
About two decades later (1965), a former Justice of the US Supreme Court, Arthur Goldberg, 
argued that the “time is overdue” “for the establishment of an International Court of Human 
Rights to enforce the rights” set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as 
guaranteed by a binding treaty.
49
 Since then, more authors have argued in support of the 
establishment of such an international or world court for human rights.
50
 Some authors have even 
prepared what they called the “[Draft] Statute of the World Court of Human Rights”.51 The draft 
Statute states that the court “shall be a permanent institution and shall have power to decide in a 
final and binding manner on all complaints about alleged human rights violations brought before 
                                                                                                                                                             
<http://www.udhr60.ch/report/hrCourt-Nowak0609.pdf> [Nowak & Kozma]; Mark Gibney, 
International Human Rights Law - Returning to Universal Principles (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2008), 121 – 123 [Gibney]. 
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1966 (Sydney: Federation Press, 2005), 180 [Devereux]; Manfred Nowak, “A New World Court 
of Human Rights: A Role for International Humanitarian Law?” in Robert Kolb & Gloria 
Gaggioli, eds., Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2013) 531 at 532 [Nowak 2013]. 
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 Devereux, supra, note 45, 180. 
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 Goldberg, supra, note 44, at 621. 
50
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it”.52 It lists the Convention on the Status of Stateless Person, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child as part of the “applicable law’ which the court has 
jurisdiction to enforce.
53
 However copiously missing from the list are the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. According 
to the draft, the court may receive complaints from any person, non-governmental organization, 
groups of individuals claiming to be the victim of violation of any human right provided in any 
human rights treaty to which the respective state is a party.
54
  
 
Some authors have advanced reasons for the desirability of such international human rights 
court. Nowak, for example, argues that it will ensure the right of victims of human rights 
violations to an effective remedy and to adequate reparation for the harms suffered, and it will 
also offer the opportunity to address a number of unsolved contemporary human rights problems, 
such as the accountability of non-State actors.
55
 He also contends that the creation of the World 
Court can be achieved in a smooth manner without any treaty amendment and without abolishing 
the present treaty monitoring bodies, and that the court would become the major counter-part of 
the Human Rights Council within the treaty system.
56
 Scheinin suggests that the absence of such 
international human rights court allows states to evade their human rights obligations.
57
 Ulfstein 
also argues that the establishment of such a court would help overcome the “present weaknesses 
of the supervisory system” of human rights in international law and also “strengthen the 
effectiveness of individual (and possibly interstate) complaints”.58  
 
However, some authors have dismissed the idea of a world court as “utopian” which “will never 
be realized in practice”.59 Trechsel extensively reviewed the arguments in favour of the 
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establishment of a world court of human rights, but nonetheless concludes that “[r]ealistically 
speaking, the creation of a world court for human rights is, at the present time, neither desirable, 
nor necessary, nor probable.”60 He raised crucial questions regarding the status of the proposed 
world court using three different models, namely, (a) a sibling to the ICJ (“Sibling Model”, (b) a 
court in its own right like the International Criminal Court (“ICC-Model”), and (c) a court as the 
top part of a world-wide judicial pyramid (“Pyramid Model”).61 He also raised valid questions 
regarding the competencies of the court with reference to (a) “ratione personae” (who can apply 
to the court),
62
 (b) “ratione materiae” (what is meant by ‘human right’),63 (c) “ratione loci” (the 
question of locus standi),
64
 and (d) “ratione temporis” (the questing of dealing with ‘continuing 
situation’).65  
 
As previously noted, the draft Statute provides for individual and group complaints, from 
persons claiming to be victims of alleged human right violations. This provision however 
strengthens the argument in favour of the impracticability or utopian nature of the proposed 
court, if the experience of regional human rights courts is anything to go by. For example, the 
European Convention on Human Rights allows individual complaints in respect of alleged 
human rights violations,
66
 and this may have allowed the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) to be overwhelmed with a high volume of applications, such that 151,600 applications 
were pending before the ECHR by the end of 2011 while 128,000 applications were pending at 
the end of 2012.
67
 Allowing individual applications to the proposed world court would most 
certainly overwhelm the court with high volumes of application and essentially defeat the 
essence of the proposed world court. In addition, there are also valid questions regarding the 
ultimate status of the court: would it be an ultimate court of appeal? That is, would an appeal lie 
to the court from the Inter-American Court of Human Right, ECHR or even the International 
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Criminal Court (ICC)? These questions put the desirability and practicability of the court in 
doubt. 
 
While it may be impracticable to establish a world court of human rights, it is very practicable, 
and even much more desirable, to expand the jurisdiction of the present ICJ – so that it can be 
able to entertain human rights enforcement applications brought in a representative capacity on 
behalf of stateless groups like the Rohingyas. This expansion is necessary because only states are 
presently allowed to initiate or defend any action before the ICJ.
68
 Thus, there is presently no 
room for individual or representative complaints before the ICJ, and this limited jurisdiction as to 
parties has resulted in the court making a very limited impact on the development of 
international human rights law jurisprudence.
69
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In order to avoid overwhelming the ICJ with high volumes of applications, potentially much 
more than the regional ECHR currently has to deal with, it is necessary to restrict the proposed 
expanded the jurisdiction of the ICJ to accommodate only representative actions brought on 
behalf of stateless people, and specifically for an alleged violation of their right to nationality. 
Such alleged violation of the right to nationality must be on a wide scale with some racial or 
ethnic undertone, that is, it involves denationalization (or exclusion from nationality) of some 
particular ethnic groups. The action must be brought on behalf of the affected ethnic groups, 
such as the Rohingyas and Bidoons, as a whole so that the issue of their entitlement to the 
nationality of the alleged violator country may be resolved once and for all. As observed above, 
the perception of the protection of the right to nationality as erga omnes obligation allows 
anyone, including other states, to bring this action on behalf of the Rohingyas and Bidoons 
against Burma and Kuwait respectively. 
 
2.2.1 Expansive and Liberal Interpretation of Relevant Instruments 
 
In exercising the proposed expanded jurisdiction, it is necessary for the ICJ to take the right to a 
nationality, as well as the suffering that arise from any failure to respect the right, seriously.  
Drawing from Dworkin, Baxi and Felice above,
70
 taking the rights and suffering of stateless 
people seriously would mean that the ICJ, when faced with the existing previously-discussed 
vague and imprecise provisions of relevant international human rights instruments on the right to 
nationality, will adopt the expansive and liberal method of interpretation adopted by the Indian 
Supreme Court when dealing with enforceability of socio-economic rights (ESRs) under the 
Indian Constitution.
71
 The Indian Constitution enumerates some ESRs in the Directive Principles 
of State Policy
72
 which by the same Constitution “shall not be enforceable by any court”.73 
Arguably, the Constitution prima facie renders the ESRs unenforceable in court. However, an 
examination of some of the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court reveals that the Court, by 
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adopting a broad definition to the right to life under the Constitution, has rendered ESRs 
enforceable in India. One of such cases is the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. The 
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors,
74
 where the Supreme Court held thus:  
 
“But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of 
limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right 
to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, 
namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and 
facilities for reading, writing and expressing one-self in diverse forms, freely moving 
about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.”75 
 
 
The definition of the ‘right to life’ was further extended in the latter case of Olga Tellis & Ors. v. 
Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors,
76
 where the Supreme Court, while considering whether 
forcible eviction of pavement and slum dwellers and removal of their hutments deprives them of 
their means of livelihood and consequently right to life, held thus: 
 
“…the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right 
to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of 
the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely 
that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and 
execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That 
is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to 
livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of 
livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to 
life, the easiest way of depriving a person his right to life would be to deprive him of his 
means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude 
the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to 
live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure 
established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. 
That, which alone makes it possible to live… must be deemed to be an integral 
component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall 
have deprived him of his life.”77 
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In view of the above, it is absolutely necessary for the ICJ to adopt such a liberal attitude in 
respect of the right to nationality in order to give effect to the right to nationality of stateless 
people. 
 
2.2.2 Invoke Principle of Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium 
 
Taking rights and suffering seriously, as well as the adoption of a liberal attitude to 
interpretation, may also necessitate the invocation of the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium 
(“where there is a right, there is a remedy”) in respect of the right to a nationality. As noted 
above, one of the reasons some have advocated for the establishment of a world court of human 
right is to give effect to the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium. It is submitted that the principle 
can still be invoked by virtue of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute which empowers the court to apply 
“the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations” as part of the source of 
international law. This provision allows the court to apply “certain common themes that run 
through many different legal orders”.78 Consequently the court has applied common law and 
equitable principles relating to res judicata,
79
 circumstantial evidence,
80
 estoppel,
81
 amongst 
others.  
 
Although a review of some decisions of international tribunals suggests that the principle of ubi 
jus ibi remedium have not been directly invoked, recognition of this principle may be inferred 
from the Chorz´ow Factory case where the PCIJ declared that “it is a general conception of law 
that every violation of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation”.82 Similarly, in 
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2005 the UN General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
83
 The resolution affirms the ubi jus 
principle in respect of victims of “gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law which, by their very grave nature, constitute an 
affront to human dignity”.84 The foregoing supports the proposition that the ICJ, and in fact any 
court, can validly invoke the ubi jus principle to remedy the otherwise vague and imprecise right 
to nationality, if it takes the suffering of stateless people seriously.   
 
2.3 Pre-emptive Measures 
 
As the title suggests, pre-emptive measures are steps taken to stop statelessness before it 
develops. There have been several attempts at such measure. For example, there is the 
recommendation by the 1949 UN report which states that (a) every child must receive a 
nationality at birth,
85
 and (b) no person should lose his/her nationality unless he/she has acquired 
a new one.
86
 Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child also enjoins states to grant 
nationality at birth to all children born in their territory ‘in particular where the child would 
otherwise be stateless’.87 Similarly under Article 1 of the CRS, contracting States are obliged to 
grant nationality to any person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. 
 
However, as discussed in previous chapters, while the efficacy of Article 7 of the CRC has been 
hampered by vagueness and imprecision of its provisions in failing to provide for which 
nationality the child is entitled to, Article 1 of the CRS has also suffered due to lack of 
ratification by most states. The failure of the above provisions necessitates the adoption of some 
socio-political measures to counter-balance the otherwise legitimate exercise of state 
sovereignty. In line with the above-mentioned erga omnes perception of the protection of the 
right to nationality, any state may take these measures, which may involve diplomatic, economic 
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and other pressures sufficient to ensure that states do not insist on exercising their perceived 
sovereign powers to the detriment of stateless people. 
  
2.4 Naturalizing Measures 
  
While taking steps to prevent future statelessness, it is also necessary to tackle present 
statelessness. As noted in previous chapters, one of the reasons for the conception of the right to 
nationality was to tackle the statelessness of the millions of stateless people in pre-WWII 
Europe. This aim was abandoned in favour of efforts being directed towards preventing future 
statelessness, following the collapse of negotiation on the draft Protocol on Elimination of 
Present Statelessness
88
 which sought to deal with the then existing statelessness. Thus, the right 
to nationality as conceived under the UDHR was supposed to be a means of preventing future 
statelessness in the post-WWII world by its assertion that everyone has a right to be a part of a 
people or to be a member of a state, and that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality. 
 
It seems, however, that the proponents of the right to nationality as a means of preventing future 
statelessness either did not take into account the identity sentiment that is attached to nationality 
at all, or did not fully anticipate it. This sentiment accounts for the existence of more than twelve 
million stateless people around the world today. The fate of these twelve million stateless people 
ought to not be sealed like that of their pre-WWII counterparts who seemed to have been left in 
the lurch following the collapse of debates on the Protocol on Elimination of Present 
Statelessness. Hence the need for the adoption of naturalizing measures. 
 
Naturalizing measures would involve granting nationality via naturalization to (present) stateless 
people. However, citizenship by naturalization carries with it the suggestion that the people were 
otherwise not entitled to it, or that they are otherwise foreigners. The national laws of some 
countries also make differentiation between rights and privileges enjoyed by those who acquired 
citizenship by birth and naturalized citizens. In Burma for example, the citizenship of a 
naturalized citizen may be revoked if he, for example, shows “disaffection or disloyalty to the 
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State by any act or speech”, or gives “information relating to a State secret to any person, or 
commits “an offence involving moral turpitude for which he has been sentenced to imprisonment 
for a minimum term of one year or to a minimum fine of kyats one thousand”.89 Those who 
acquired citizenship by birth would not lose their citizenship in such situations.
90
  Similarly 
under the Kuwaiti nationality law, unlike one who acquires citizenship by birth, naturalized 
citizens do not have the right to vote in any parliamentary elections within 30 years from the date 
of their naturalization.
91
 A naturalized citizen, unlike one who acquires citizenship by birth, may 
also have his/her citizenship revoked:   
 
(a) where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false 
declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such 
person may also be revoked; 
(b) where, within 15 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is convicted of any honour 
related crime or honesty-related crime. In such case, the nationality of the convicted 
person alone may be revoked; 
(c) where, within 10 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is dismissed from public 
office on disciplinary grounds for reasons relating to honour or honesty; 
(d) where the competent authorities have evidence that a naturalized person has disseminated 
opinions which may tend seriously to undermine the economic or social structure of the 
State or that he is a member of a political association of a foreign State. Kuwaiti 
nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be 
revoked.
92
 
  
Although the above differentiations between rights and privileges pertaining to citizenship by 
birth and naturalization in Burma and Kuwait place the Rohingya and Bidoons in disadvantaged 
position in their respective societies, naturalization is nonetheless an effective solution to their 
statelessness. Available evidence suggests that some states have taken this measure in respect of 
their stateless population. For example, the Sri Lankan parliament passed a law which granted 
citizenship to more than 168,000 hitherto stateless Tamils in 2003.
93
 In 2000, the government of 
Indonesia also granted citizenship to about 140,000 stateless ethnic Chinese.
94
 The Kuwaiti 
Parliament has also recently passed a law (2013) which would grant 4000 ‘foreigners’ Kuwaiti 
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citizenship.
95
 Burma is also reportedly considering granting citizenship to ‘third generation’ 
Rohingyas.
96
 
  
While it is much more desirable that such naturalizing measures of the Rohingyas and other 
stateless people should be employed by their respective states, with which they have genuine and 
effective links, other states may also step in and grant these stateless people citizenship.      
 
2.5 An Independent ‘Homeland’ (state) for the Rohingyas? 
 
As noted in chapter one, the Rohingyas face the unique scenario of being rejected on all sides, 
that is, by both Burma and neighboring Bangladesh at the same time. Their situation is not 
dissimilar to the travails of millions of German Jews in Europe and other places in the 1940s. 
There are at least three basic similarities between the situation of German Jews in the 1940s and 
the present-day Rohingyas: (a) just as the German Jews were rendered stateless as a result of 
their denationalization by the Nazis, the Rohingyas are stateless as a result of Burmese 
Citizenship Law of 1982, (b) like the German Jews who faced various forms of persecution as a 
result of the anti-Semitic policies of the Nazis, the Rohingyas face persecution from their mainly 
Buddhist neighbours, and (c) just as the Nazis planned to deport the Jews of Europe to 
Madagascar, then a French island colony off the southeast coast of Africa as a solution to the 
infamous “Jewish question”,97 the Burmese government have proposed sending the Rohingyas to 
a “third country” as “the solution” to ethnic clashes between the Muslims Rohingyas and their 
                                                 
95
 See pages 20 – 21 above. 
96
 See Dean Nelson, “Burma considers citizenship for Rohingya Muslims” The Telegraph, 12 
November 2012, online: Telegraph Media Group 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/9648329/Burma-considers-
citizenship-for-Rohingya-Muslims.html>. 
97
 For further details on the Nazi’s so-called “Madagascar Plan” see Christopher R Browning, 
The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – 
March 1942 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2004), 36-89; David Cesarani, The Jewish Chronicle and 
Anglo-Jewry: 1841–1991 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 158-165;  
Mark Avrum Ehrlich, Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora: Origins, Experiences, and Culture, 
Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 452; Richard J Evans, The Third Reich at War 
(New York: Penguin, 2008). 
154 
 
mainly Buddhist neighbors.
98
  In addition, as discussed in chapter four, the various township 
meetings held by Buddhist monks representing the sangha in Rathedaung Township between 
July and September 2012, have set out plans for “‘Arakan Ethnic Cleansing Program’ of bad 
pagan [Rohingyas]”.99 The foregoing raise genuine fears as to whether history is about to repeat 
itself. 
 
Although the Holocaust played a major role in the establishment of the modern state of Israel in 
1948, there is no doubt that the establishment of modern Israel gave opportunity to millions of 
stateless Jews to become citizens of an organized political community. As Arendt succinctly puts 
it, the establishment of Israel was a “restoration of human rights” for the hitherto stateless and 
rightless European Jews.
100
 The creation of modern Israel, as well as the recent creation of 
present ‘independent’ Kosovo as a fallout of the Bosnia ‘genocide’, suggests that creation of 
homelands is a viable means protecting otherwise persecuted minority population like the 
Rohingyas. 
 
In the above premise, creation of a homeland (independent state) for the Rohingyas would be a 
very effective means of solving their statelessness. However, it is necessary to acknowledge a 
major challenge inherent in this proposal, namely, states traditionally guard their territorial 
integrity jealously. This raises the question of which state will cede its territory for the creation 
of an independent homeland for the Rohingyas, since there is hardly any terra nullius. The 
challenge is however not insurmountable if there is a collective will on the part of the 
international community address this issue. 
 
2.6  Diplomatic and other Pressures on Erring States 
 
Another collective measure which may be undertaken by the international community is to exert 
diplomatic and other pressures on countries, like Burma and Kuwait, to repeal or amend 
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denationalizing legislations, and/or sign up to the relevant international instruments or withdraw 
their reservations.  
 
As already noted, Burma is not a party to most of the relevant international instruments while 
Kuwait has entered reservations to the operative provisions of most relevant international 
instruments. The recent events in Syria, that is the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian 
regime in late August 2013, and its aftermath, may serve as a model for the Rohingyas and 
Burma. Like Burma, Syria was not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, but this did not 
make any difference as Syria was generally regarded to be in breach of international law, and in 
fact there was no question regarding its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention 
even though it was not a party.  
 
Thus, just as Syria was unable to escape international condemnation under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, Burma should also be held accountable for its failure to respect the right 
to nationality of the Rohingyas under the various international instruments. Again, the successful 
pressure on the Syria regime that made it ratify the Chemical Weapons Conventions and agreed 
to give up its chemical arsenal may also be very good model for Burma and Kuwait. 
 
2.7 Minimization/Reduction Measures 
 
While steps are being taken to eliminate statelessness, minimization or reduction measures seek 
to reduce the harsh effects of statelessness by allowing stateless people to enjoy some of the 
rights ordinarily available only to citizens.
101
 Such measures include, for example, issuing 
identity papers to any stateless person who does not possess a valid travel document, or allowing 
them access to education, gainful employment, right to own properties, etc. This was the main 
objective of the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Person (CSSP), but as noted in 
previous chapters, very few countries have ratified this convention.  
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As observed by Weissbrodt, such measures “should never been seen as replacement” for 
measures aimed at eliminating statelessness altogether.
102
 They are nonetheless very useful in 
alleviating the “difficulties of statelessness”.103 Whilst it is also desirable that such measures 
should be employed by states with which the stateless persons have genuine effective links, other 
states can also take alleviating steps as well. An example of such steps would be to do as Canada 
has done from 2007 to 2010, when it became the first, and so far the only, country to allow 
Rohingya refugees to settle in Canada.
104
 However, the resettlement process stopped since 
November 2010 following the Bangladeshi government’s refusal to issue travel documents to the 
stateless Rohingya refugees in various camps in Bangladesh.
105
  
 
The refusal of the Bangladeshi government to issue travel documents to the stateless Rohingyas 
highlights one of the major problems of stateless persons: absence of valid travel documents. 
Article 28 of the CSSP was supposed to deal with this problem and it obliges states parties to 
issue travel documents, generally known as Convention Travel Document (CTD), to stateless 
persons who are lawfully staying in their state. The CTD is designed to function in lieu of a 
passport and may also entitle the holder to re-enter the issuing state.
106
 However, as previously 
noted, very few states are parties to this convention and, more importantly, it applies only to 
stateless persons lawfully in the territory of contracting states – whereas a large majority of 
stateless people are illegal refugees wherever they are.   
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The “world” passports issued by the World Service Authority (WSA) founded by Gary Davies 
maybe also useful in this regard.
107
 As noted in chapter two, the “world” passport is the “official 
travel document” issued to “citizens of the world” who, like stateless people, generally do not 
come under the protection of any state, albeit as a result of their deliberate act of renouncing their 
citizenships without acquiring another.
108
 The WSA has so far reportedly issued 2,500,000 
“world passports” and over 180 countries have reportedly accepted the world passport at one 
time or another.
109
 Stateless persons could be allowed to use this document as official travel 
documents. 
 
2.8 The Role of the Media 
 
As observed by a UNESCO Declaration on the media,
110
 the “mass media throughout  
the world, by reason of their role, contribute to promoting human rights, in particular by giving 
expression to oppressed peoples who struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign 
occupation and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make 
their voices heard within their own territories”.111 Thus, the media plays a very important role in 
promoting human rights; it not only helps to expose human rights abuses, it also shapes public 
opinion in respect of the abuses.
112
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In relation to the right to nationality of stateless people like the Rohingyas, Bidoons and Non-
citizens of Latvia, the role of the media has been fairly limited. As seen in chapter one, the 
Rohingyas gained (mainstream) media attention as a result of the “Rohingya boat people” 
incidence.
113
 This media attention, as seen in chapter three, is yielding encouraging signs such 
that subsequent UNGA Resolutions on Burma now make specific reference to the Rohingyas and 
their nationality travails.
114
  However, the Bidoons and Non-citizens of Latvia have not attracted 
much mainstream attention and this has made their sufferings less known to the international 
community. 
 
A change in perception of nationality will put media reports of the travails of stateless people in 
proper perspective, namely as a violation of human right to nationality. This is because the 
emphasis of most of the media reports on the Rohingyas has been on the treatment they receive 
as “refugees”, for example, the horrific treatment melted out on them by Thai Navy, rather than 
on their statelessness. In other words, the media tend to underplay or underestimate the impact of 
their statelessness on travails, whereas as seen in previous chapters, their statelessness is the root 
cause of their sufferings.  
 
 
2.9 The Role of Individuals/ Scholars 
 
Individuals, especially legal scholars, have roles to play in the fight against statelessness, which 
has unfortunately attracted limited scholarly attention. It is not unusual to pick a book on 
“International Human Rights Law” and find out that the book does not make any reference to 
“right to nationality”.115 This is either because most scholars take nationality for granted or sub 
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silentio do not see it as a human right. However, the importance of nationality requires everyone, 
including legal scholars, rights activists, and NGOs, to take the right to nationality seriously. 
Taking the right seriously requires, amongst others, frequent public and other interactive forums 
to discuss the right to nationality, as well as highlighting the undesirable and harsh effects of 
statelessness. 
 
It has been said that “someone who, by acquiring medical training, comes to understand the 
human body acquires as well a moral duty not just to observe disease, but to try to cure it.”116 In 
the same way, one can also say that everyone who acquires knowledge of the sufferings 
associated with statelessness acquires a duty not simply to observe or empathize with their 
sufferings but also to try to be part of the solution. In this quest for solution, everyone’s effort 
counts. In the words of Robert Kennedy, quoted by Professor Koh – to stress the need for 
individual efforts in the enforcement of international human rights law: 
 
Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out 
against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a 
million different centers of energy and daring, those ripples build a current that can 
sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance.
117
 
 
As Koh rightly points out, everyone has a role to play in the enforcement of human rights 
generally and specifically the right to nationality of stateless people. The roles range from talking 
or writing about right to nationality, to lobbying local politicians to enact requisite legislation 
and/or exert necessary pressures on countries like Burma and Kuwait to respect the right of the 
Rohingyas and Bidoons respectively.    
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3.0 CONCLUSION 
 
Like most other human problems, statelessness can be eradicated if there is a WILL on the part 
of the international community to do so. It may not be solved by waving a ‘right to nationality” 
like a magic wand without a corresponding WILL to ensure that states respect the right. Unlike 
most other rights, which “99 per cent of the time I can fully respect… simply by ignoring 
you,”118 the right to nationality denotes acceptance of the right bearer as being a “part of us” and 
allowing the right bearer to enjoy all the rights and privileges associated with it. It is the failure 
or refusal to accept the stateless Rohingyas, Bidoons and “Non-citizens” as “part of us” in their 
respective countries that has been the stumbling block to the enforcement or respect of their right 
to nationality.  
 
In order to effectively tackle the rejection of stateless people as part of their respective countries, 
a robust collaborative approach is necessary. The starting point, as noted above, is a re-
conceptualization of statelessness, that is, seeing statelessness simply as a violation of human 
right to nationality, and then taking the right and suffering associated therewith seriously.  
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